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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores (i) the effect of copyright on the reuse of prior works, (ii)
the economic effects of reuse upon the original work, (iii) the impact of litigation and
copyright assertions on patterns of reuse, and (iv) the effect of the expiry of copyright
on the availability and supply of music through differing models of distribution. As
a setting to explore these questions, I focus on the popular music industry and the
phenomena of “digital sampling,” where prior sound recordings are reused to create
a new musical arrangement. This setting allows one to empirically track the use and
reuse of information goods over time in a process of cumulative creativity, where new
works of authorship build upon past works.
The statistical results of this dissertation imply that copyright policy has con-
strained cumulative creativity, even while reuse in this setting does not appear to
cause economic harm upon original works, as reusing works do not empirically sub-
stitute for the originals upon which they are based. Rights assertions by copyright
aggregators, however, does not appear to stifle reuse when the portfolios of rights
aggregators are compared to other similar songs. The last set of results focus on
v
copyright’s reuse through the re-releases of music, demonstrating that copyright ex-
piration causes a dramatic increase in the supply of music, but these restrictions
imposed by copyright appear to be mediated by new models for digital distribution
of content and associated blanket licensing practices.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A Brief Introduction to Copyright
The Statute of Anne, or the Copyright Act of 1710, provided the first statutory grant
of copyright protection by a government. Prior to this act by the Parliament of
Great Britain, a private copyright system was practiced by the Stationers’ Company,
which exercised a monopoly on the production of books in exchange for abiding by
Parliament’s censorship. Expiration of censorship laws in 1679 led to a push by the
stationers to enact a new system of licensing and property rights, with Parliament
ultimately accepting a regime that recognized the property right of authors and their
incentives to create. The statute provided authors of literary works with the exclusive
right to produce copies for a renewable 14 year term. Copyright systems have evolved
considerably since the 18th century in terms of the duration of rights granted, the
types of exclusive rights granted, the copyrightable subject matter, and the statutory
exceptions to the limited monopoly granted by copyright.
The copyright law of the United States, a major focus of this dissertation, was
undoubtedly influenced by the Statute of Anne, but is authorized by the Copyright
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 8)
provides the United States Congress with the power “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” This clause serves as
the authorization for both U.S. patent and copyright law, but these two intellec-
2tual property (IP) regimes diverge substantially along the typical dimensions of IP
protection: height, width, and length (Varian, 2005).
Copyright policy in the United States rewards authors and artists with exclusive
rights to exploit their creative works for a set duration of time. The length of copy-
right protection has significantly grown since the early copyright systems of the 18th
century. With the most recent U.S. Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, copyright
protection for a work persists for 70 years past the author’s death, or up to 120 years
of protection for works made for hire.1 Some economists have argued that the ex-
tended duration of copyrights, now extending for decades after an artist’s death, has
little effect on the incentives to create new works (Akerlof et al., 2003). Chapter 5
of this dissertation focuses upon the role of copyright protection and term extensions
upon the supply and availability of music.
The width of IP rights defines the breadth of protection that the property right
grants. Copyright protects only the expressions of ideas, and does not grant cre-
ators with any property right to an underlying idea – known as the expression-idea
dichotomy. While such a dichotomy may initially appear straightforward, the width
of copyrights is complicated by notions of “substantial similarity,” the concept and
rights to derivative works, as well as the “fair use” doctrine of U.S. copyright law. The
role of copyright’s width in cumulative innovation is a major focus for the subsequent
chapters of this dissertation.
Height refers to the standard of novelty required for a new work to receive IP
protection. For copyright protection, the height is quite low, as essentially any ex-
pression that falls under the copyrightable subject matter of 17 U.S. Code § 102 will
receive protection, conditional on fixation in a medium. Despite this, works that build
upon past works (i.e., cumulative creativity) are at risk of infringing the reproduction
right and derivative work right of prior copyrights. But unlike the patent system, the
1For comparison, U.S. patents currently grant a term length of up to 20 years.
3creator of an expressive work bears no responsibility to apply for a copyright in order
to receive protection.
According to 17 U.S. Code § 102, copyright protection extends to original works
of authorship in the following subjects: (1) literary works, (2) musical works, (3)
dramatic works, (4) pantomimes and choreographic works, (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works, (6) motion pictures and audiovisual works, (7) sound recordings,
and (8) architectural works. The creator of an original work in any copyrightable
subject matter is granted six exclusive rights under 17 U.S. Code § 106: (1) the right
to reproduce, (2) the right to prepare derivative works of the work, (3) the right to
distribute copies, (4) the right to perform the work publicly, (5) the right the display
the work publicly, and (6) for sound recordings, the right to perform the work via
digital audio transmission. The subsequent chapters of this dissertation consider the
role of copyright policy on the re-use of sound recordings and musical works.
1.2 Copyright’s Trade-offs
The design of well-functioning intellectual property systems must generally balance
three effects: (1) the effect of the limited monopoly afforded by IPR on incentives to
innovate, (2) the deadweight loss of this monopoly, and (3) the restrictions that prior
IPR place on creators of subsequent innovations. The economic incentives created by
a copyright system are straightforward. As a reward for creating an original work of
authorship, a creator is granted the ability to exclude others from practicing the six
enumerated rights described in the previous section. This creates a profit incentive
for the creator, as absent copyright the market for the creator’s work would be at
risk of competition from near-perfect substitutes in the form of pirated copies. The
ability of IPR to stimulate innovation through economic incentives was undoubtedly
internalized by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, as the aforementioned Copyright
4Clause directly authorizes Congress to create property rights in order to “promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
Empirical research suggests that the implementation of copyright systems gener-
ally achieves this goal of incentivizing innovation. Giorcelli and Moser (2016) explores
the implementation of copyright systems across eight Italian states and its effect on
the creation of operas in those states between 1770 and 1900. The empirical estimates
of Giorcelli and Moser (2016) imply that the adoption of a copyright system by an
Italian state led to a significant increase in the quantity and quality of operas, with
an approximately five-fold increase in the creation of popular operas and a ten-fold
increase in the creation of durable operas.2 However, with regards to the duration of
copyrights, Giorcelli and Moser (2016) find no benefits in their setting for copyright
term extensions beyond the life of the creator.
Despite copyright’s ability to incentivize innovation, it may also impose costs and
restrictions on subsequent innovations. That is, copyright may inhibit cumulative
creativity in which new works of authorship build upon past works. The potential for
intellectual property rights to hinder the flow of knowledge and cumulative innova-
tion is a central focus to innovation research in the patent space. Studies on patents
and cumulative innovation have generally found that IPR impedes follow-on innova-
tion, but that this effect is heterogeneous across industries (Murray and Stern, 2007;
Williams, 2013; Galasso and Schankerman, 2014). In comparison, copyright’s role
in cumulative creativity has not been so extensively explored. I expect that there
are two primary reasons for the dearth of research in this space. First, empirical
data on copyright is difficult to collect and difficult to work with. Unlike patents
and academic research, there are no ready-to-use datasets that record the creation
of new copyrighted works, along with citations to the previous works that they build
upon. Second, researchers may consider copyright protection as narrowly defined and
2Durable operas being those operas available on Amazon.com as of 2014.
5unlikely to hinder subsequent creativity. Such a view may ignore the potential for
new works of authorship to incorporate prior copyrighted works and pieces thereof.
Additionally, throughout history, authors and artists have appropriated and borrowed
from the works of past creators. A contribution of this dissertation is to present a
new source of data for studying copyright’s role in cumulative creativity.
Formal intellectual property rights may impose a number of costs upon subsequent
innovations. In copyright, there are two forms that these costs take, licensing costs
and transaction costs. With licensing costs, I refer to the costs of licensing a copyright
priced according to a licensing agreement between a rightsholder and licensee. Obvi-
ously, the presence of formal IPR increases the costs of a license, as absent a system
of IPR, the potential licensee could forgo paying a royalty to the work’s creator and
reproduce it at will (i.e., piracy). However, in the presence of IPR, there are situa-
tions in which the price of a license may reach inefficient levels. An example of this
being multiple marginalization, wherein upstream rightsholders exert market power
and price their licenses without internalizing the pricing of complementary inputs
(Cournot, 1838; Lemley and Shapiro, 2007). This situation may exist in licensing
sound recordings, where a license for use must be negotiated with both the owner
of the sound recording, as well as the owner of the musical composition (i.e., double
marginalization). As another example, the multiple marginalization issue may persist
when attempting to obtain licenses to use a complete set of works (e.g., an exhaustive
compilation of a set of works). This issue, along with holdup, is explored further in
Chapter 2.
A system of copyrights also induces a number of transaction costs for follow-on
innovation. First, creators under a copyright regime bear search costs in determining
what rights, if any, are owned by past creators. These search costs are amplified by two
features of the U.S. copyright system, (1) the lack of registration requirements and (2)
6the long duration of copyrights. In the U.S., no registration with the U.S. Copyright
Office is required for a creator to enjoy the benefits of copyright protection. The lack
an exhaustive registration system can make the appropriate rightsholder costly to
locate, further complicated by the buying, selling, and assignment of copyrights by
their original creator. The long duration of copyrights adds to the “orphan works,”
phenomenon, wherein the owner of a copyright may not be located. With copyrights
extending for decades past the death of the creator, it may be difficult to locate
the current owner, even if those rights were never sold. Private collective rights
organizations (CROs) have been formed to remedy these issues, among others. As an
example of a type of CRO, music performance rights organizations (PROs), such as
ASCAP and BMI, maintain a registry of songs, associated songwriters, and a song’s
current publishers. PROs sell licenses for their entire portfolio of song to businesses
that wish to perform music publicly.
Strong property rights over creative works may also create holdup problems. Un-
der ex post licensing, in the vein of Scotchmer and Green (1995), follow-on creators
may face insufficient incentives to innovate due to an inability to negotiate over cre-
ation costs. This situation arises when follow-on creators sink a relationship-specific
investment with a copyright holder before a license may be negotiated. As an exam-
ple, a follow-on creator may bear creation costs specific to a prior copyright’s owner
in creating a new work of authorship based upon the rightsholder’s works.
For an IPR system to protect creators’ property rights, rightsholders must possess
a means to remedy unauthorized uses and infringement. U.S. Code § 501 authorizes
the owner of a copyright to litigate their property rights against infringing uses,
with an option to seek statutory or actual damages from infringement. Incentives
for rightsholders to litigate their copyrights may increase the costs to innovate for
follow-on creators. These issues are developed further and explored empirically in
7Chapter 4.
The previously described economic trade-offs in the design of an efficient copyright
system are further complicated by notions of moral rights. A moral regime of copy-
rights, distinct from the economic incentive motivation of the U.S. Copyright Clause,
argues that creators of copyrightable works possess inalienable moral and personal
rights to their works. The statutory protection of moral rights has historically been a
distinctive feature of Continental European copyright systems compared to the lack
of these rights in Anglo-American regimes.3 The traditional moral rights in copyright
have included the right to attribution, the right to control the integrity of the work,
the right of disclosure, and the right to withdraw a work after publication (Riga-
monti, 2006). While these rights have received little traction in the development of
U.S. copyright policy, copyright owners in the U.S. do obtain a general right to control
the derivatives of their work, similar to a moral right to a work’s integrity.4 Though
not the focus of this dissertation, the phenomena of sampling and re-use focused upon
in Chapters 2,3, and 4 could certainly be argued as infringing upon an artist’s right
to integrity. Instead, this dissertation focuses upon the economic rights.
1.3 Copyright’s Economic Significance
Over the last two decades, the creative content industries have experienced a dramatic
shift in the production, distribution, and consumption of copyrighted products. Digi-
tization and the internet have all but nullified the costs of reproducing and distributing
information goods. By enabling widespread digital piracy, these changes have effec-
tively weakened copyright’s power to exclude unauthorized use, leading to concern
and debate over the extent by which this piracy displaces sales and revenues (Rob
3These moral rights of Continental Europe has been attributed to the legal systems of France
and Germany (Rigamonti, 2006).
4The Visual Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A, does however grant several moral rights to
creators of certain visual arts.
8and Waldfogel, 2006; Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2007). Just as digitization has
seemingly weakened copyright, it has also lowered the costs of producing information
goods (Waldfogel, 2012), and opened new channels and models of distribution.5 Dig-
itization has dramatically improved consumers’ access to creative content, especially
recorded music, acting against copyright’s restrictions over supply – this trade-off is
explored further in Chapter 5.
Despite the decline in revenues at the start of the 21st century, music industry
revenues are once again rising due to growth in digital streaming revenues.6. Globally,
the creative content industries, which rely on copyright’s exclusion to varying degree,
now generate over $2.25 billion in revenue annually.7 With the economic significance
of copyright-related industries, the potential for copyright to incentivize creative in-
vestment, but also its potential to distort cumulative creativity, a deeper examination
of copyright policy is justified.
1.4 This Dissertation
This dissertation proceeds with four body chapters and concludes with a brief conclu-
sion and discussion of implications. In the next chapter, Chapter 2, I utilize federal
court decisions that restricted re-use to study copyright’s effect on cumulative cre-
ativity and the content of new products. With a dataset that tracks re-use through
“digital sampling,” I find that sampling, wherein new works build upon existing sound
recordings, significantly decreased following a 1991 decision strengthening rights for
the original rightsholder. However, the propensity of a song to contain samples did
5For example, with the now widespread use of subscription digital streaming platforms.
6According to the RIAA’s 2017 music industry revenue report, available at http://www.
riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/RIAA-Year-End-2017-News-and-Notes.pdf. (Ac-
cessed 5/10/2018)
7For perspective, global telecom service revenue was estimated at $1.57 billion annually in
the same report by EY, available at https://en.unesco.org/creativity/sites/creativity/
files/cultural_times._the_first_global_map_of_cultural_and_creative_industries.pdf
(Accessed 5/10/2018)
9not decrease after the decision, with the effect coming from the intensive margin.
Additionally, this policy change affected the creativity of new works by limiting the
diversity of music re-used in new products.
In Chapter 3, I combine disaggregated streaming data from Spotify with sampling
data to study the demand spillovers from re-use. Specifically, I study how the intro-
duction of a derivative work impacts the market for the underlying good upon which it
is based. With my data-set covering 11,682 artists and their daily streaming demand
between 2015 and 2016, I utilize a matched-sample difference-in-differences estimator
to find that, on average, re-using works do not substitute for the original work, and
may in fact boost demand for the re-used artist. This effect is significantly mediated
by prominence of the re-used artist – with the positive effect neutralized for highly
prominent artists, while artists of low prominence have a larger boost in listening.
On the other hand, re-use downstream by popular artists significantly increases the
baseline boost in listening to the original artist. Novel re-uses of artists that have not
been subject to extensive past re-use appear to have the largest effect. These results
highlight an advertising effect of re-use, suggest that derivative works have limited
ex post competition with upstream works, and point toward the potential benefits of
permissive intellectual property rights licensing.
Chapter 4, co-authored with Timothy Simcoe, examines copyright litigation and
its effects on the exploitation of rights. Specifically, we estimate the effects of copy-
right acquisition and assertion by firms that aggregate the rights of popularly sampled
songs. Our ability to track the sampling of a song over time allows us to distinguish
between IP rights aggregators role as intermediaries, versus their assertions and liti-
gation having a net negative effect on the exploitation of the rights they own. While
it first appears in an unmatched sample that the actions of these rights aggregators
have a negative effect on the re-use of a work, once we carefully match the songs ac-
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quired by aggregators to other popular songs, this negative effect disappears. While
it may be the case that these asserting entities do impose a negative effect on re-use,
it is not apparent compared to the patterns of re-use for other popular songs.
Chapter 5, coauthored with Megan MacGarvie and John McKeon, examines the
effect of the expiry of recording copyright on the supply of music – in the form of
re-releases, availability on streaming platforms, and concert performances – by artists
popular in the UK in the 1960s. The duration of recording copyright in the UK was
extended from 50 to 70 years in 2013, implying that copyrights on recordings made
in the late fifties and early sixties are no longer in force, while songs recorded a few
years later remain under copyright protection. With a sample of 13,238 tracks first
released between 1928 and 1975, we find that the expiry of recording copyright is as-
sociated with an approximately 141-247% increase in the number of re-releases, while
controlling for artist, age and year fixed effects. Results on availability on the Spotify
streaming music platform tell a different story: there is no significant difference in
the availability of tracks recorded before 1963 in the UK where their recording copy-
rights have expired, compared to the US where their recording copyrights are still in
force. However, when a tracks original recording copyright expires, it becomes less
likely to be performed in concert, particularly by UK-focused artists. These results
suggest that copyright term extensions may lead to fewer re-releases but more live
performances of popular music first recorded approximately fifty years ago. They
also point towards substantial heterogeneity in the effects of copyright on availability
of cultural products across different distribution channels, and raise the question of
whether the digital platform distribution model may moderate the negative effects of
long copyright terms on availability.
Finally, Chapter 6 provides some concluding remarks and implications to this
dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Copyright and the Production of Hip-Hop
Music
2.1 Introduction
In recent decades, digital technologies have lowered production costs in creative con-
tent industries, especially music, and new digital channels for distributing content
have emerged. Technological progress has contributed to the development of new
styles and genres within the music industry, such as the advent of the digital sam-
pler and the emergence of hip-hop music. New production technologies, such as the
aforementioned digital sampling devices and more recent digital audio workstations
(DAW), decrease the costs of re-use in creating new works that build off past works.
However, the intellectual property rights regime may be at odds with the direction
afforded by such advances in technology.
Music, like most forms of art, relies and builds upon the existence and ideas
expressed in previous works. However, copyright, which protects specific rights asso-
ciated with the creation of original works, imposes limits upon the ability of artists
to re-use prior work in new contexts. The apparent strengthening of copyright over
time has been of growing concern in the music industry, as even absent direct re-use,
courts may find creators of new works to be infringing the rights of an older vintage.
The recent jury decision that Robin Thicke’s single “Blurred Lines” infringed the
rights of Marvin Gaye’s “Got To Give It Up” exemplifies this restriction over re-use,
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despite any direct copying, as does the less recent decision that George Harrison, in
writing “My Sweet Lord,” subconsciously plagiarized a work by Ronnie Mack.1 While
intellectual property rights regimes must weigh the moral rights for ownership as well
as the economic incentives faced by potential innovators, concerns over the strength
of granted rights are especially relevant when innovation is cumulative. As discussed
in Scotchmer (1991) and Scotchmer and Green (1995), while downstream creators
in a cumulative innovation context may bargain with inventors to license upstream
rights for re-use, downstream incentives can often be deficient in a regime of strong,
restrictive property rights. In contrast to the literature on cumulative innovation
in patent-intensive industries (see e.g., Williams (2013); Galasso and Schankerman
(2014)), there is very little evidence on copyright’s effect upon innovation and cre-
ativity when it is cumulative.
This paper uses a novel dataset on a form of explicit re-use in popular music –
known as digital sampling – to estimate the effect of U.S. copyright court decisions
on sampling practices and cumulative creativity in the music industry. By comparing
sampling trends before and after precedent-setting court decisions that restricted
re-use, I find that the decision in Grand Upright v. Warner Brothers Records led
to a mean drop of between 0.3 and 0.45 songs re-used in each new hip-hop track.
Provocative results demonstrate that the 1991 Grand Upright decision also affected
the creativity of new products, with fewer “novel” samples being used in the industry,
while re-use of samples from songs that had previously been sampled became more
common. I examine two sampling-related court decisions and find that only the first
decision had a meaningful impact on the content of new products and the direction
of re-use. Despite the large magnitude of the estimated decline in sampling, results
are driven by changes along the intensive margin; there is no significant change in the
1See Pharrell Williams et al v. Bridgeport Music Inc et al, Docket No. 2:13-cv-06004 (C.D. Cal.
Aug 15, 2013) and Bright Tunes Music v. Harrisongs Music 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
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propensity to use samples in a given song. Furthermore, I find that the magnitude of
this decline was greater for more prominent artists.
2.1.1 Digital Sampling
While many genres of contemporary music may incorporate some form of “sampling,”
hip-hop music in particular began with a focus on sampling fragments of existing
sound recordings to create new works.2 The roots of modern sampling practices in
popular music can be traced back to disc jockeys (DJs) manipulating vinyl records via
turntables and crossfaders, using such equipment, DJs could loop over interesting seg-
ments of a song, or isolate particular instrumentals, such as the drum “break.” These
techniques extended beyond just replaying parts of the song in a recognizable manner
– DJs can manipulate the playback of the record using techniques like “scratching” to
create sound effects that are almost unrecognizable compared to the original record-
ing. While such techniques were useful for live performances, the advent of digital
sampling devices in the 1980s significantly enhanced producers’ flexibility in record-
ing new, sample-based music. By allowing artists to store, loop over, and sequence
samples, the digital sampler helped transform hip-hop into a recorded, commercially-
relevant art form.
Musicians that incorporate sampling may view the technique as more than routine
appropriation or theft of an original sound recording, but the use of samples runs
the risk of infringing at least two rights associated with the sampled work: (1) the
copyright of the sound recording, and (2) the copyright of the underlying composition.
While early hip-hop musicians up to late-1991 utilized unlicensed samples in a legal
gray area (see discussion in McLeod and DiCola (2011)), federal copyright cases since
1991 have set precedent and highlighted the risk of infringement that comes with
2Sampling is defined in this paper as the re-use of a portion of an existing sound recordinbg or
musical composition in a new song or recording
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unlicensed sampling.
A recent theoretical literature has emerged that focuses on models of sampling,
(or “remixing”) wherein a downstream sampler bargains with an upstream creator
whose original work is repurposed by the downstream agent (DiCola, 2010; Gans,
2015). While such literature is useful in considering the incentive constraints faced
by upstream and downstream creators in alternative copyright policy scenarios, this
paper builds upon these theoretical papers by providing the first quantitative evidence
of how sampling and re-use is affected as copyright policy has effectively grown more
restrictive.
2.1.2 Federal Copyright Decisions on Sampling
Grand Upright v. Warner Brothers Records
While there have been many copyright lawsuits over sampling, with the first notable
case regarding the Beastie Boys’ 1986 album License to Ill, many of these cases were
settled out of court and hence provided no public precedent to set the contours of
copyright policy with respect to sampling. The first case on sampling to be settled
via court decision was Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F.
Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y 1991) (henceforth Grand Upright). This case concerned the rap
artist Biz Markie’s use of a sample from a Gilbert O’Sullivan recording on Markies
album “I Need a Haircut.” Judge Kevin Duffy, in ruling in favor of the plaintiff,
Grand Upright Music, granted an injunction against the defendant, with whom Biz
Markie was under contract. In his opinion, Duffy stated “Thou shalt not steal,”
essentially equivocating the digital sampling of music with theft. While the ruling
did not provide an in-depth analysis of copyright law with respect to sampling, the
infringement ruling highlighted the risk of sampling in the music industry. Prior
to Grand Upright sampling in hip-hop had been likened to lawlessness in the Old
West, as by Eothen Alapatt of Stones Throw Records: “it was a kind of Wild, Wild
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West situation where no one really knew the legalities. Everyone was just doing it.”3
By strengthening the breadth (or perceived breadth) of copyright in this respect,
the ruling may have affected future sampling practices in the recording industry, a
conclusion supported by interviews with industry participants found in McLeod and
DiCola (2011). For example, McLeod and DiCola, in quoting entertainment lawyer
Whitney Broussard, “For many years after ... they [Warner Bros.] wouldn’t let you
release anything that wasn’t licensed. They had a sample committee that would listen
to records to see if they could find undisclosed samples. So, they take that pretty
seriously.” McLeod and Dicola additionally argue that out-of-court settlements for
infringement likely increased after 1991, as a successful defense appeared unlikely
after the broad ruling by Judge Duffy. Faced with the outcome of Grand Upright,
record producers may either attempt to use unlicensed samples in their music and
risk costly infringement claims based on this precedent, or pay lawyers to track down
rights holders and bargain over a license to incorporate samples in their work.
Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films
The second case of interest for this paper, that also set controversial precedent re-
stricting the use of sampling, was Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410
F. 3d 792 (6th Circuit 2005) (henceforth Bridgeport Music). This case, brought by
the apparent rights holder for Funkadelic’s “Get Off Your Ass and Jam,” concerned
the unauthorized usage of a three-note guitar sound from the Funkadelic recording in
N.W.A.’s track “100 Miles and Runnin.” The opinion of the 6th circuit determined
that a de minimis defense against infringement did not apply to sound recordings.
The court ruled in its opinion, “Get a license or do not sample. We do not see
this as stifling creativity in any significant way.” Again, this case anecdotally had a
large effect on the advice given by lawyers practicing in the industry, as evidenced
3As reported in McLeod and DiCola (2011)
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by McLeod and DiCola (2011) quoting one music lawyer “I would advise my clients
before Bridgeport if they used a little snippet of a recording that was de minimis,
’That’s fine; we dont have to clear it,’ ” whereas according to another lawyer post
Bridgeport Music “they probably got even more conservative about clearing stuff.
Basically, it said that even if you can’t hear a sample of the sound recording, you still
have to clear it.”
The remainder of the paper provides a brief review of prior research related to this
study (Section 2), examines copyright’s expected effects on re-use (Section 3), explains
the empirical framework, data, and identification strategy (Section 4), presents the
empirical results (Section 5), and finally concluding remarks (Section 6).
2.2 Literature Review
The main contribution of this paper uncovers how the breadth of copyright policy
shapes follow-on innovation in new products. Of particular relevance, this paper
explores how copyright may contribute to hold-up when innovation is cumulative, and
is one of the first papers to examine how copyright policy and digitization affect the
content of new goods. While economists have been specifically interested in copyright
for some time now (see e.g., Landes and Posner (1989)), the economic literature on
copyright is relatively sparse compared to the range of intellectual property literature
regarding patents. Much of the recent empirical work on copyright is motivated
by the development of file-sharing and peer-to-peer technologies, focusing on the
extent to which file-sharing did or did not displace legitimate record sales (Liebowitz,
2008; Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2007; OberholzerGee and Strumpf, 2010; Rob and
Waldfogel, 2006). Another major stream of recent empirical work on copyright focuses
on the effect of copyright’s duration and implementation on creators’ incentives and
the supply of new creative goods (Hui and Png, 2002; Png and Wang, 2006; Kim,
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2011; Li et al., 2018; Giorcelli and Moser, 2016).
From a broad perspective, this paper contributes to our understanding of the
effects of intellectual property policy on innovation, where most work has focused
on the patent system and academic research (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Kortum
and Lerner, 1999; Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001; Qian, 2007; Williams, 2013).
This paper is similar in nature to Hall and MacGarvie (2010), which investigates
the effect of federal court decisions on the scope of software patents. This paper, to
my knowledge, is the first research to study how copyright policy affects the content
of new products, and one of the first to examine copyright policy in a cumulative
context.
Closely related work by Nagaraj (2017) has studied digitization and copyright in a
cumulative innovation context, utilizing a natural experiment with the Google Books
project to estimate the negative impact of copyright on re-use of the Baseball Digest
magazine in Wikipedia articles. However, Nagaraj (2017) focuses on upstream works
that have fallen into the public domain, whereas this paper examines policy changes
that affect the breadth of rights for existing copyrights. Given the unique dataset in
this paper, I am additionally able to examine how copyright policy affects changes in
commercially released new products, and further examine the manner in which works
are repurposed.
A major contribution of this paper is to the aforementioned literature focusing
on sequential music creation (e.g., sampling, remixes) and the role of the copyright
system (DiCola, 2010; McLeod and DiCola, 2011; Menell, 2016; Gans, 2015). This
empirical study builds off and complements these prior theoretically-focused exam-
inations, and as the first such empirical research in this vein, provides quantitative
estimates of how copyright policy has affected the sampling practices of industry
participants.
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The focus on sampling in this paper, a production practice in the music industry
that was greatly enabled by technological change ties this research with the recent
work studying digitization and its impact on the creative industries.4 Research in this
area has examined the impact of new, digitally-enabled distribution channels on mu-
sic industry profits (e.g., Mortimer et al. (2012)), as well as the effect of digitization
on the quality of new products in the music industry (e.g., Waldfogel (2012)). An
expanding research stream in this area has focused on firms’ efforts to protect their
copyright goods under the threat of digital technology that enables unlicensed copying
(Luo and Mortimer, 2016; Zhang, 2016). Field experiments in stock-photography en-
forcement and settlement have highlighted the role of communication in protecting IP
assets (Luo and Mortimer, 2017), while observational studies have estimated the ef-
fective sales increase that results from rights enforcement through Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) takedown procedures (Reimers, 2016). Rather than focusing
on digitization’s interaction with illicit copying and piracy on the demand side, this
paper instead focuses on the supply side, exploring trade-offs between digitization
and copyright on the production process.
Due to the cumulative innovation setting of this paper, it builds off the existing
theoretical and empirical literature on cumulative innovation and patents, and extends
upon this stream by providing empirical evidence of the effect of copyright on follow-
on innovation (Scotchmer, 1991; Scotchmer and Green, 1995; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001;
Bessen and Maskin, 2009). By examining the rate and direction of innovation after
intellectual property rights become more restricted, this paper may also deepen our
understanding of the costs and benefits of open-access for innovation in a novel,
cumulative creativity setting (Furman and Stern, 2011; Murray and Stern, 2007).
4Digital sampling was originally enabled by dedicated digital sampling devices, now digital soft-
ware
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2.3 How Copyright May Effect Cumulative Creativity
How might a strong copyright regime alter the direction of creative activity and
complicate efficient licensing for re-use? First, the licensing of copyrights in a cu-
mulative creativity context is complicated by a number of transaction cost hurdles
that may lead to hold-up and inefficiency. Sample licensing incurs significant search
costs from the onset of the licensing process. If a sound recording is licensed, both
sets of rights holders for the sound recording and the underlying composition right
must be identified and contacted before negotiations begin, and such a process can
be far from trivial. Both of these distinct rights may be fragmented due to the col-
laborative nature of music production, with the composition right being at particular
risk for fragmentation.5 While in the best case all songwriters may be under con-
tract with a single major publisher (e.g., BMG, Universal, EMI), the situation is
often much bleaker with control split among publishers, or with rights held in part
by independent songwriters. Further complications may arise in practice - an artist
being sampled may have a contract that requires express permission before their work
may be sampled, or the original songwriter and publisher may no longer control the
copyright in question.
Once all of the relevant rights holders are identified, a negotiations process begins
with a number of complications in its own right. Even if rights holders are interested
in cooperating with downstream samplers, negotiations may be complicated by the
manner that the sample is used in the new work, or the context in which it is used.
In worse cases, rights holders may have divergent interests, with a portion open to,
or even reaching licensing terms, with some relevant party holding out.
Perhaps of greatest concern, and theoretical source of hold-up, relates to the timing
5For example, the recent Billboard chart-topping single ”Can’t Feel My Face” by The Weeknd
has five separate songwriters associated with the underlying composition, according to the music
database MusicBrainz.
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of actions in the licensing negotiations. The transaction cost economics literature
(e.g., Williamson (1985)) provides intuition here for how licensing will be affected
when upstream rights are strong. Before the necessary samples and potential licensors
are identified, artists must expend a significant amount of effort in searching for
samples, and experimenting with samples during early stage production. An artist re-
using existing work thus expends a considerable amount of effort before negotiations
over sample licenses may begin, often creating a new song before negotiations open.
Once a sample has been selected by the artist for their new work, their investment in
creatively using the sample is highly specific to the relationship with the owners of the
sampled copyright. This sunk investment, in combination with the ex post licensing
typical in practice, creates a hold-up problem. With incomplete contracts, parties
cannot realistically contract over licensing before potential downstream licensees sink
their investment in production. This result positions downstream licensees at risk of
being exploited by upstream rights holders, and should decrease the extent of sample
usage.
Cournot’s theory of complementary monopoly provides further intuition for how
strong upstream rights may affect the direction of re-use downstream (Cournot, 1838;
Economides et al., 1992). Cournot considers the case of two monopolists selling com-
plementary goods (e.g., zinc and copper) used in a downstream market. When both
of the monopolists act individually to maximize profits, equilibrium prices result that
are greater than would be obtained from an integrated monopolist. In addition to
the increased prices, total welfare decreases when the upstream producers act inde-
pendently compared to the integrated case as the independent monopolists do not
account for how their own actions affect demand for the other. Such a model is a
useful example when considering the licensing of copyrights for producing derivative
works (e.g., sample-based music). When upstream rights holders independently price
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licenses of complementary works, sub-optimal equilibrium may result. In creating
derivative works, this situation can arise in two ways in the music licensing context.
First, creators of derivative works may have to negotiate with multiple rights holders
covering a single work when rights are fragmented. Second, complementarities exist
between works when the derivative work is created. That is, after downstream artists
invest in creating a derivative work with multiple samples, each upstream rights holder
controls a complementary copyright that the downstream producer must license be-
fore their derivative work can be commercialized under restrictive re-use. Acting
independently, the complementary rights holders price their licenses above the level
obtained in an optimal equilibrium, leading to a royalty stacking scenario (Lemley
and Shapiro, 2007). In response to sub-optimally high prices, it is expected that cre-
ators of derivative works will decrease the number of samples used per song in order
to reduce the number of upstream complements and alleviate costs.
Given the above discussion, one may also expect the proposed effect on sampling to
have differential impact across artist types. For example, artists and labels may differ
in their willingness to infringe, or risk infringing, the copyrights of others through
unlicensed sampling. Furthermore, successful artists may have greater resources and
an increased ability to clear transaction cost hurdles and negotiate licenses. Absent
data, the theoretical expectation in this situation remains particularly unclear. On the
one hand, successful artists may have the resources necessary to clear licenses when
rights are restrictive. Such resources available to successful artists could include higher
production budgets, as well as the availability of administrative and legal support for
licensing samples. On the other hand, prominent artists have much greater exposure,
and unlicensed sampling by high-profile artists may be easily identified by upstream
rights holders. An analogous effect has been observed in the patent space, with non-
practicing entities (NPE) litigation preferentially targeting cash-rich firms (Cohen
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et al., 2014). Because of this, major labels with which prominent artists are associated
may be highly restrictive over artists’ use of samples, and may monitor their releases
closely to ensure they are not at risk of costly litigation. With these predictions in
mind, it is uncertain which effect will dominate, and thus whether prominent artists
will be more or less affected by restrictive sampling rights than less prominent artists.
The exploration of this question thus depends on the empirical results in the following
sections.
2.3.1 Licensing in Practice
In practice, licensing of copyrighted works may follow a number of paths depending
upon the rights desired and the context of their desired usage. For some cases, com-
pulsory licensing provisions exist in U.S. Copyright law – such as the right for artists
to create “cover versions” of previously recorded musical works. In addition to com-
pulsory licensing schemes, copyright collectives have been created in many countries
that represent groups of copyright owners to manage the licensing of selected rights,
as well as the collection of royalties. Performance rights organizations (PROs), such
as ASCAP and BMI, are a notable example of copyright collectives, that specifically
work to license and manage the public performance right (e.g., playing a song in a
retail store) for participating copyright holders. However, in most cases, the licensing
of copyrights must proceed in an ad hoc, un-standardized manner when prior works
under copyright are incorporated into a new derivative work. Negotiations over this
right may proceed in either direction, a potential licensee may approach a rights
holder to obtain a license to create a derivative, just as a rights holder may identify
their unlicensed work in a published derivative work and seek out the infringing artist.
Two separate rights must be licensed in the context of sampling a sound record-
ing, a “mechanical license” for the underlying composition, as well as a “master use”
license for the rights associated with the sound recording itself. These two rights
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are often owned by separate parties, with the sound recording copyright typically
controlled by the record label or performing artist(s), and the composition copy-
right typically vesting with the song writers or their publisher. When these rights
are successfully licensed for use as samples, Broussard (1991) identifies five types of
agreements that are typically encountered: gratis, buyouts, royalties, co-ownership,
and assignment of copyright. Additionally, the form of the license agreement often
differs for the right being licensed. While master user licenses typically take the
form of ”buyouts” (or flat fees), with royalty agreements being less common, royalty
agreements and co-ownership agreements are the most common deals for licensing of
the composition right. Along with the types of deals negotiated, Broussard (1991)
highlights three main factors that influence the price of the negotiated sample license
agreement - what is sampled, how the sample is used, and who is using the sample.
Typically, in terms of what is sampled, price depends on the popularity of the original
artist/song, as well as what part of the song is sampled (e.g., vocal/instrumentals,
chorus, melody, etc.) and how recognizable the sampled section is. The negotiated
price also depends on how the sample is repurposed in the new work, with higher
rates associated with samples that are repeated throughout the song and samples
that provide a great deal of the new derivative work’s appeal. The final factor deter-
mining price, who is using the sample, generally depends on the prominence of the
artist using the sample, with very commercially successful artists expected to pay a
higher rate. However, with equal importance to “who” uses the sample, is whether
the sampling artist sought prior permission to use the sample, with heavy penalty
pricing imposed when the original rights holder finds infringing content and begins
negotiations post-release.
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2.4 Empirical Framework and Identification
2.4.1 Data and Measures
Data for this paper was collected from two sources, WhoSampled.com and Bill-
board. Data on music sampling was self-collected from the website WhoSampled.com.
WhoSampled, which bills itself as “the world’s largest community for fans of sampled
music, cover songs and remixes,” is a community-driven website where contributors
upload information about samples used in songs. The database has information on
365,330 unique songs and 207,632 samples, provided by 14,230 contributors at the
time of this draft. While the WhoSampled database also has information on cover
songs and remixes, for the purposes of this study only sampling data was used. For
each sample driven song in the database, WhoSampled provides a number of fields
important to building this dataset: the artist, title, label, and date of release of the
sampling (“follow-on”) song, plus the artist, title, label, and date of the sampled
song. Additionally, the WhoSampled database contains information on the genre of
both the sampled and sampling song, as well as where in the song the sample is used,
and where the sample is taken from in the original track. While the “importance”
or “prominence” of the sample in the sampling song would be a useful measure for
this study, the WhoSampled data unfortunately does not provide any such measures.
Figure 3·1 depicts the typical track level data available on WhoSampled for a sample-
using song. In addition to the high level details shown in Figure 3·1, the community
provides additional detailed information for each specific sample used in a song, as
shown in Figure 3·2.
The second source of data used for constructing this study’s dataset comes from
Billboard.com. Billboard provides weekly music industry top-charts for singles, and
now ranks singles based upon digital sales, physical sales, radio play, and online
streaming. For this paper, data from Billboard’s “Hot R&B/Hip-Hop” charts were
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collected since Billboard began tracking this genre in the beginning of 1985. Each
weekly chart contains a ranked list of Hip-Hop/R&B singles, including the title of the
ranked song and the song’s artist(s).
To construct the dataset used herein, the list of hip-hop/R&B artists appearing
on the Billboard charts since 1985 is merged with the artists from the WhoSampled
data. The dataset then includes all sampling tracks found in the database since
1985. The main response variable, samplesi is constructed by calculating the count
of samples used in the sampling song i. An additional response variable, new samples,
is constructed by calculating whether the sampling song i has any novel samples -
samples of songs for which song i is the first sampling track - and equals 1 if song i
contains 1 or more novel samples, 0 otherwise. Two treatment variables were created,
post-Grand Upright which is a binary indicator variable that equals 1 if song i was
released after Grand Upright, and post-Bridgeport Music that analogously equals 1
if song i was released after Bridgeport Music. Summary statistics for this data are
shown in Table 2.1.
2.4.2 Estimation
To investigate the effect that a court decision has on the sampling practices in the
music industry, I first focus on the raw count of samples used in a new song. In an
ideal experiment to study this question, the econometrician would expose a randomly
selected treatment group of sample-using musicians to more (or less) restrictive copy-
right policy for re-use of existing work. The econometrician could then compare the
output of this treatment group to a control group that was not exposed to a change
in policy. With this ideal setup, the econometrician could then simply estimate the
change in the rate of sampling that is associated with stronger/weaker copyrights
over re-use.
Unlike the ideal experiment, the identification strategy in this paper must deal
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with the fact that there is little heterogeneity in the treatment condition. During the
period of the first court case, Grand Upright, sampling was primarily found in hip-hop
music, and the vast majority of this music was being produced in the U.S. Strong
assumptions about either pre-treatment sampling rates or treatment heterogeneity
based upon jurisdiction of the court could be used to help identify the parameter
of interest (e.g., using a differences-in-differences design). Instead, this paper takes
a simple, transparent approach rather than relying on specious assumptions given
the industry context. To estimate the effect of copyright court decisions on the rate
of sampling, the rate of sampling is compared for songs released before and after
the court decision. This pre/post strategy however raises concerns about potential
confounding effects from unobserved time-trends in re-use, as any time-varying trend
will be absorbed into our parameter estimate and bias the results. To deal with
this, a shrinking time window is used around the court decision “treatment,” to
rule out confounding temporal trends. While this identification depends upon a
maintained assumption regarding time trends within the window, similar strategies
have been used in the past with success (e.g., Zhang and Zhu (2011)), and this
strategy is suitable given the lack of appropriate control group. With a linear model,
the following regression is used:
si = X
′
iβ + γ1[i is post-court] + εi (2.1)
Where si is a count of samples in song i, 1[i is post-court] is a dummy indicator
variable equal to 1 if the song is released after the court decision, and Xi is a vector of
control variables. The available control variables are categorical variables for the main
artist associated with song i and the label of song i. Since sampling was predominantly
used in hip-hop music during the first court decision, the entire sample is restricted to
the hip-hop music industry to keep the analysis consistent. The same identification
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strategy and framework shown in Equation 3.3 is used when investigating the impact
of federal court decisions on the incidence of new samples being used in popular music.
2.5 Results
The results of this analysis are presented in three parts. The first part of this sec-
tion presents the estimates of the main treatment, the effects of Grand Upright and
Bridgeport Music on the rate of sampling in hip-hop music. I demonstrate evidence
for the mechanism of this effect, as it operates along the intensive margin. The anal-
ysis proceeds by presenting evidence of how Grand Upright affected the creativity of
new works and the diversity of works being re-used. I conclude by examining how this
main effect differs by artist type. The majority of the analysis in this section focuses
on the Grand Upright case, as will be discussed below, due to the lack of effect that
can be attributed to the later Bridgeport Music court decision.
2.5.1 The Rate of Sampling in Hip-Hop Songs
Figure 2·3 depicts the mean samples-per-song time trend since 1986, shown as the
estimates of a fitted Poisson model. From Figure 2·3 we see that the average number
of samples (per-song) peaks between 1989 and 1990, before beginning a sharp decline
in 1991, a trend that continues until leveling off in the late 1990s - early 2000s. Such
evidence lends support to Grand Upright spurring a change in sampling practices, but
of note is the seeming lack of effect seen in the mid 2000s, where one would expect any
effect from Bridgeport Music to appear. Some insightful comparisons can be made
between the sampling trend shown in Figure 2·3 and the past trends in cover songs
(Figure 2·4) and the rate of self-sampling (Figure 2·5). While such comparisons are
imperfect control groups, they give one an idea of whether there were other general
trends in re-use over this time period. Figure 2·4 shows the rate of cover songs per
year as a total proportion of all songs released. Because cover songs are covered by
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a statutory licensing regime, the incentives to create cover songs should have been
completely unaffected by the Grand Upright decision, and this does appear to be the
case, as the rate of cover songs produced actually increased after 1991, before reaching
a peak in the mid 2000s. Second, one can also examine trends in self-samples, that
is, samples in which an artist repurposed part of their previous works. As shown
in Figure 2·5, the decline in self-samples post-1991 was much lower than the decline
in general sampling. It is of potential concern that any change in self-sampling is
observed, but it must be re-iterated that ownership of musical copyrights are often
fragmented. One could expect to see some effect of the court-imposed restrictions
on self-samples, as just because an artist is associated with a work does not indicate
that they control all of the rights needed to license it for re-use.
Table 2.2 presents the estimated change in sampling per hip-hop song due to the
Grand Upright decision. Columns (1)-(3) of Table 2.2 restrict the estimation sample
to a ±3 year window before and after the Grand Upright decision in order separate
the effect of Grand Upright from any confounding long-term time trends. Column
(1) includes no controls, and implies that Grand Upright led to a mean decline in
sampling of 0.461 samples used per song. Record label controls are added in Column
(2) to account for the unobservable influence on sampling coming from record label
management, with the estimate negative effect of Grand Upright marginally shrinking
to 0.444 fewer samples per song due to the decision. Artist controls are added in
Column (3) to account for heterogeneity in artists’ styles and use of sampling as
a production process, but the results remain consistent, with the point estimates
implying 0.422 fewer samples per song. All of these stated effects are statistically
significant at the one percent level.
The ±3 year time window on either side of the Grand Upright decision may still
allow for underlying time-trends in sampling practices to bias the parameter estimates.
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To lessen concerns about confounding time trends, the time window around Grand
Upright shrinks to ±2 years in columns (4)-(6) of Table 2.2. Column (4) includes
no controls, and implies that, conditioning on a ±2 year time down, Grand Upright
caused a mean drop of 0.302 fewer samples per song. Column (5) includes label
effects, with the result remaining consistent but shrinking to 0.275 fewer samples
per song. Finally, the fully saturated model in Column (6) includes both label and
artist effects, with an estimates 0.320 fewer samples per song as a result of the Grand
Upright decision. Results thus remain largely consistent across specifications, with
all results significant at the one percent level, and leading to the inference that Grand
Upright reduced re-use, and altered the direction of innovation in the industry.
The analysis of Bridgeport Music’s effect on the magnitude of sampling in hip-
hop is shown in Table 2.3. Similar to the prior results on Grand Upright, Columns
(1)-(3) of Table 2.3 restrict the estimation sample to a ±3 year time window around
Bridgeport Music. However, in contrast to the large drop caused by Grand Upright,
Bridgeport Music appeared to have no significant effect. Without controls, in Column
(1), I estimate the effect of Bridgeport Music to be near zero at 0.020 fewer samples
per song, and while this effect is economically insignificant, it is also statistically
insignificant. While adding label controls in Column (2) brings statistical significance
at the 5% level to the small estimated coefficient, the effect disappears once artist
controls are added in Column (3).
Once I shrink the time window shrinks to ±2 years around Bridgeport Music in
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 2.3, the effect of Bridgeport Music remains insignificant.
The point estimates are further attenuated towards zero across specifications without
controls (Column 4), with label controls (Column 5), and with both sets of controls
(Column 6). Overall, due to the small, economically insignificant mean effect size
across models, and the lack of statistical significance, it appears that if Bridgeport
30
Music did in fact have an effect upon the rate of sampling in the industry, such effect
is smaller than what can be detected given noise in my sample. The apparent lack
of effect from the Bridgeport Music ruling is consistent with the industry rapidly
adapting to a new sample-licensing model in the wake of Grand Upright, a model
that precludes extensive re-use in the production process. As I cannot reject the null
of no effect for most models estimating the impact of Bridgeport Music, the rest of
the empirical analysis in this paper focuses upon the Grand Upright decision and its
effect upon sampling practices in the industry.
2.5.2 Impact on the Probability of Sampling
I next disentangle whether Grand Upright ’s effect manifested as a change in the
proportion of songs that contained samples or instead a decrease in the magnitude of
sampling across all songs. A new dependent variable is constructed that equals one if
song i contains any samples, and 0 otherwise for songs that do not contain samples.
Running a logistic regression using this outcome measure with my post-Grand Upright
variable, as shown in Table 2.4, provides evidence that the court decision did not have
any outright effect on the propensity of songs to contain samples, as I cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no effect. Column (1) of Table2.4 includes no controls, and implies
the odds of a song containing samples after Grand Upright is approximately 14%
greater than before, but this effect is only significant at the 10% level. Controlling for
label effects renders this effect statistically insignificant in Column (2), as with artist
controls in Column (3). The fully saturated linear probability model in Column
(4) also implies no statistically significant effect on the propensity for a song to
contain samples post-Grand Upright, but with the point estimate remaining positive.
Hence, from these consistent results, there is no evidence that Grand Upright had
any negative impact on the probability that a new work utilized sampling in the
production process.
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It thus appears that the reduced sampling after Grand Upright was due to a re-
duction in the number of samples per track, not the proportion of songs containing
samples after the decision. This result is consistent with a royalty stacking mecha-
nism, whereby artists in the restrictive rights regime decrease the number of samples
used per song in order to defray the sub-optimally high licensing costs that result from
upstream complementary rights holders acting independently. Furthermore, these re-
sults also help to rule out an alternative interpretation that sampling was a fad that
peaked in the 1990s then faded from popularity. I do not observe any decrease in
the popularity of using sample-based production, instead, the decrease in sampling
manifests along the intensive margin.
2.5.3 Impact on Creativity and Diversity of Samples
Given that Grand Upright had a dramatic effect on the content of new products
in the music industry, it may have also affected the creativity and the diversity of
works drawn upon. If Grand Upright made copyright more restrictive for artists
wishing to re-use existing sound recordings, it may have pushed artists and labels to
increasingly re-use work from rights-holders that either (1) did not assert their rights
against re-use and derivative works, and/or (2) were apt to license their rights to
hip-hop producers. Table 3.10 presents results with a new outcome variable that is
equal to 1 if the observed song i has a sample of a song that was never previously
sampled (henceforth a “novel” sample), and 0 otherwise.
Table 3.10 shows the effect of Grand Upright on the incidence of novel samples
in hip-hop songs. From the evidence of these results, it is clear that Grand Upright
had a negative impact on the creativity of new products in the industry and the
diversity of re-used work. Columns (1) through Column (4) of Table 3.10 utilize
linear probability models, while Column (5) depicts marginal effect estimates from
logistic regression. Across specifications, the estimated effect of Grand Upright is
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statistically significant at the 1% level. Column (1) includes no controls, and implies
that songs released post-Grand Upright were 4% less likely to include a novel re-use.
When label effects are included in the model, the magnitude of this estimate grows to
5%, while controlling for artist effects implies that songs were 9% less likely to include
a novel re-use as the result of restrictions put in place by Grand Upright. I estimate
that songs are 10% less likely to use novel samples after controlling for both artist
and label effects with a linear probability model. Very similar results are achieved
with an alternative logisitic regression in Column (5), which estimates that the court
decision led to a 10.6% decrease in the use of novel samples while controlling for artist
and label.
Thus, from these regression results, there appears to be a consistent negative effect
of Grand Upright on novel samples being used to produce new music. Songs released
after the Grand Upright decision are, on average, about 10% less likely to utilize sam-
ples that have not been previously exploited. These results support the interpretation
that the downstream restrictions from Grand Upright are leading artists to exploit
samples from a less diverse pool of previously recorded music than would have been
obtained under a less-restrictive regime. Thus, while I have already established that
the effective policy changes from Grand Upright altered the rate of re-use in the music
industry, these results demonstrate that the policy change also affected the direction
of re-use, creativity, and innovation for new products.
2.5.4 Change in Sampling: Heterogeneity by Artists
Table 2.6 presents the results of examining how the Grand Upright decision affected
more and less-prominent artists. I define musicians as prominent if they have previ-
ously released an RIAA certified gold album, a certification that is awarded albums
that have sold at least 500,000 units. With this measure, I estimate that the change in
sampling practices post-Grand Upright was greater in magnitude for these prominent
33
artists, as the interaction between the post-Grand Upright indicator and the indicator
for gold-certified artists is significant across all specifications. While the prominent
artists not only were more so affected by the Grand Upright decision, these artists
appear to practice a higher baseline rate of sampling per song pre-Grand Upright
than less prominent artists.
Column (1) of Table 2.6 includes no controls, Column (2) and (3) respectively
control for label and artist, and Column (4) controls for both label and artist effects.
In models without artist fixed effects (Columns 1 and 3), Gold-certified artists have a
higher baseline rate of sampling compared to less prominent artists, using between 1
and 1.4 more samples per song on average. Furthermore, across specifications, Grand
Upright had a more extensive effect on sampling for prominent artists. Without
controls, I estimate in Column (1) that the interaction between prominent artists and
post-Grand Upright was approximately 0.5 fewer samples per song compared to base
effect of Grand Upright at 0.25 fewer samples per song. When artist and label fixed
effects in Column (4), this interaction effect grows in magnitude to 0.72 fewer samples
per song, a result that is statistically significant at the 5% level.
These results clarify the theoretical-focused discussion in Section 2.3. It is ex
ante ambiguous without data whether highly prominent artists would be more or less
affected by restrictive copyright. While famous and/or successful artists may have
the record label resources to overcome transaction costs and pay costly licensing fees,
these artists also face greater scrutiny from major label management, which are wary
to allow unlicensed sampling that risks infringement claims and damages. However,
from my data and estimation strategy, it appears that any resource advantage these
prominent artists have is dominated by the increased scrutiny and litigation risk they
face when using samples without a license.
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2.6 Conclusion
This research examines the impact of strengthened copyright breadth on re-use in the
music industry. While the results of the analysis require maintained assumptions, this
work provides evidence of how copyright policy affects the actual content and creativ-
ity of new products – demonstrating that the intellectual property right regime has
altered not only the rate of re-use, but the direction as well. While I cannot estimate
welfare in this context, this setting still allows me to uncover how copyright policy has
altered the trajectory of new products. Concerns over appropriate copyright balance
have never been more pressing. Digitization has nixed replication costs (Goldfarb and
Tucker, 2017), enabling both demand-side replication (e.g., piracy) and supply-side
re-use in a creative content industry that now generates over $2 trillion in global
annual revenue. Future work in this area may further explore the welfare question,
as well as focus on the other side of the samplee/sampler dyad - the upstream rights
holders.
First and foremost, the empirical results indicate that there was a moderate de-
crease in sampling following the Grand Upright decision. Depending on the model
used and time window around the event, the court decision is estimated to have caused
sampling to decrease by approximately 0.3-0.4 samples per song on average, and the
magnitude of this result is robust across models. An interesting result is the lack of
a significant effect on re-use from the Bridgeport Music decision. While Bridgeport
Music had a more dramatic effect on copyright policy itself, as it effectively changed
policy within its jurisdiction (see McLeod and DiCola (2011)), it appears that the
earlier Grand Upright decision had a more significant impact upon sampling and li-
censing practices within the industry. The evidence suggests that the first decision
pushed labels to confront the risks associated with unlicensed sampling, cleared the
path for infringement claims, and thus forced major record labels to rapidly adapt
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a licensing model for sample based music. Thus, while this paper fails to find any
economically significant or statistically significant effect of Bridgeport Music on sam-
pling in the industry, there does appear to be robust evidence that Grand Upright
decreased the rate of sampling and re-use. Strikingly, the evidence shows that the
court decision mainly affected derivatives and re-use through an effect on the inten-
sive margin, with the magnitude of samples used per track dropping, and no apparent
change in the probability of a new song containing samples. This effect highlights the
royalty stacking problem in licensing for derivative works - with multiple upstream
rights holders (complementary monopolies), downstream artists face high licensing
fees and must decrease the number of samples used in order to offset high input
costs. Thus, I find not only that the magnitude of sampling decreases when re-use is
restricted, but also find evidence of the mechanism at work.
Perhaps most concerning, I have demonstrated that copyright policy altered the
creativity of new products. After the decision in Grand Upright, music producers
have drawn upon a less diverse pool of existing works for re-use in new music. This
result could thus be interpreted as impeding the “Progress of Science and useful
Arts,” the U.S. constitutional basis for establishing copyright. Expanding the existing
compulsory licensing regime (Menell, 2016) could remedy this stifling effect of the
current restrictive regime. Objections to such policy interventions have focused on
the moral right of artists to control the manner in which their works are exploited –
but such objections have less basis in U.S. policy as compared to continental European
copyright systems (Rigamonti, 2006).
Empirical evidence also confirms Grand Upright had a differential impact on more
versus less prominent artists, with the regression analysis providing evidence that
more prominent artists were affected to a greater extent by the court decision than
other, less prominent artists. Such a result is particularly interesting due to the
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theoretical ambiguity of how stricter rights over re-use may effect artists. On the one
hand, it may be that more prominent artists signed to major labels have the resources
to license samples that independent, less prominent artists do not have. On the other
hand, a separate effect can be theorized wherein less-exposed artists (“underground
artists”) are able to conduct unlicensed sampling without a high risk of infringement
suits, and are thus able to continue sampling at a higher rate than those artists with
greater financial and media exposure. However, from the empirical results shown in
this paper, I see no evidence of the former dominating, instead finding that more
prominent artists were affected more so by the decision.
The study of copyright strength in this context is a complicated issue, necessitating
concerns over both moral rights as well as economic incentives. This paper does not
attempt to provide a final answer on the matter or to calculate a welfare estimate.
Instead, this study seeks to chip-off and answer one question - how did more restrictive
rights over re-use affect the content of follow-on work? By answering this question,
this paper may contribute to the discussion forming around copyright and the creation
of derivative works, a spreading phenomenon enabled by digitization.
Figures and Tables
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Figure 2·1: WhoSampled: Song-level Information example
The WhoSampled.com community provides data on the samples incor-
porated, and reused to create each song tracked in database. This
screen capture displays the raw data covering the samples used in
Beastie Boy’s 1989 song “Car Thief”
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Figure 2·2: WhoSampled: Detailed Sample Information
Along with the high-level sampling data shown above, the commu-
nity at WhoSampled also provides detailed information for each sam-
ple added to the database, shown here for the Beastie Boy’s sample of
Funk Factory’s “Rien Ne Va Plus”
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Figure 2·3: Samples-per-song Time Trend
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l l
l
l l
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
1
2
3
4
5
6
Mean samples trend
Year
M
ea
n 
+/
− 
St
d.
 E
rro
r
This figure illustrates time trend of samples used per song (shown as
fitted Poisson-model marginal effects). The time of the Grand Upright
decision (December 1991) is shown in red
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Figure 2·4: Cover Song Time Trend
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This figure illustrates time trend of cover songs per year, as a proportion
of total songs released per year
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Figure 2·5: Self Sampling Time Trend
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This figure illustrates time trend of self-samples used per song (shown as
fitted Poisson-model marginal effects). The time of the Grand Upright
(December 1991) decision is shown in red
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Year of release 26,892 2002 8.25 1985 2015
Number of Samples 26,892 1.22 1.62 0 36
post-GrandUpright 26,892 0.86 0.35 0 1
post-BridgeportMusic 26,892 0.39 0.49 0 1
Contains New Samples 19,425 0.35 0.48 0 1
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Table 2.2: Grand Upright Effect on Sampling
Dependent variable:
Number of Samples
±3 Year Window ±2 Year Window︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post-GrandUpright -0.461∗∗∗ -0.444∗∗∗ -0.422∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.070) (0.095) (0.074) (0.077) (0.104)
Constant 2.096∗∗∗ 2.070∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.063)
Artist FE No No Yes No No Yes
Label FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 5,706 5,461 5,263 4,119 3,945 3,777
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays coefficients from linear probability model regres-
sions in which the dependent variable is a count of samples used in
song i. The main variable of interest, post-GrandUpright =1 for songs
released after the Grand Upright... court decision that restricted re-
use. Columns (1), (2), and (3) utilize a ±3 year window around the
event to minimize confounding time trends. Column (2) controls for
record label effects, while Column (3) controls for both artist and label.
Columns (4), (5), and (6) shrink the time window further to ±2 years,
with Column (6) fully controlling for label and artist effects
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Table 2.3: Bridgeport Music Effect on Sampling
Dependent variable:
Number of Samples
±3 Year Window ±2 Year Window︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post-BridgeportMusic -0.020 -0.077∗∗ -0.044 -0.002 -0.060 -0.019
(0.031) (0.035) (0.052) (0.038) (0.045) (0.076)
Constant 0.967∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.026)
Artist FE No No Yes No No Yes
Label FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 5,772 5,070 4,797 3,998 3,511 3,285
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays coefficients from OLS regressions in which the de-
pendent variable is a count of samples used in song i. The main variable
of interest, post-BridgeportMusic =1 for songs released after the Bridge-
port Music... court decision in 2005 that restricted re-use. Columns
(1), (2), and (3) utilize a ±3 year window around the event to minimize
confounding time trends. Column (2) controls for record label effects,
while Column (3) controls for both artist and label. Columns (4), (5),
and (6) shrink the time window further to ±2 years, with Column (6)
fully controlling for label and artist effects
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Table 2.4: Grand Upright Effect on Propensity to Sample
Dependent variable:
Contains Samples (1/0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Logit Logit OLS
post-GrandUpright 1.136∗ 1.040 1.119 0.020
(0.084) (0.098) (0.151) (0.016)
Constant 2.735∗∗∗
(0.158)
Artist FE No No Yes Yes
Year Controls No Yes No Yes
N 4,119 3,615 2,907 4,112
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This display displays odds-ratios from a logistic regression (Columns
1-3) and coefficients from an OLS regression (Column 4) in which the
dependent variable is a binary (1/0) variable = 1 when song i contains
samples, 0 otherwise. The main variable of interest, post-GrandUpright
=1 for songs released after the Grand Upright... court decision that
restricted re-use. Column (1) includes the main variable of interest,
Column (2) adds label effects, and Column (3) controls for artist effects.
Column (4) displays results from a linear probability model controlling
for both artist and label effects.
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Table 2.5: Novel Sampling
Dependent variable:
Contains Novel Sample(s)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit (M.E.)
post-GrandUpright -0.040∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023)
Constant 0.393∗∗∗
(0.013)
Artist FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Label FE No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 4,195 4,009 3,995 3,851 3,337
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays coefficients from linear probability models (Columns
1-4) and marginal effects from a logistic regression (Column 5) in which
the dependent variable is a binary variable, Contains Novel Sample(s),
that = 1 when song i contains samples that have not been previously
used, 0 otherwise. A ±3 year window around the Grand Upright court
decision is used. These regressions include the main variable of interest,
post-GrandUpright =1 for songs released after the Grand Upright...
court decision that restricted re-use. Columns (1) includes no controls,
Column (2) controls for label effects, Column (3) controls for artist
effects, and Columns (4) and (5) controls for both label and artist.
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Table 2.6: Heterogeneity by RIAA Gold Artists: 2 Year Window
Dependent variable:
Number of Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-GrandUpright×Goldjt -0.491∗ -0.530∗ -0.641∗∗ -0.719∗∗
(0.252) (0.283) (0.254) (0.309)
post-GrandUpright -0.247∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗ -0.195∗∗ -0.125
(0.074) (0.079) (0.076) (0.092)
Goldjt 1.424
∗∗∗ 0.0812 1.002∗∗∗ 0.269
(0.223) (0.340) (0.232) (0.369)
Constant 1.855∗∗∗
(0.062)
Artist FE No Yes No Yes
Label FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 4,119 3,927 3,945 3,777
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays coefficients from OLS regressions in which the de-
pendent variable is a count of samples used in song i. These regres-
sions include the previous variable of interest, post-GrandUpright =1
for songs released after the Grand Upright... court decision that re-
stricted re-use. Additionally, an interaction term is added using the
variable Goldjt, which =1 when artist j has had an album certified
“Gold” (500,000 units) prior to year t according to the RIAA. A ±2
year time window around Grand Upright... is used for all the models in
this table. Columns (1) introduces the Gold variable and the interac-
tion term, Column (2) controls for artist effects, Column (3) controls for
label effects, and Column (4) controls for both label and artist effects.
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Chapter 3
The Demand Spillovers of Reuse
3.1 Introduction
Copying, reuse, and appropriation are nothing new. In 1873, Johannes Brahms com-
posed Variations on a Theme by Joseph Haydn, attributing the reused theme to the
Austrian composer of the prior century. Early rock and roll musicians, especially Led
Zeppelin, heavily appropriated from twelve-bar blues and the works of delta blues
musicians such as Muddy Waters and Robert Johnson. As digitization decreases
the costs of re-using bits and pieces of music, the incidence of reuse, appropriation,
and remixing has since accelerated, particularly with amateur creators (Lessig, 2008).
Such reuse and recontextualization has been an accepted norm in art for centuries, yet
it was only with the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 that broad restrictions over reuse were
established with general “derivative rights” (Voegtli, 1997; Tushnet, 2004). Hence,
while digitization takes replication and distribution costs to zero (Goldfarb et al.,
2015; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2017), copyright creates legal barriers and transaction
costs that may impede replication, especially reuse. On the one hand, there is the
view that strong intellectual property rights are needed to incentivize the creation,
dissemination, and further downstream licensing of high quality works (Landes and
Posner, 1989). In particular, entertainment industry professionals have voiced con-
cern that easing restrictions over reuse “would do great damage to the value of the
creator’s property” (LaPolt et al., 2014). However, absent empirical evidence, many
legal scholars point to the transaction costs inherent to copyright licensing, along
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with the changing norms around reuse in the digital age to motivate a call for policy
relief (Lessig, 2008; McLeod and DiCola, 2011; Menell, 2016).
This paper studies creative reuse in the popular music industry to understand
whether reuse harms the market for the original work, or instead acts as a comple-
mentary good that increases demand for the reused piece of music. I draw upon
two new data sources to answer this question. First, a rich data-set tracking reuse
in popular music through two forms: 1) “digital samples,” wherein portions of past
recordings are reused in a new sound recordings, and 2) “cover songs,” wherein the
composition and lyrics of a previously released song are reused in a new recording of
the song. I link this data with a proprietary panel data-set from Spotify, an online
music streaming platform, that tracks daily streaming, or “listens,” to each artist in
my data. With the maintained assumption that the precise timing of reuse is ex-
ogenous once conditioned on observable characteristics, I employ a matched-sample
difference-in-differences design, matching each reused artist to an observably similar
“control” artist based upon both time variant and time invariant features. With this
data and research design, I am able to causally estimate how the release and distri-
bution of a new song incorporating existing work affects demand for the underlying
good upon which it is based, as measured through online listening.
I find that, on average, reuse by a downstream artist induces a positive impact on
the upstream (reused) artist. In an unmatched sample, the release of a derivative song
increases daily streaming of the reused artist by 2.8%. These results remain robust
under a matched-sample where each reused artist is matched to one closely related
control artist. Estimates from the matched-sample design suggest that reused artists
receive a 3% boost in demand on the streaming platform once their works have been
reused. This baseline effect significantly increases when upstream artists are reused
by popular artists downstream, as the estimated effect more than doubles when the
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downstream artist’s popularity increases by one standard deviation. I also find that
low-prominence artists receive the greatest benefit from being reused – double the
baseline estimates – with the positive effects of reuse shrinking towards zero for the
most prominent artists. In a similar vein, I demonstrate that this effect is most
dramatic for “novel reuse,” those of artists that have not been extensively sampled
and/or covered.
This paper makes three contributions. First, I contribute to the management of
IP literature, particularly research on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Much of the work in this area has focused upon patent litigation and enforcement
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001, 2004; Cohen et al., 2014). A more recent litera-
ture in this area has turned to copyright and piracy (Rob and Waldfogel, 2006, 2007),
focusing on the effectiveness of copyright enforcement and new tools to combat unli-
censed online copying, from government policy (Danaher et al., 2014), to the impact
of digital rights management (DRM) (Zhang, 2016), to online takedown procedures
(Peukert et al., 2017; Reimers, 2016), to the importance of communication on suc-
cessful ex post licensing (Luo and Mortimer, 2017). While much of the copyright
literature in this area has focused on demand-side copying (e.g., digital piracy), this
paper instead focuses on supply-side copying and reuse. My paper contributes to
this area by informing and describing the contours where licensing can result in posi-
tive spillovers to rights-holders’ past catalogs of IPR, versus when downstream reuse
instead results in cannibalization of productive upstream markets.
Second, this research contributes to the growing literature on cumulative creativ-
ity. Heald (2009) examines the use of early 20th century musical compositions in
late 20th/early 21st century films, and finds no significant effect of copyright pro-
tection on the propensity that a song is reused. Subsequent work in Heald (2014a),
however, suggests that a composition’s inclusion in the public domain dramatically
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increases the chance that the song appears in a high-grossing movie. A recent stream
of copyright literature focuses on cumulative creativity and the innovation process,
examining the effect of copyright policies on reuse of copyright-protected materials.
Nagaraj (2017) finds that Baseball Digest content that has lapsed into the public
domain is significantly more likely to be reused on Wikipedia, an effect that is partic-
ularly pronounced for rich content like images, rather than text. Chapter 2 similarly
finds that court decisions restricting digital sampling have had a negative impact
on reuse in popular music, highlighting hold-up and royalty stacking mechanisms at
play in licensing multiple copyrights. Gans (2015) considers a model where original
content is remixed by a downstream creator, and compares outcomes under several
proposed rights regimes. This paper follows the results in Gans (2015) by testing one
of the key assumptions of their model – that downstream reuse harms the upstream
creator’s profits – finding that on average, this assumption may not hold. While em-
pirical papers in this stream typically examine the effect of copyright protection or
breadth on subsequent reuse, this paper focuses on the reverse direction by measuring
the consequences of reuse on the reused work.
Finally, the results of this paper speak directly to the policy debate regarding the
balance of copyright, derivative works, and fair use. Much legal scholarship has been
written about copyright and derivative works following the broad derivative work
right enacted with the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 (Goldstein, 1982). Since the early
days of digitization, legal scholars have been concerned that the rights over derivative
works are overly broad, and at odds with both historical norms of appropriation in art,
as well as paths offered by digital technologies (Voegtli, 1997). While many authors
have suggested that the derivative work right may be a particularly onerous restriction
over the first amendment and free speech (Tushnet, 1996; Rubenfeld, 2002), others
have pointed towards broad derivative rights as a lever to prevent undue ex post
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competition against an artist’s original creations (Abramowicz, 2005). A more recent
literature has tackled the legal challenges surrounding digital sampling itself (McLeod
and DiCola, 2011), as well as the related mashup phenomena (Menell, 2016). Citing
royalty stacking and transaction costs when multiple copyrights are sampled, these
works have called for policy relief, such as compulsory licensing, to counteract the
inherent transaction costs. My research contributes to this field by providing direct
empirical evidence regarding the impact of derivative works on the market for the
original, demonstrating that ex post competition is limited, and that derivative works
may often confer a positive effect on average.
This paper proceeds with a discussion of music licensing (Section 3.2), describes
the data used (Section 3.3), explicates the research design and identification strategy
(Section 3.4), reviews the results (Section 3.5), and ends with concluding remarks
(Section 3.6).
3.2 Institutions of Music Licensing and Reuse
Information, a public good, is non-rival and non-excludable. In the absence of intellec-
tual property rights (IPR), theory suggests that the threat of piracy and bootlegging
may create insufficient incentives for content producers to bring new goods to market
if they cannot recoup their initial sunk cost of production. Policymakers may inter-
vene with copyright to bolster ex ante incentives, but must balance the length and
breadth of rights granted with dynamic concerns for cumulative innovation, wherein
new innovation builds upon prior work (Scotchmer, 1991; Scotchmer and Green, 1995;
Murray and O’Mahony, 2007). Furthermore, copyright has significantly evolved since
its origins in the Statute of Anne, and in the U.S. now incorporates peculiar statu-
tory licensing schemes, a broad restriction over reuse through “derivative works,” yet
allows some forms of unlicensed reuse as “fair use.” In the United States, any piece
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of recorded music necessarily includes two separate copyrights – (1) the copyright of
the sound recording, and (2) the copyright of the underlying musical composition.
Digital sampling, the practice of re-using portions of a prior sound recording
in creating new works, can be traced back to the “versioning” production-style of
Jamaican dub musicians that was subsequently brought to the U.S. by Jamaican-
American DJ Kool Herc during the early stages of hip-hop music and culture (McLeod
and DiCola, 2011). Disc jockeys at the time used vinyl turntables to isolate, repeat,
and extend portions of a song, such as the “break,” during a live event. As with jazz
music (Phillips, 2013), geography undoubtedly shaped the development of hip hop,
but it was technology that transformed hip hop from a live, event-driven medium
into a commercially potent recorded art form with the advent of the digital sampler.
Diffusing in the 1980s, digital samplers allowed record producers to rapidly isolate
small portions of sound recordings, store them in memory, replay, and loop over these
samples. Rather than having to create a new sound de novo, record producers could
select the “right” sound from a vast catalog of past recordings and inspirations. By
recontextualizing past recordings in a new song, producers can give their recordings
a familiar element while creating a distinctively new work, balancing the similarity-
differentiation tradeoff (Askin and Mauskapf, 2017). Prior to 1991, sampling was
rampant in hip hop music, and often operated in an unauthorized, legal gray area
(McLeod and DiCola, 2011). With commercial success, the copyright infringement
lawsuits inevitably followed, particularly the landmark Grand Upright Music, Ltd
v. Warner Bros. Records Inc. (1991) ruling that equated sampling with theft,
precipitating a rapid decrease in the use of digital sampling. Following Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (2005), the courts have provided a bright-line
rule – unauthorized sampling of a sound recording will be regarded as infringement,
regardless of whether the recordings are substantially similar.1
1However, clearly de minimis should apply on compositions, as one cannot hold a copyright over
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Two distinct licensing agreements are required to “clear” a sample for inclusion
in a new work. An artist using a sample in their new production must negotiate not
only a license for the repurposed sound recording, but also a license for the underlying
musical composition. While compulsory licenses exist for certain reproductions of
the composition property right, compulsory licensing does not extend to the use of
samples, and the composition rights-holder may always refuse a license. Oftentimes,
the sound recording right and the composition right are held by separate parties, and
licensing of both proceeds in an ad hoc manner.
Although unauthorized sampling clearly still exists, major labels are wary to per-
mit unauthorized reuse under threat of costly infringement claims, and thus new
samples in popular music are cleared by negotiating a sample licensing agreement.2
While some music licensing is highly standardized, sample licenses must be negotiated
on a case by case basis.3 Kohn and Kohn (2010) provides guidance on the contours of
these deals, and this section draws heavily from the discussion therein. The most im-
portant factors in general with sample licensing are (a) who was sampled, (b) who is
doing the sampling, (c) the value of the sampled work, (d) the nature of the intended
reuse, and (e) the manner in which the reuse came to the rights-holder’s attention.
Music publishers and songwriters, as the owners of composition rights, have typi-
cally been less tolerant of sampling than record labels. Hence, a composition license,
known as a “mechanical license,” must be negotiated to avoid potential infringement
a single musical note. See the Newton V. Diamond 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) opinion that
a 3-note sample of a composition was de minimis. Recently, the 9th circuit disagreed with the
judgment on de minimis in Bridgeport Music, see VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th
Cir. 2016).
2The Illegal Art label operated under blatant disregard for licensing of digital samples, with the
associated mash-up artist Girl Talk achieving commercial success re-using hundreds of samples per
album.
3Examples of standardized licensing include licensing a public performance from a performance
rights organization (PRO), or authorizing a cover song via a compulsory mechanical license. Note
also that the statutory licensing of music compositions precludes significant alterations or transfor-
mative use, hence does not apply to digital sampling.
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suits.4 Copyright owners have a number of options to consider when they discover a
downstream artist is producing, or has already distributed, music containing samples
of their work. Timing is especially important due to hold-up (Williamson, 1985), as
well as the typical punitive terms demanded under post-infringement licensing. At
the most basic level, the copyright owner may choose to ignore the sample, especially
in cases where enforcement will not justify the costs, particularly when the reuse is
minimal or the downstream artist is commercially unsuccessful. Alternatively, the
copyright holder may also choose to flatly refuse a mechanical license, and forego
licensing revenue, perhaps in the case that the proposed reuse results in the original
work being “perverted, distorted, or travestied.”5 In the case that the rights-holder
chooses to give sampling permissions, they have a number of options, (a) grant a
mechanical license for a flat fee, (b) license for a royalty, (c) take a share of the new
composition, along with royalties, (d) seek co-ownership in the new composition, or
(e) demand full assignment of the copyright. In the most common arrangement, the
rights-holder licenses the sample for a percentage below the statutory mechanical rate,
while also taking a royalty share from the public performance right. However, licen-
sor’s demands typically increase with the popularity of the reused work, especially in
cases of extensive reuse.
A master use license is additionally required if a new song incorporates any por-
tion of an existing sound recording. Upstream sound recording rights-holders begin
negotiations from a substantially more powerful position compared to the composi-
tion rights-holder, given the previous discussion on de minimis use. However, record
4 These licenses have historically, and continue to be known as “mechanical licenses” due to the
then mechanical nature of early reproductions, such as piano rolls for player pianos, music boxes, and
phonograph records. Piano rolls, for example, consisted of rolls of paper with perforations coding
the notes of a musical composition. The rolls were fed through a player piano, which mechanically
scanned the perforations to perform the composition.
5As was the case with anecdotes in the early days of hip hop, with artists objecting to their
melodies being featured in expletive-filled, anti-authority focused songs.
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labels are more lenient with sampling than songwriters and publishers, given that a
record label’s own artists may engage in sampling and reuse. Again, however, the
options available to a sound recording copyright holder are very similar to those of the
previously discussed composition owner. When reuse is substantial and the success of
the downstream work can be attributed to the sampled recording, royalty agreements
are most common.6 Sound recording royalty rates in this context typically range from
1/2 cent to 5 cents per unit, along with an upfront royalty payment.
Digital sampling’s historical roots in hip hop music should influence the selection
process in this study. Samples are more likely to be used downstream in hip hop
music, although the practice has now become relatively common in electronic music
and used to a degree in other genres as well. Furthermore, this norm of sampling in
hip hop should affect the types of artists that are selected for reuse through samples,
with hip hop music heavily drawing from funk, soul, R&B, and previous hip hop
music to create the percussion-based “sound” of hip hop.7 Sampled songs are often
not especially prominent or mainstream, with many producers priding themselves on
their ability to repurpose obscure, forgotten tunes. In the empirical section of this
paper, I employ a matched-sample design that controls for this selection process in
order to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) artists.
In contrast with digital sample licensing, cover songs are covered under a statutory
licensing doctrine that originated from antitrust concerns in the early 20th century
player piano market.8 Congress originally set the statutory royalty rate at 2 cents
6Royalty agreements may sometimes be necessary due to the recording contract between the
reused artist and their label. These recording contracts may also prevent licensing of samples
without the express permission of the recording artist.
7Although not the topic of this paper, copyright policy has since significantly shaped the sound
of hip hop music, see McLeod and DiCola (2011).
8In 1908, the United States Supreme Court, in White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo
Company, ruled that piano rolls and phonograph records were not infringing copies of musical com-
positions due to the opinion that humans could not read these mechanical reproductions. The Æolian
Company, a manufacturer of player pianos and organs, anticipated that congress was poised to su-
persede the controversial Supreme Court decision through recognition of mechanical reproductions
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per unit, which held until 1978, and currently stands at 9.10 cents per unit, or 1.75
cents per minute per unit for songs over 5 minutes in length. The Harry Fox Agency,
founded in 1927 by the National Music Publishers Association, collectively manages
this licensing in the U.S. market, as well as collects and distributes royalties to member
songwriters and music publishers.
The practice of creating cover versions is less tied to any specific genre than the
relationship between hip hop and digital sampling. It is common, however, for cover
versions to be used to adapt past compositions across genres, such as Johnny Cash’s
cover of Nine Inch Nail’s industrial track “Hurt.” Prominent early rock and roll
artists, like The Beatles, The Rolling Stones, and Bob Dylan, are especially prone to
be the subject of cover versions.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Digital Sampling and Cover Song Data
A new, proprietary panel data-set tracking online music streaming was provided by
Spotify, one of the largest online music streaming platforms with over 40 million paid
subscribers. Spotify provided a private, disaggregated data-set measuring the daily
streaming demand of 11,682 artists between August 1, 2015 and August 29, 2016.
While song-level data may have been ideal, artist-level aggregation was required as
part of the data-transfer arrangement.
The streaming sample covers 11,682 artists, consisting of 1,004 treated artists
– those that were reused in the WhoSampled data described below – and 10,678
control artists. These control artists were gathered according to Spotify’s similar
as an exclusive right of the copyright holder. In anticipation, Æolian negotiated exclusive licenses
with major music publishers in order to control the mechanical reproduction rights for the majority
of popular music at the time, preventing competing manufacturers from acquiring their own piano
roll licenses. Congress responded with a compulsory licensing requirement in the 1909 act, mandat-
ing that anyone had the right to a mechanical reproduction license once the reproduction right of
the song had been exercised at least one time.
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artist feature. For each treated artist, I collected the name and unique database
identifier of each similar artist, dropping any duplicates. Upon collecting this list
of artists, Spotify then provided me with daily streaming data, totaling 4,394,568
observations for 11,682 unique artists.
Data on reuse in music was collected from WhoSampled.com. WhoSampled.com
is a community-driven website dedicated to sample-based music, cover songs, and
remixes. Currently the largest website of this kind, WhoSampled tracks the origins
of samples and cover versions used in popular music. Any of the approximately
17,000 community members of the website may upload a reuse to the database – as
well, members of the community may comment on songs tracked in the database,
report incorrect information, or vote on the “quality” of a particular sample, remix,
or cover version. Figure 3·1 depicts an example of a typical sample-based song in the
database, that is, a song that appropriates elements of past work. This reuse data
thus unambiguously measures a form of cumulative innovation, and I am hence able
to avoid many of the known pitfalls that come with inferring knowledge flows from
patent citations (Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006).
Beyond just data on who and what was reused, the WhoSampled database also
tracks data on how the content was reused, such as what elements of the prior song
were captured, as well as whether the sample appears once, or throughout the new
composition. Figure 3·2 provides an example of this raw, detailed data that I’ve col-
lected from WhoSampled. My data from WhoSampled, in aggregate, covers 358,356
cases of reuse in popular music, including cover songs, remixes, direct samples, and
interpolations.9 Such data was previous utilized in Chapter 2 to study copyright’s
9Interpolations are a form of sampling in which the original composition is reused, but the
downstream artist creates their own, new sound recording of the original composition. Rather than
licensing both the composition and the recording, the composition can be licensed and re-recorded
to avoid licensing fees on a master-use license of the original sound recording – though artists may
also choose to re-record the composition to alter the sound and feel. An example of this being Dr.
Dre’s reuse of David McCallum’s “The Edge” in “The Next Episode.”
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affect on reuse and the content of new products. Upon reducing this data-set to
samples and covers that occurred over the duration of my music streaming data, this
data covers 2,180 reuses, consisting of 801 cover versions, 364 interpolations, and
1,015 samples.
Additional artist attributes and measures were collected from the Spotify database.
Follower counts were collected for each artist, along with detailed genre information,
and data on all releases by each artist (e.g., albums, singles, compilations). Spotify
tracks genres at a highly disaggregated level – artists in my data-set are tagged with
several genres, covering 1,186 distinct genres in total, including examples like “funk
rock,” “vegan straight edge,” and “quiet storm.”10 I use Spotify’s release data to
measure when an artist debuted – by the appearance of their first album – as well as
to measure when an artist last released an album.
Due to contractual obligations, Spotify could not provide raw, uncensored stream-
ing counts for artists at the artist-day level. Instead, Spotify provided a normalized
measure of streaming demand, Streamsit, created by dividing streams for artist i in
time t in the U.S. market by the average artist’s streams in the United States during
the period. To aid interpretation of the regression results in Section 3.5 given this
normalization, consider Equation 3.1 below.
ln(Streamsit) = αt + δPostReuseit + εit (3.1)
where Streamsit is the normalized measure of streaming, equal to the count of
streams for artist i in time t, lit, divided by a normalization factor, µ, in this case
equal to the average artist streams during the sample period. With Equation 3.2
below, ln(µ) will be absorbed by the constant term α, thus δ will be interpreted as
the percentage change in lit resulting from a unit-change in PostReuseit.
10With vegan straight edge being a subgenre of punk rock, and quiet storm a popular form of
R&B incorporating jazz and pop influences
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(
lit
µ
)
= ln (lit)− ln (µ) = α + δPostReuseit + εit (3.2)
Summary statistics for the combined data-set are shown in Table 4.1, with vari-
ables split between reused artists and control group artists in Table 3.2. As seen in
Table 4.1, the outcome variable of interest, Streamsit is highly skewed – while the av-
erage is 1.00 due to the normalization, Streamsit reaches a maximum value of 876 for
the artist Drake, implying that on the observed day t, Drake received 876 times the
average listening. Followersi measures the number of Spotify users that have sub-
scribed to updates for artist i, and hence is an alternative measure of popularity on
the platform – that is similarly skewed, with a maximum follower count of 11 million,
compared with an average of∼ 113, 000 followers and a minimum of 0. Approximately
9% of the sample artists were treated with reuse (average of EverReusedi = 0.089), a
result of constructing the data-set – control artists were selected for each reused artist
from Spotify’s “similar artists” feature. It is thus important to note that I am not
observing the universe of artists and songs on Spotify, but rather a sub-population
that is somewhat similar even before econometric matching. Table 3.2 splits the sam-
ple by treatment category, between those artists that are reused (EverReusedi = 1)
and those that are not (EverReused = 0). From this table one can see that the
reused artists are much more popular on average. This is not particularly surprising
given that digital platforms enable distribution of the “long tail” (Brynjolfsson et al.,
2006), and thus the control group will be comprised of many low-popularity artists.
I discuss methods to account for this bias in Section 3.4.
3.4 Empirical Framework and Research Design
With regards to research design and identification for this research question, it is first
useful to consider the ideal experiment used for estimating demand spillovers in reuse
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and derivative works. In the ideal experiment, the researcher would, (1) randomly
select a sample of treatment songs from the population of available songs, (2) create
derivative works based upon them, by appropriating sections of the treatment group
songs in new compositions, and (3) distribute these new musical arrangements to
the relevant market. Then, ceteris paribus, demand could be compared between the
treatment and control group songs by observing changes in online streaming, digital
downloads, and physical media purchases.
Alternatively, the same ideal analysis could be undertaken at the artist level,
rather than the song level. An artist-level analysis may be necessary if spillovers exist
between downstream and upstream artists, and are not confined to the reused-reusing
songs. For example, consider Kanye West’s reuse of portions of Steely Dan’s 1976 hit
song “Kid Charlemagne” in West’s “Champion.” If reuse confers a positive effect,
it may drive more listeners to seek out “Kid Charlemagne,” but it may also drive
consumers to listen to other songs and albums in Steely Dan’s discography beyond
the reused song. Thus, the econometrician would underestimate the effect of reuse if
changes in listening are measured only at the song level, as reuse may spur dramatic
changes in demand for the reused artist’s expanded discography. Second, if reuse
directs positive or negative spillovers to an artist’s broader discography, any reused
artist’s songs could not be used in the control group, or vice-versa, in order to maintain
the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) (Rubin, 1980). These concerns
justify conducting the analysis of potential spillovers at the artist-level, rather than
a song-level analysis.
In this paper, I rely on observational data, and hence cannot turn to the random,
controlled variation from an ideal experimental condition in order to identify the effect
of interest. Rather than specifying and estimating a discrete choice demand model
(e.g., McFadden (1973)), I measure the spillovers to reuse through a reduced-form,
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difference-in-differences design, based upon the specification shown in Equation 3.3.
ln(Streamsit) = X
′
itβ + γt + ζi + δPostReuseit + εit (3.3)
Where Streamsit is a non-negative measure of an artist i’s streams in time t, Xit
is a vector of time-variant controls, γt captures time period effects, ζi an artist-specific
fixed effect, and PostReuseit = 1 for artists in the treatment group once they have
been treated (reused). Thus δ captures the potential positive/negative spillovers that
result from being reused.
Additionally, I combine the differences-in-differences estimator above with a matched-
samples approach to estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT).11
Identification in this setting thus rests on the key assumption of unconfoundedness of
selection into treatment, conditioned on observable characteristics. In my empirical
context, I observe a set of songs that have been reused (as both digital samples and
cover songs), the characteristics of both upstream/downstream songs, the characteris-
tics of both upstream/downstream artists, and a time-series of demand for the artists
that have been reused. In addition, I also observe a pool of artists that have not
been reused during the study time period, characteristics of these artists, and a time
series of demand for each of these “untreated” artists. Dealing with treatment group
selection in the data generating process is the primary empirical challenge in this set-
ting. It is reasonable to be concerned about the proposition that artist’s repertoires
are not randomly selected when derivative works are created, and that this selection
process may be correlated with unobserved characteristics of the artist’s appeal. If
this is the case, the unobserved error term in a regression framework correlates with
the treatment condition, and parameter estimates will hence be biased. I consider
two types of selection problems, (1) time invariant, and (2) time varying.
11See e.g., Azoulay et al. (2010) for examples of prior use of this approach
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Some artists may have a higher baseline propensity of being reused than other
artists. Heterogeneity in prominence between artists exists over time, and this promi-
nence may be correlated with the chance that the artist’s work is used in a new deriva-
tive work. Some artists also have a history of consistent reuse, such as the “Amen
break,” a 6-second section of “Amen, Brother” by The Winstons, a sample that has
been reused over 2,700 times since it was released in 1969.12 This time invariant
selection can be remedied with panel data, as the within estimator – in the form of
an artist-level fixed effect – can control for unobserved-to-the-econometrician, time
invariant characteristics of each artist in the sample.
It is more difficult to deal with potential time-variant selection into treatment,
but I argue that the precise timing of reuse is plausibly exogenous, and rely on
this timing assumption for identification. However, one may still be worried that
career dynamics of an artist influence the propensity that an artist’s works are reused.
Potential dynamic sources of treatment selection could come from examples such as
(a) new artists, rising in popularity, are sampled by downstream artists due their rising
profile, (b) promotional activities (e.g., increased radio airplay) of an upstream artist
remind downstream artists of these works, influencing the chance that the promoted
works are incorporated in downstream innovations, or (c) short lived fads arise in
particular types of sounds and melodies, which are extensively reused during the
fad. All of these examples could result in trend heterogeneity between treatment and
control group, leading to violation of the difference-in-differences central assumption
of parallel trends between treatment and control groups. In light of these concerns,
and in order to bolster the timing exogeneity assumption, I create a matched sample,
matching each treatment-group artist to a closely matched control-group artist based
upon both time invariant and time variant characteristics of the observed artists.
Treatment artists are matched to control group artists in my sample based upon (1)
12http://www.whosampled.com/The-Winstons/Amen,-Brother/ (Accessed 9/1/2017)
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artist genre, (2) artist vintage, and (c) artist popularity trends before treatment.
Combining the assumption of exogenous timing of reuse, this estimation strategy,
and the high-frequency variation of my data, I identify the short-run effects of reuse.
With respect to long-term effects, it is possible that the release of samples and cover
songs begets further reuse of the original song. To the extent that this is true, most
of the long-term effect will be absorbed by the artist fixed effects given the length of
the data-sample. My estimation results with this design may thus arguably under-
estimate any long-run spillovers that arise from reuse. Furthermore, I am only able
to measure potential spillovers in online streaming, but it is possible that spillovers
permeate through other sources of artist revenue, such as concert and merchandise
sales.
To ensure balance between treatment and control groups, I implement matching
between treatment and control artists based upon coarsened exact matching (CEM)
of pre-treatment variables (Iacus et al., 2012). I match artists based upon vintage,
genre, and pre-treatment popularity. In the matching procedure, I coarsen vintage
into the decade that an artist’s first album was released (e.g., 1960s, 1970s, etc.),
disaggregate genre into main genre (e.g., garage rock → rock), and pre-treatment
popularity into percentile rank “buckets.” For each treatment artist, i, I then select
a control-group artist, j, that exactly matches artist i on the coarsened variables. If
many control artists exactly match artist i, the tie is broken by selecting one control
from the potential controls at random. Treated artists are dropped from the matched-
sample in cases where there is no exact match between the treated artist and potential
control group artists.
Three variables were coarsened for use in the matching procedure - genre, vintage,
and pre-treatment streaming. Each artist in the data-set is assigned, on average, 5.17
genres of the total 1,186 observed genres. Exactly matching on this highly detailed
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genre information thus clearly presents a dimensionality problem, as it is unlikely
that any given artist will exactly match the ∼ 5 genres of a focal artist. In order to
tractably match on genre, I hand-code each of the 1,186 genres into one of 18 broader
genres, based upon AllMusic’s genre classification.13 The broad genres include “rock,”
“r&b,” “jazz,” “blues,” “folk,” “avant garde,” and so on. With this coding in hand,
I then count how many times an artist is tagged with each of the broad genres,
and select one genre for each artist based upon the greatest number of tags. An
artist’s “vintage” is coarsened according to the date of their first album debut. For
each artist in the data, I select their earliest album release – and coarsen this to
the decade level. Thus an artists that debuted in 1983 has a coarsened vintage of
“1980s.” Five measures of pre-treatment popularity were coarsened for the matching
procedure. For each artist, rolling averages of log(streamsit) for 5, 10, 25, 50, and 100
days before day t for artist i were calculated. The percentile rank of these measures
were calculated for each day, and then coarsened into 27 “buckets,” with successively
tighter break points approaching the top of the distribution.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Baseline Estimates
First, using an unmatched sample, I consider the average effect of being reused on
the original, underlying artist. Table 4.4 displays the baseline results in which the
dependent variable is log(streamsit), a log-transformed measure of streaming for
artist i on day t, and the main variable of interest, PostReuseit, = 1 for reused
artists after they have been reused. This variable pools both sample and cover songs
in the baseline regressions due to power concerns, while cover songs are separately
considered in Table 3.4. Following the previous discussion in Section 3.4, we can
13http://www.allmusic.com/genres
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interpret the coefficient on PostReuseit as the percent change in raw stream-counts
when artist i is reused. Standard errors are clustered at the artist level.
Column (1) includes no control, and implies an enormous benefit to being reused,
but does not account for treatment-selection issues, or confounding secular time trends
in listening on the platform. Not controlling for these confounders would imply a 243%
boost in streaming resulting from downstream reuse. Additionally, it is well estab-
lished that the time lag between the release date of music and the current date has a
significant impact on its popularity (Waldfogel, 2012), thus in Column (2) I control
for the time since artist i last released an album by including log(since albumit),
measuring the log-transformed days since an artist’s last album release. As expected,
an artist’s popularity dissipates as the time since album release grows and associated
promotional activity dies out. However, even after controlling for this distance in
time, the reuse parameter remains extremely high, implying a 239% increase in pop-
ularity on the platform as a result of downstream reuse. I add an individual artist
fixed effect for the reused artists in Column (3) in order to control for time invariant
selection effects in my estimation. With the addition of this artist-level effect, the pa-
rameter on PostReuseit significantly shrinks in magnitude, from ∼ 240% down to an
estimated 19.8% positive increase in listening – suggesting that an artist’s popularity
has a large role in the propensity that they are reused downstream in cover songs and
sample-based music. I alternatively control for time trends in Column (4), by adding
time fixed effects, in the form of a day-of-week fixed effect to capture cyclical patterns
in streaming throughout the week, and a month-of-year fixed effect to capture secular
time trends on the platform. These potentially confounding time trends appear to
have little effect on the results, as the introduction of the time fixed effects in Column
(4) yields results consistent with the model lacking controls in Column (1). Finally,
I include all fixed effects and control for time since last release in Column (5). This
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fully saturated model implies that reuse, on average, results in a 2.9% increase in
streaming for the reused artist, a result that is significant at the 5% level
To explore cover version vs digital sample heterogeneity, I restrict the treatment
group to artists that were subject to reuse through cover songs, dropping those artists
that were reused through downstream digital sampling. The results of this analysis
are shown in Table 3.4. Column (1) includes no controls, Column (2) adds a control
for time since an artist’s last album release, with Columns (3) and (4) alternatively
controlling for artist and time fixed effects respectively. These results in Columns
(1)-(4) of Table 3.4 are relatively consistent with the analogous columns in Table 4.4,
that is, showing a positive spillover as a result of a downstream cover version release.
However, the positive effect of reuse disappears for cover songs once both artist and
time fixed effects are included in the model. Additionally, the coefficient mean es-
timates appears negative, translating to a 1.8% drop in listening post-reuse, though
this result is not significant at typical levels. Thus if there is any negative effect from
the release of cover songs, it is below the noise threshold in my sample. These results
suggest that cover songs, wherein the entire composition and lyrics of a past song are
reused in a new recording, do not have a significant impact on the consumption of
the reused artist.
In light of the selection effect apparent from controlling for reused artist-level
fixed effects, I further explore this in Table 3.5, where I introduce the dependent
variable EverReusedi, which = 1 if artist i is reused in the data-set, and 0 otherwise.
I collapse the panel to a cross section, by averaging each artists stream measure,
streamsit over all days, t, to yield avg(streamsit).
14 Table 3.5 thus explores, with
linear probability models, how artist popularity, genre, and vintage correlate with the
propensity with which artists are reused downstream. Column (1) includes just the
14Note that avg(streamsit) is endogenous in these regressions – this is the topic of this paper,
and these specific results must be interpreted as correlations.
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streaming measure of popularity, log(avg.streamsit), as across specifications this has
a small, but positive and significant correlation with the propensity of reuse. Similar
results are observed when I include another correlated measure of artist popularity,
the log-transformed count of an artists followers, log(Followersi), in Column (2).
Again, the chance that an artist is reused appears to increase with popularity across
specifications. In Column (3) I explore artist vintage, by including a set of dummies
for the decade of artist debut, with 2010 as the omitted category, while Column (5)
includes genre fixed effects. Interestingly, across Columns (3)-(5), we see that artists
from the 1960s and 1970s are much more likely to be reused, with results from Column
(5) implying that artists from the 1960s are 7.4% more likely to be reused, and artists
from the 1970s 8.3% more likely to be reused than artists from the 2010s. Regression
results also imply that genre also plays a significant role in reuse. Columns (6) and
(7) explore this by comparing the R&B genre category against all other genres –
estimates that imply R&B artists are 8.5%-9.7% more likely to be reused than other
genres of music.
I then contrast the magnitude of the treatment effect, versus the “selection ef-
fect” in Table 3.6. The dependent variable is the log-transformed streaming variable.
Columns (1)-(2) include time fixed effects, while Column (3) adds vintage fixed ef-
fects, and Column (4) additionally includes genre fixed effects. The variables of
interest are PostReuseit as before, which equals 1 for reused artists post-reuse, along
with EverReusedi which = 1 for artists that are part of the treatment group – those
that are reused at any point during the sample period. The results across columns are
fairly consistent, there appears to be a large, positive bias in streaming for treatment-
group artists, that is, treatment group artists have a significantly higher baseline of
listening as compared with artists in the control-group, and this effect is much greater
in magnitude than the treatment effect, assuming exogeneity. These results are not
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unexpected given the procedure for constructing the unmatched-sample. Digital mar-
ketplaces and distribution platforms are known to enable the “long tail” (Brynjolfsson
et al., 2006) – and a large fraction of the ∼ 10, 000 control group artists are relatively
obscure acts that receive minuscule daily demand. In order to ensure comparabil-
ity and balance between the reused artists and the control artists, I then turn to a
matched-sample estimator in the next section.
Matched Sample
A matched-sample, implemented as described in Section 3.4, was used to match each
treatment artist to one closely-related control group artist. In this way, I can ensure
that the treatment group and control group are not observably different ex ante,
and better control for time-variant selection into treatment by matching popularity
trends between treatment and control artists. However, we trade bias for variance,
as the matched-sample is reduced to 652 treatment-control pairs, compared with the
approximately 11,000 artists in the unmatched sample.
Figure 3·3 graphs my estimates of the pre and post reuse trajectory of artist listen-
ing using the matched-sample. The 95 percent confidence interval of these estimates
is overlaid, based on artist-clustered robust standard errors. The model used for this
graph includes a full set of time and artist fixed effects, along with controls for time
since last album. In this model, the treated artist’s streaming rate remains relatively
level compared with the control group from 50 days prior to the day of reuse, and
the error bands show that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the
pre reuse trends. Thus, the reused artists and control artists have similar trends
in listening up to the point of reuse, once conditioned on observable characteristics.
Furthermore, the point estimates in the graph show that reused artists gain an im-
mediate boost in listening upon reuse, with this effect most precise from five to nine
days after reuse, with the error bands from two weeks after exposure to reuse indi-
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cating the noise in my estimates. Part of the variance in my estimates is attributable
to the high-frequency (day-level) of observation, but this level of disaggregation is
also useful for picking up the apparent immediate effect. This graph must also be
interpreted in context – the baseline estimate of reuse’s effect is rather small at 3%.
The results of the baseline regression on the matched-sample are shown in Ta-
ble 4.6, with these results representing Average Treatment Effects on the Treated
(ATT). Column (1) regressed log(streamsit) on PostReuseit without no controls,
and shows a much more modest effect compared with the same regression on the un-
matched sample in Table 4.4, implying an average 9% boost in streaming from reuse
compared to the larger 243% estimate in the unmatched sample. Controlling for time
since last album in Column (2) does not significantly change the significance, but the
point estimate does increase to an implied positive effect of 18%. However, addition
of an upstream artist fixed effect in Column (3) yields statistically significant results
that are comparable in magnitude to the same regression on the unmatched sample,
with an estimated positive effect of 19.5% increase in listening on the matched sam-
ple, compared with estimates of 19.8% on the unmatched sample. Time fixed effects
are included in Column (4), with the fully saturated model in Column (5) suggesting
that reuse results in an average increase in listening of 3% for reused artists. It is
important to note that this estimate is quite consistent with results from the un-
matched sample, where the estimated effect was 2.8% in the fully saturated model.
This consistency between unmatched/matched samples implies that time-variant se-
lection effects are only of minor concern – most of the selection appears driven by
time invariant heterogeneity in artist popularity.
3.5.2 Artist Prominence
With some robust evidence that reuse leads to a positive spillover of an approximate
3% boost in plays, I then explore how this effect is mediated by the prominence of
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an artist. Measuring artist prominence as a function of their followers on Spotify,
I create a measure Prominenti, which = 1 when artist i is in the top 50% of the
followers distribution, and 0 otherwise. Interacting this variable with the previously
used treatment effect on the matched sample produces the results shown in Table 3.8.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.8 omit the artist fixed effect, and we see that these
high-prominence artists receive much greater listening on average, corresponding to an
over 400% increase in listening compared to artists with fewer followers. Conversely,
once I introduce an artist fixed effect in Columns (3)-(5), the negative interaction
between our post-treatment reuse variable and Prominenti points to the moderating
impact of prominence on reuse. Column (3) includes just the main treatment variable,
PostReuseit, along with the interaction effect PostReuseit × Prominenti, without
controlling for time trends, while Column (4) controls for time since last album.
Columns (3) and (4) are rather consistent in inference, with a 22-23% estimated in-
crease in listening, paired with a 4-6% negative moderating effect for high-prominence
artists. In the fully saturated model, Column (5), I find that on average, the artists of
low prominence receive a 6% boost in plays from being reused, but that this effect is
nearly entirely nullified for highly prominent artists, as the interaction of these effects,
PostReuseit × Prominenti, is estimated at negative 5.8%. These results point to an
advertising effect at play, wherein low-prominence artists benefit from the exposure
of being reused, but with the most prominent artists deriving no benefit from the
exposure, having sufficiently saturated the market.
Figure 3·4 separately graphs my estimates of the pre and post reuse trajectory for
artists of high and low prominence. The sample is split by prominence. The left plot,
in blue, displays the effect of reuse for low prominence artists, while the right plot, in
red, for high prominence artists. This figure is based upon the matched-sample, and
95 percent confidence intervals are overlaid based on artist-clustered robust standard
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errors. The model in both graphs controls for time since last album release, along with
a full set of time and artist fixed effects. Rather than the high-frequency day-level
estimates used in Figure 3·3, the effects are estimated at the week level to diminish
variance.
On the left plot of Figure 3·4, I estimate the listening trajectory for low promi-
nence artists before and after reuse. The artist’s streaming rate remains close to zero
relative to the controls from 3 weeks prior up to the week of reuse, and the error
bands overlapping with zero-effect show that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no difference in the pre reuse trends. Thus, once conditioned on observables, the low
prominence reused and control artists display similar trends in listening up to the
point of reuse. However, upon reuse, the artists immediately gain an increase in lis-
tening during the first week post reuse, and this effect remains statistically significant
for four weeks after the reuse date.
These results contrast with the right-hand plot of Figure 3·4, which estimates
the listening trajectory for high prominence artists. Again, I find no difference in pre
reuse trends between the high prominence reused artists and the control artists. After
reuse, however, the high prominence artists receive only a modest boost in listening,
based upon the point estimates, with the error bars implying that I cannot reject
the null hypothesis of no effect. The point estimates then trend toward zero-effect
starting at two weeks after reuse, suggesting that high prominence artists receive
little, if any, positive effect from downstream reuse.
It may also be the case that the popularity of the downstream artist, that is,
the artist that creates the sample-based work or cover song, modulates the baseline
average effect on the treated artists. To explore this, I interact the main treat-
ment effect, PostReuseit with a measure of the downstream artist j’s popularity,
Downstream Followersj. To account for the skewness of Followers, this mea-
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sure is normalized to Mean = 0, S.D. = 1. The results of regressions where
Downstream Followersj is interacted with PostReuseit are shown in Table 3.9. The
results in Table 3.9 are consistent with the estimated baseline effect of PostReuseit on
the matched sample, originally shown in Table 4.6. That is, after an artist is reused,
they gain an approximate 3% boost in listening under a fully saturated model that
controls for artist and time trends. However, from the estimates for the interaction
term PostReuseit × Downstream Followersj, a one standard deviation increase in
the downstream artist’s popularity above the mean essentially doubles the aforemen-
tioned average treated effect for the treated artists. Across models, from Column (1)
to Column (4), a unit increase in Downstream Followersj corresponds to between
an estimated 3.3% to 3.7% boost in listening, in addition to the estimated baseline 3%
increase in listening from reuse. These estimates stress the importance of the market
for the downstream work. Intuitively, when the downstream work has a small, limited
market, it is unlikely to shift demand. But when the downstream market is large, the
fraction of consumers that choose the upstream work due to downstream exposure
produces a significant, measurable increase in demand upstream.
3.5.3 Novel Reuses
Finally, I also explore how this effect differs for artists that have not traditionally been
the target of digital sampling and cover versions. Some artists have been particularly
subject to reuse, such as James Brown, The Winstons, and George Clinton’s related
Parliament and Funkadelic acts.15 Instead, I look at artists that have yet to receive
attention through reuse, by restricting the sample to artists that have previously been
reused one or fewer times. Of course, this restricts the sample size substantially, and
the resulting sample consists of only 73 matched treatment-control pairs. While the
statistical inference in this setting is limited, the results may still be provocative.
15Particularly James Brown’s “Funky Drummer” drum break and The Winstons’ “Amen Break”
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The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3.10. Column (1) includes no con-
trols, Column (2) introduces an artist fixed effect, Column (3) only time fixed effects,
Column (4) includes both artist and time fixed effects, and Column (5) presents the
fully saturated model including controls for time since last album. While the re-
sults are somewhat limited due to the small sample size and limited statistical power,
we observe consistent trends and inference between these results in Table 3.10 with
the previous results in Table 4.6, albeit with greater magnitude in point estimates.
Without controls, Column (1) suggests an insignificant effect, similar in magnitude
to the same regression in Table 4.6. However, once I include an artist fixed effect in
Column (2), the estimate jumps to a significant 30% increase in listening as a result
of reuse. The fully saturated model in Column (5) suggests that reuse leads to a 15%
boost in plays. While that result is significant at only the 10% level, this effect is
quite provocative given that it is 5 times as large as the positive spillover estimated
for the more general matched-sample. If these results hold, it would suggest that
less-targeted artists receive a particularly large benefit from reuse. Thus encourag-
ing downstream reuse of both emerging acts and out-of-spotlight musicians though
permissive licensing may be an effective promotional tool.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
With this research, I have found no evidence that derivative works compete with the
original works that they are based upon. Instead, the release and online distribution
of a derivative work induces a positive effect on demand for the underlying good. This
effect is particularly pronounced for artists that have been reused for the first time,
as well as for low-prominence artists. The positive exposure effect is also significantly
larger for those artists reused by the most popular artists downstream. Derivative
works thus appear to have, on average, a net positive advertising effect for the work
75
reused. Consequently, these results contribute to the debate around the appropriate
balance of rights to derivative works, aims to adapt fair use to the digital age, as well
as providing quantitative evidence to content industry IPR strategy. In particular,
these results speak to the potentially unexpected benefits of a permissive licensing
strategy – that easing licensing terms of music publishers’ and record labels’ catalogs
may actually drum up demand for these under-utilized works. This research addition-
ally may inform licensing negotiations, as I’ve thus far seen no evidence that digital
sampling and cover version licensing deals internalize this positive effect in pricing
and licensing terms.16 That is, when an eminent artist intends to reuse a piece of
music, pricing should incorporate the chance that this downstream reuse will actually
boost the market for the original.
From a policy perspective, the finding of a small, positive effect from downstream
reuse is particularly useful for designing the appropriate balance of copyright in a
cumulative setting. In fact, finding any non-negative effect from downstream reuse
would still be policy relevant as this would imply that reuse causes no economic
harm to the original artist. If reuse does not harm the market for the original,
easing restrictions over reuse should not affect the incentives for artists to create
new works. In the United States, the copyright system is rooted in consideration
for the incentives to create new creative works, with the copyright clause of the U.S.
Constitution granting congress the ability “to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The U.S. constitution does not,
however, justify copyright by considering the profits of the creator or the moral right of
the artist. This focus on economic incentives in the U.S. system contrasts with other
copyright systems, particularly those in Europe, which emphasize the moral rights
16See McLeod and DiCola (2011), Broussard (1991), and Kohn and Kohn (2010) for detailed
discussions of the factors affecting digital sampling license rates. Cover song licensing falls under
statutory rates.
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of the original artist. Many objections to easing reuse restrictions (e.g., through
compulsory licensing) focus on the desire for artists to control the context in which
their work is reused to avoid undesired distortions. However, at least in the United
States, such objections have little basis.
Evidence of these potential positive spillovers is particularly relevant to rapidly
changing content industries. Particularly in the music industry, publishers and record
labels face new threats from digitization. Traditional music industry strategies for
promoting back catalog works, such as the n-th anniversary re-issue box set, are be-
coming less relevant due to digitization and the successive unbundling of content.
Despite this, labels now possess a repertoire covering decades of copyrights on once-
popular music, and these rights are extremely long lived – nearly all sound recordings
will be protected by U.S. copyright until 2067. While labels have many avenues for
promoting currently active artists – through new albums and singles, collaborations
with established acts, and live tours – methods are more limited for promoting dated,
now-forgotten artists. Thus, this research provides a suggestive avenue for monetiz-
ing the rights portfolio of out-of-spotlight artists, and the industry should consider
supporting mechanisms to ease the transaction costs of reuse – through collective
licensing and/or compulsory licensing schemes.17
Finally, these results are also useful for adapting fair use to the digital environ-
ment. Rather uniquely, the copyright policy of the United States includes a fair use
doctrine that permits legal, unauthorized use of copyright-protected material in lim-
ited contexts.18 Fair use is determined in a case by case basis using a four factor test,
with the fourth factor considering “the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.” I have demonstrated in this paper a context in
17See e.g., Menell (2016) detailing how existing copyright compulsory licensing could be expanded
for this context
18Israel, Poland, and South Korea current have small fair use provisions. The European Union
may also be moving towards fair use style exemptions.
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which reuse, on average, has a positive effect on the potential market of the upstream
work, speaking directly to the fourth factor of consideration under fair use.19 As a
balance to copyright’s restrictions of first amendment free speech, the fair use doc-
trine is still quite flawed.20 Due to the necessarily vague statute, any given fair-use
case is subject to the opinions of a judge and jury, such that determining whether a
use qualifies as a fair use ex ante is extremely difficult, if not impossible, even under
guidance from a legal professional. In the cases that a use will be judged to fall under
fair use, a successful defense of this in court is inevitably very costly. And yet, dig-
ital age policies like ’notice-and-takedown’ procedures further threaten fair use with
their ability to be abused to invoke censorship. This paper thus provides provocative
results that contribute to the debate of how to best re-design fair use.
Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean S.D. Min Max
log(Streams)it -3.59 3.13 -10.03 6.76
Streamsit 1.00 6.26 0 876
PostReuseit 0.067 0.25 0 1
EverReusedi 0.088 0.28 0 1
Followersi 113,652 476,558 0 1.14e+07
Since albumit 1,603 2,599 1 19,800
19Although it is the case that the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market,
includes consideration for the effect of the use upon the market for authorized derivative works.
These results do not refute the relevance of this factor, but are intended to aid discussion and
debate of the matter.
20See e.g., Tushnet (2004); Carroll (2007) for a thorough analysis of this point.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics - Continued
EverReusedi = 0 EverReusedi = 1 Total
log(Streamsit) -3.80 -1.43 -3.59
(3.04) (3.17) (3.13)
Streamsit 0.62 4.89 1.00
(2.90) (18.43) (6.26)
PostReuseit 0 0.75 0.067
(0) (0.431) (0.249)
Followersi 74,007 520,108 113,652
(254,737) (1,307,252) (476,558)
Popularityi 37.96 53.37 39.33
(19.40) (20.92) (20.02)
Since albumit 1,602 1608 1,603
(2,594) (2,650) (2,599)
Note: This table displays sample means, with standard deviations in
parentheses, split by reused/control group category. The first column
displays statistics (EverReusedi = 0) for the control group artists,
those artists that were not covered or sampled
. The second column for those artists that were reused through new cover songs or
sample-based music (EverReusedi = 1). Pooled statistics are displayed in the third
column.
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Table 3.3: Baseline Regression: Non-matched sampled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit)
PostReuseit 2.4266
∗∗∗ 2.3947∗∗∗ 0.1983∗∗∗ 2.4209∗∗∗ 0.02876∗∗
(0.104) (0.099) (0.014) (0.105) (0.014)
log(since albumit) -0.4410
∗∗∗ -0.05862∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.002)
Constant -3.7552∗∗∗ -0.7040∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.098)
Artist FE No No Yes No Yes
Day FE No No No Yes Yes
Month FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 4327084 3928784 4327059 4327084 3928774
Robust standard errors, clustered at the artist level, in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in
which the dependent variable is the log-transformed streaming measure
for artist i in time t. Linear regression is used for estimation. Columns
(1) and (2) include no fixed effects, with Column (2) controlling for
the number of days between time t and the last album released by
artist i. Column (3) adds an artist fixed effect, Column (4) includes
time fixed effects in the form of day-of-week and month-of-year fixed
effects. Column (5) includes both artist and time fixed effects, as well
as controlling for time since last album
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Table 3.4: Baseline Regression: Cover Songs Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit)
PostReuseit 3.6635
∗∗∗ 3.4615∗∗∗ 0.1434∗∗∗ 3.6504∗∗∗ -0.01836
(0.167) (0.160) (0.021) (0.168) (0.021)
log(since albumit) -0.4496
∗∗∗ -0.05848∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.003)
Constant -3.7752∗∗∗ -0.6702∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.101)
Artist FE No No Yes No Yes
Day FE No No No Yes Yes
Month FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 4069076 3686099 4069051 4069076 3686089
Robust standard errors, clustered at the artist level, in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in
which the dependent variable is the log-transformed streaming mea-
sure for artist i in time t. Linear regression is used for estimation.
The treatment group is restricted to only those artists that were reused
through cover versions, not digital samples. Columns (1) and (2) in-
clude no fixed effects, with Column (2) controlling for the number of
days between time t and the last album released by artist i. Column
(3) adds an artist fixed effect, Column (4) includes time fixed effects
in the form of day-of-week and month-of-year fixed effects. Column
(5) includes both artist and time fixed effects, as well as controlling for
time since last album
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Table 3.5: Treatment Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
EverReusedi EverReusedi EverReusedi EverReusedi EverReusedi EverReusedi EverReusedi
log(avg. Streamsit) 0.01830
∗∗∗ 0.01554∗∗∗ 0.01821∗∗∗ 0.01485∗∗∗ 0.01085∗∗∗ 0.02316∗∗∗ 0.02318∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
log(Followersi) 0.003661
∗∗ 0.004539∗∗ 0.01896∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
vintage=1960 0.02852∗∗ 0.02502∗∗ 0.07427∗∗∗ 0.04518∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
vintage=1970 0.04449∗∗∗ 0.04017∗∗∗ 0.08337∗∗∗ 0.05853∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
vintage=1980 0.01001 0.005395 0.04661∗∗∗ 0.02743∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
vintage=1990 -0.01129 -0.01601∗∗ 0.01854∗∗ 0.009970
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
vintage=2000 -0.02794∗∗∗ -0.03230∗∗∗ -0.01167 -0.01472∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
R&B 0.09704∗∗∗ 0.08589∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013)
Constant 0.1565∗∗∗ 0.1146∗∗∗ 0.1580∗∗∗ 0.1095∗∗∗ -0.03247 0.1562∗∗∗ 0.1452∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.020) (0.007) (0.021) (0.041) (0.006) (0.008)
Genre FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11671 11589 11671 11589 9473 9474 9474
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays coefficients from linear probability model
regressions in which the dependent variable is a binary variable,
EverReusedi, which = 1 if an artist is the target of reuse in my data-
set, and 0 otherwise. Column (1) includes only log(avg.streamsit) as
a regressor, while Column (2) adds log(Followersi). Columns (3) and
(4) include an artist’s vintage,, their decade of first appearance, as ex-
planatory variables, with the 2010’s group omitted as the base factor.
Column (5) additionally controls for genre fixed effects. Column (6) and
(7) explore the effect of genre by comparing the R&B genre against all
other genres.
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Table 3.6: Non-matched sampled: Treatment vs. Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit)
PostReuseit 0.3062
∗∗ 0.3413∗∗∗ 0.3216∗∗∗ 0.2379∗∗
(0.126) (0.117) (0.117) (0.104)
EverReusedit 2.1459
∗∗∗ 2.0745∗∗∗ 2.1039∗∗∗ 2.0878∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.133) (0.134) (0.121)
log(since albumit) -0.4409
∗∗∗ -0.4500∗∗∗ -0.4138∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vintage FE No No Yes Yes
Genre FE No No No Yes
Observations 4327084 3928784 3928784 3504823
Robust standard errors, clustered at the artist level, in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in
which the dependent variable is the log-transformed streaming mea-
sure for artist i in time t. Linear regression is used for estimation. The
variable PostReuseit = 1 for artists that have been reused. The vari-
able EverReusedi = 1 for artists that are reused at any point during
the sample period. Columns (1) and (2) include time fixed effects in the
form of day-of-week and month-of-year fixed effects. Column (3) con-
trols for time effects, as well as vintage effects – the year of an artist’s
debut. Column (4) controls for time, vintage, and genre.
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Table 3.7: Baseline Regression: Matched Sampled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit)
PostReuseit 0.09511 0.1770 0.1948
∗∗∗ 0.02535∗ 0.03046∗∗
(0.140) (0.132) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
log(since albumit) -0.3636
∗∗∗ -0.05991∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.005)
Constant -1.7424∗∗∗ 0.7557∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.271)
Artist FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Day FE No No No Yes Yes
Month FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 506394 474540 506394 506394 474540
Robust standard errors, clustered at the artist level, in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in
which the dependent variable is the log-transformed streaming mea-
sure for artist i in time t. Linear regression is used for estimation. The
sample is restricted to a matched-sample, wherein each reused artist is
matched to one closely related control-group artist. This procedure re-
duces the sample to 652 such treatment-control pairs. Columns (1) and
(2) include no fixed effects, with Column (2) controlling for the number
of days between time t and the last album released by artist i. Column
(3) adds an artist fixed effect, Column (4) adds time fixed effects in
the form of day-of-week and month-of-year fixed effects. Column (5)
includes both artist and time fixed effects, as well as controlling for
time since last album
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Table 3.8: Heterogeneity: Prominence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit)
PostReuseit 0.08263 0.03121 0.2168
∗∗∗ 0.2322∗∗∗ 0.06103∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.156) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Prominenti 4.4447
∗∗∗ 4.4456∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.125)
PostReuseit × Prominenti -0.1504 -0.1491 -0.04368 -0.06194∗∗ -0.05841∗∗
(0.187) (0.187) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
log(since albumit) -0.05031
∗∗∗ -0.06004∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Constant -3.9373∗∗∗
(0.102)
Artist FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Day FE No Yes No No Yes
Month FE No Yes No No Yes
Observations 505955 505955 505955 474540 474540
Robust standard errors, clustered at the artist level, in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in
which the dependent variable is the log-transformed streaming mea-
sure for artist i in time t. Linear regression is used for estimation. The
sample is restricted to a matched-sample of 652 treatment-control pairs.
The variable Prominenti = 1 when artist i is of “high prominence,”
falling into the top 50% of followers on Spotify. Columns (1) contains
no controls, while Column (2) adds time fixed effects. Column (3) adds
an artist fixed effect, while dropping the main effect of prominencei.
Column (4) adds a control for time since last album. Column (5) in-
cludes a full set of controls for both artist and time fixed effects, as well
as controlling for time since last album
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Table 3.9: Heterogeneity: Downstream Popularity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit)
PostReuseit 0.1957
∗∗∗ 0.02280 0.1985∗∗∗ 0.02919∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
PostReuseit ×Downstream Followersj 0.03308∗∗ 0.03417∗∗ 0.03586∗∗ 0.03698∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
log(since albumit) -0.05019
∗∗∗ -0.05993∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Artist FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day FE No Yes No Yes
Month FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 490,944 490,944 474,540 474,540
Robust standard errors, clustered at the artist level, in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in
which the dependent variable is the log-transformed streaming measure
for artist i in time t. Linear regression is used for estimation. The sam-
ple is restricted to a matched-sample of 652 treatment-control pairs.
The variable Downstream Followersj is a normalized (mean = 0,
S.D. = 1) measure of the downstream, “re-using,” artist j’s follow-
ers. Artist fixed effects across models are at the level of the upstream
artist, i, whose streaming demand is observed on day t. Column (1)
includes artist fixed effects, Column (2) includes both artist and time
fixed effects. Column (3) controls for time since last album and artist
effects, while Column (4) displays the fully saturated model control-
ling for artist and time fixed effects along with time since artist i’s last
album.
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Table 3.10: Heterogeneity: Novel reuse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit) log(streamsit)
PostReuseit 0.1316 0.3219
∗∗∗ 0.05993 0.1168 0.1509∗
(0.434) (0.076) (0.467) (0.084) (0.083)
log(since albumit) -0.1145
∗∗∗
(0.024)
Constant -3.9542∗∗∗
(0.287)
Artist FE No Yes No Yes Yes
Day FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 54817 54817 54817 54817 42744
Robust standard errors, clustered at the artist level, in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in
which the dependent variable is the log-transformed streaming measure
for artist i in time t. Linear regression is used for estimation. The
sample is restricted to a matched-sample, wherein each reused artist
is matched to one closely related control-group artist. The sample is
further restricted to those artists that have previously been reused one
or fewer times. This procedure reduces the sample to 73 such treatment-
control pairs. Column (1) contains no controls. Column (2) includes
an artist fixed effect, while Column (3) contains only time fixed effects.
Column (4) controls for both artist and time fixed effects, while Column
(5) fully controls for artist, time, and time since last album.
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Figure 3·1: WhoSampled: Song-level Information
The WhoSampled.com community provides data on the samples incor-
porated, and reused to create each song tracked in database. This
screen capture displays the raw data covering the samples used in
Beastie Boy’s 1989 song “Car Thief”
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Figure 3·2: WhoSampled: Detailed Sample Information
The WhoSampled.com community provides detailed reuse data for each
song in their database. For the same downstream song shown in Fig-
ure 3·1, details about each reuse are also collected, such as the timing
and extent of reuse, and the elements of the upstream song that were
reused. This screen capture displays the raw data covering Beastie
Boy’s 1989 sample of Funk Factory’s 1975 song “Rien Ne Va Plus”
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Chapter 4
Copyright Enforcement: Evidence from
Sampling
Coauthored with Timothy Simcoe
4.1 Introduction
The enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights is an essential mechanism in IP-
based markets for ideas and expressions. Intellectual property regimes provide IP
owners the standing to litigate their property rights in order to enjoin infringing uses.
The statutes that allow creators and inventors of IP to exclude competitors from
their markets have also given rise to non-practicing entities (NPEs), popularly called
patent and copyright trolls. NPEs are distinguished by their role as intermediaries in
IP markets. Rather than acting as inventors or artists, NPEs target practicing entities
that have committed to an infringing act in a market. Much research on patent
assertion entities (PAEs) argues that NPE activity is societally harmful, raising the
cost to innovate through legal fees and settlement costs while not increasing incentives
to innovate (Bessen and Meurer, 2014). However, opponents of this view argue that
PAEs confer efficiency gains to markets for ideas by facilitating patent exchange
and the licensing of innovations (McDonough, 2006). The vast majority of the NPE
literature has focused on patent trolls (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Bessen et al.,
2011; Cohen et al., 2016), but these studies are limited by their inability to examine
the ex post demand for technology rights asserted by trolls. With data on music
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sampling in this paper, we are able to directly measure the use of litigated IPR in a
manner that is not possible with patents.
Copyright trolling activity has recently increased, incentivized by copyright’s statu-
tory damage provisions and enabled by digital technologies that decrease the costs
of reproducing, distributing, and subsequently identifying infringing content. While
copyright’s statutory damages are intended to avoid burdening rightsholders with
complex or impossible calculations of lost profits from infringement, these same pro-
visions incentivize litigation by NPEs who may have little actual damages from in-
fringement due to their non-practicing nature. Similar concerns regarding NPEs’ im-
pact on economic efficiency, initially raised by the PAE literature, have been applied
to copyright trolls (DeBriyn, 2012; Balganesh, 2013; Sag, 2015). This paper examines
the impact of copyright trolls in the music industry in order to study litigation’s effect
on patterns of re-use for copyrighted material.
We contribute to the NPE debate by providing the first empirical study of copy-
right trolls’ effects on re-use of prior works through a phenomena of “digital sam-
pling.” Digital sampling, henceforth sampling, is the practice of taking a section of a
past sound recording for re-use in a new recording. The commercialization of digital
sampling devices in the 1980s enabled the widespread use of sampling in hip hop
music, in which early samplers held uncertain beliefs over the copyright infringement
or fair use implications of their use. Copyright litigation, in part by the firms stud-
ied in this paper, helped trace the contours of property rights in this context, and
established that most unlicensed sampling in the U.S. will be regarded as copyright
infringement. Our unique ability to observe original source material and subsequent
products that incorporate a given source, or sample, allows us to trace trolling’s ef-
fect on the commercial exploitation of creative material. These results thus help to
distinguish between NPEs’ potential roles as market makers in IP markets versus
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their acquisition and litigation strategies inducing an overall negative effect on the
exploitation of acquired works and technologies.
4.2 Copyright and Patent Assertion Entities
A guiding concern in the patent assertion literature is the extent to which the private
rewards to asserting a given intellectual property right, especially a patent, diverge
from the social value contributed by the invention covered by said patent (Scott
Morton and Shapiro, 2016). To what extent do these concerns extend to copyright
systems? The answer to this question is not immediately clear given that the scope
of a copyright is narrowly defined compared to patent rights, that copyright regimes
typically provide limitations and exceptions to the exclusion right (i.e., assertion
rights) of copyright owners, and that the duration of a copyright is much longer than
that of a patent.
Digital technology innovations over the past several decades have led to an ex-
pansion of activity by patent assertion entities. The internet has decreased search
costs for connecting patent inventors with patent intermediaries, while the rise of
IP-intensive industries that rely upon information and communication technologies
has provided PAEs with ample targets for litigation (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013). These
same technologies have also led to a parallel increase in assertions by copyright own-
ers. Copyright owners and content creators, through use of the internet, may now
easily find an aggregator or assertion entity that will enforce their copyrights. The
decrease in replication costs due to digitization has increased the incidence of re-use,
providing targets for assertion entities. Many uses may fall under fair use, but it is
unclear whether rightsholders consider the context of use before asserting their prop-
erty rights. Search engines, tracking of peer-to-peer networks, and content recognition
software may now also be utilized by asserting entities to identify new digital content
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that infringes their copyrights.
What is a Troll?
Several features of the U.S Copyright Act of 1976 encourage and enable the litigation
strategy of firms specializing in copyright assertion. Under 17 U.S. Code § 501,
the owner of a copyright, or an exclusive licensee to any of the six rights specified
under 17 U.S. Code § 106 may bring action against infringement of any particular
controlled right. The owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights to (1) reproduce
the copyrighted work, (2) prepare derivative works, (3) distribute copies of the work,
(4) to perform the work in public, (5) to display the work in public, and (6) to
perform the work in public via digital audio transmission. The exclusive licensee of
any of these six rights is considered an owner with respect to infringement of the
exclusively licensed right. However, these rights cannot be infinitely divided with
e.g., an exclusive license to bring lawsuits enforcing a copyright. Secondly, plaintiffs
may seek statutory damages from infringement, and need not prove actual lost profits
due to the litigated use.
Lemley and Melamed (2013) separate patent trolls into three distinct business
models, “lottery-ticket” trolls, “bottom-feeders,” and “patent aggregators.” Lottery-
ticket trolls own a potentially high-quality patent that covers an important techno-
logical area, and attempt to assert this patent in court against industry incumbents
towards an end goal of large jury awards for damages. “Bottom-feeders,” on the other
hand, often hold many low quality patents that are at high risk of invalidation in court.
These plaintiffs file “nuisance” lawsuits against a large number of defendants, aimed
at recovering small settlements from many targeted firms under the implicit threat
of high costs of defensive litigation. Even if the defendant is very likely to win these
defendants, it may be cheaper to settle than pay costs of patent litigation. Patent
aggregators, the third type of troll, amass a large numbers of patents and license their
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portfolio to firms under a threat of litigation for those firms that refuse.
Many copyright infringement lawsuits are characterized by creators suing other
creators in an isolated manner, arguing that a particular work of the defending artist
unfairly appropriated or plagiarized the plaintiff’s creations. Regardless of the validity
of the plaintiff’s claims, these lawsuits parallel the lottery-ticket patent lawsuits, as
they often feature a low-profile artist suing a successful artist who is accused of not
giving due credit or royalties to the plaintiff.
Litigation by copyright collective rights organizations (CROs) may resemble the
activity of patent aggregators in several ways. A common form of CRO is the per-
formance rights organization (PRO), a collective that manages licenses and collects
royalties for the performance rights of its members’ copyrights. The American So-
ciety of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), one of three PROs in the
United States, represents over half a million members and more than ten million
associated copyrights. PROs alleviate the transaction costs of connecting potential
licensees with rightsholders, while also solving the multiple marginalization problem
of negotiating separately with each licensor.1 PROs have been criticized for their ag-
gressive copyright enforcement and litigation against potential licensees, often small
businesses, against which PROs leverage their large portfolio of potentially infringed
copyrights.2
Accusations of “sample trolling” have arisen in response to the aggregation and
enforcement of music copyrights against sampling in hip hop and rap music.3 Bridge-
port Music and Tuff City Records, studied in this paper, aggregate and acquire the
copyrights to old musical recordings and compositions that have been heavily used
1e.g., A restaurant that desires to play background music has little use for licensing just one song
to play, but must license a variety of songs with distinct copyright owners.
2https://hudsonvalleyone.com/2012/04/09/popular-open-mic-pay-2k-licensing-shut/
(Accessed 4/25/2018)
3http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/culturebox/2006/11/jayz_versus_the_sample_
troll.html (Accessed 5/3/2018)
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as samples in hip hop music. Many of the lawsuits by Bridgeport and Tuff target
infringing uses of music released a decade or more prior to litigation. This practice
of aggregating copyrights for assertion in mass lawsuits against previously released
works has led to accusations of opportunistic behavior, but these “trolling” labels
have contended that they act as intermediaries in copyright markets.
Content industry trade organizations, like the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) and Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), organized
mass copyright enforcement and litigation against consumer piracy after the advent
of peer-to-peer filesharing networks. Rather than targeting businesses as PAEs do,
these mass lawsuits have often targeted individual consumers accused of piracy and
associated copyright infringement on the internet. Although it has since ramped down
the intensity of its litigation campaign, the RIAA asserted copyrights against more
than 30,000 individuals from 2003 to 2008 via John Doe lawsuits.4 The RIAA and its
members commonly served targeted consumers with pre-litigation letters, demanding
several thousand dollars per work infringed under the threat of statutory damages if
the assertion proceeded to litigation. Despite this, it is unclear that this litigation
campaign was ever intended as a source of profit for the RIAA’s members, or instead
an effort to curb rampant online piracy that had been blamed for slumping music
industry revenues.
Copyright owners and aggregators have taken interest in the nuisance value, and
potential profit, of mass assertion campaigns designed to extract settlement payments
from targets under the threat of costly IP litigation. Copyright aggregators, such
as Righthaven LLC, engage in mass lawsuits filed against hundreds of defendants,
threatening purported infringers with statutory damages unless a settlement fee is
paid (Balganesh, 2013). The nuisance value and leverage that these assertions hold
may be enhanced when defendants are threatened with public exposure for violating
4https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later (Accessed 4/25/2018)
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copyrights of socially stigmatized content – particularly pornography (Sag, 2015).
A distinguishing feature of patent assertions compared to copyright assertions is
the relative risk of unintentional infringement. A firm may develop a new technol-
ogy, unaware that its invention infringes upon the patent rights of past inventors.
This type of “innocent” or unintentional infringement appears much more limited for
copyrightable works, though there is certainly a spectrum of infringement. In some
cases, despite being cognizant of their use of a work, a creator in a copyright regime
with fair use statutes may believe that their use is fair and non-infringing upon the
rightsholder. On the other end, the now commonplace peer-to-peer piracy of works is
almost certainly witting infringement given the press received by the aforementioned
litigation campaigns of the music and movie industries. However, the spread of the
internet and digital technologies that diminish reproduction costs has also led to un-
intentional copyright infringement. Infringing users may be unaware that their use
of a copyrighted work (e.g., stock photos in the case of Luo and Mortimer (2016))
constitutes infringement, they may be unaware of how to obtain a license for a work
they found online, or the infringement may be a consequence of actions by a third
party. For example, a firm may directly contract with a third party that then incor-
porates a copyrighted work into the firm’s product without obtaining the necessary
licenses. But in the digital era, there is also the risk that copyrighted works, or pieces
thereof, may be added to databases without an appropriate license for such use. If
these databases are then continually drawn upon to create new products and works,
widespread unintentional copyright infringement could result.
Who are the targets?
Empirical evidence suggests that patent-owning NPEs preferentially target cash rich
firms (Cohen et al., 2014). Rather than exclusively targeting practicing firms, the
prevalence of digital piracy has led to copyright trolls also focusing upon anonymous
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consumers for statutory damages and settlements (Sag, 2015).5 When firms and
content creators are targeted by asserting firms, it is an open empirical question as
to whether cash rich entities are the preferred targets. Anecdotal evidence, however,
suggests that this may be the case. The independent label Illegal Art bills itself
as “pushing the limits of sample-based music since 1998,” disregarding the potential
copyright infringements incurred in its distribution of sample-heavy albums that each
may contain unlicensed use of several hundred songs.6 Despite Illegal Art’s disregard
for the copyright implications of its releases, it has apparently faced no litigation
for infringement. On the other hand, highly successful rap artists such as Jay Z,
Kanye West, and Drake appear to often face litigation due to allegations of copyright
infringement in their music.7
Do damages regimes matter?
Current damages regimes in copyright and patent policy incentivize litigation by non-
practicing entities. Both patent and copyright policy obviate a need for plaintiffs to
prove that infringement by the defendant led to realized lost profits in the plaintiff’s
market. This is an essential element for many IP intermediaries, as these entities may
derive no revenue from their property rights absent that from litigation, settlements,
and licensing royalties.
The owner or exclusive licensee of a copyright has the option of seeking actual
damages from infringement or, as 17 U.S. Code § 504 stipulates, plaintiffs may in-
stead seek statutory damages. When statutory damages are sought by a rightsholder,
5i.e., before the user record is subpoenaed from their ISP, the target and their ability to pay a
large settlement is unknown.
6http://illegal-art.net/allday/samples.html (Accessed 5/3/2018)
7See, for example,
https://nyti.ms/2sQCZm1
https://www.spin.com/2018/02/kanye-west-solange-copyright-infringement-report/
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/06/17/drakes-fair-use-copyright-victory-music-
copyright-infringement/id=84504/
(All accessed 4/30/2018)
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these awards range from $750 up to $150,000 for willful infringement. Statutory dam-
ages reduce the burden of proof on the plaintiff, and also may allow asserting firms
to inflate settlements to an unreasonable size compared to the level of infringement
(Sag, 2015). On the other hand, seeking actual damages may be quite lucrative with
respect to infringement of music copyrights as discussed in this article, because the
infringed rightsholder may seek the related profits from album sales, digital distribu-
tion, publishing revenue, concert ticket sales, and so forth.
Just as copyright litigation may be incentivized by the prospect of statutory dam-
ages, PAEs need not prove to a court that lost profits were realized from the infringing
use. As many PAEs are non-practicing entities, they may in fact derive no revenue
from commercializing their patents aside from licensing revenue. Instead, PAEs may
seek a reasonable royalty as damages for the infringement of their IP, assuming that
their patents are valid and infringed. In contrast to the copyright regime in the U.S.,
plaintiffs in a patent suit may not request injunctions against infringement, or actual
lost profits.
Scope of Rights
Patents in practice do not guarantee a well-defined property right to exclude infring-
ing uses, but instead provide the right for an owner to attempt exclusion (Lemley
and Shapiro, 2005). Additionally, patent litigation and assertion entities appear less
prevalent in industries in which patent rights are typically not “fuzzy” and property
rights have well defined boundaries – especially the chemical and pharmaceutical in-
dustries (Bessen and Meurer, 2008). In the copyright space, assertion and litigation
may concern cases of explicit copying in whole - e.g., digital piracy of music and
movies. However, the right to exclude is less well defined when a copyrighted work
is incorporated into a new derivative work, or where such use may be considered fair
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use.8 Copyrights may also be successfully asserted even in cases when a prior work is
indirectly imitated or when a new work is merely similar to an old work.9 Copyright
infringement litigation in the U.S. thus often relies upon a standard of “substantial
similarity” to determine whether a new work infringes upon the reproduction rights
of a past copyright.
Despite this, the boundaries of copyright appear well-defined compared to patents.
Copyright claimants cannot use vague claims as a strategy to increase the breadth of
their rights, as can be achieved with patent claims. The invalidation of copyrights also
appear to be rare.10 Whereas a given technology may be covered by a patent bundle
of uncertain size, the mapping between a creative work and its associated copyrights
is very straightforward – any given work has a well defined bundle of rights defined
by statute – though ownership and control of these copyrights can be a source of
fragmentation.
Although copyright boundaries are well defined, the rightful ownership of a copy-
right, and hence standing to sue, can be murky given that copyright ownership is often
fragmented among several parties. To bring legal action against copyright infringe-
ment in the U.S., the party must have an exclusive license to one of the aforementioned
six exclusive rights that is allegedly infringed. Thus the asserting entity must have
full ownership of the asserted right, not just a contract with the rights owner cov-
ering litigation of the owner or creator’s copyrights. These issues have arisen in the
litigation campaigns of copyright aggregators. In Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Un-
derground LLC, Judge Roger L. Hunt determined that Righthaven lacked standing
8See, for example, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) regarding 2 Live
Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison, or Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) regarding Richard
Prince’s appropriation of Patrick Cariou’s photographs.
9See subconscious plagiarism in Bright Tunes Music v. Harrisongs Music, and the finding of
substantial similarity between “Blurred Lines” and “Got to Give It Up” in Williams v. Bridgeport
Music.
10Though we are not aware of statistical evidence so far that demonstrates the incidence of copy-
right invalidations.
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to sue for copyright infringement, as their agreement with the original rightsholder
Stephens Media constituted a contract assigning standing to sue, not an exclusive
license for exploitation of the litigated works. TufAmerica, an aggregator at the core
of this article, faced similar problems asserting music copyrights against the Beastie
Boys’ sampling of songs originally recorded by Trouble Funk. The court determined
that TufAmerica did not have standing in TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond et al, be-
cause while TufAmerica had exclusive licenses with two members of Trouble Funk
covering all rights to their master recordings and musical compositions, TufAmerica
had only an exclusive license to sue from the third remaining member of Trouble
Funk. Without exclusive licenses covering exploitation from all three original copy-
right owners, TufAmerica did not own the copyright in question. Given this issue, it
is an open question as to whether assertion entities preferentially acquire copyrights
with unfragmented ownership, or rights for which exclusive licenses may be easily
obtained.11
Intermediaries
The profitability of NPE’s rests on their ability to act as arbitrageurs in the patent
market. NPEs may purchase patents for low sums compared to the chance, albeit rare,
that the NPE may use this patent to extract up to hundreds of millions in damage
awards (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013). On the copyright side, we are not aware of any work
that demonstrates the typical or average cost to purchase copyrights by aggregators.
Statutory damages for copyright infringement are of relatively small scale compared
to the large sums possible with patent litigation, reaching a maximum of $150,000
per willful infringer. Seeking actual damages may be a more lucrative prospect, given
a plaintiff’s ability to target all related revenue streams to the infringement, but it
11e.g., works-for-hire owned by a corporation may be easier to purchase than a typical musical
arrangement copyright with ownership spread among several artists or their heirs.
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seems unlikely that such awards could compete in scale with the high end of potential
patent damages.
The long duration of copyrights compared to patent rights likely forces the value
of these property rights to depreciate at vastly different rates. Patent rights, with a
term up to 20 years, rapidly depreciate in value. Copyright protection, on the other
hand, may extend for 70 years after death of the author, or up to 120 years for works
made for hire. Despite their long duration, the royalty streams from exploiting a
copyright are likely to rapidly diminish due to consumers often preferring content of
a recent vintage (Waldfogel, 2012). This may present an opportunity for aggregators
to collect copyrights with high litigation value compared to the low practical value to
the original creator.
Research on copyright litigation may help us better understand NPE’s role as
market intermediaries. The ability to identify pieces of copyrighted content in prod-
ucts could enable research to track whether NPEs solely enforce property rights on
existing products, versus the extent to which they help license unproven rights.
4.3 Music Copyright and Sample Trolls
Digital sampling is the practice of re-using segments of prior sound recordings and mu-
sical compositions to create new sound recordings. Digital sampling was sporadically
incorporated in music throughout the 20th century by experimental musicians, but
saw widespread use in popular music with the commercialization of digital sampling
devices in the 1980s, particularly in rap and hip hop music.
The U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 provides the current basis of copyright protection
for musical compositions and phonorecords in the United States. Prior to 1991, unli-
censed sampling of past recordings was rampant in hip hop music due to speculation
that sampling may not infringe on the copyrights of the re-used musical arrangement
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and composition (McLeod and DiCola, 2011). In 1991, however, Biz Markie and
Warner Bros. Records were sued by Grand Upright Music for the unlicensed sam-
pling of Gilbert O’Sullivan’s “Alone Again (Naturally)” on Markie’s album I Need a
Haircut.12 The court’s ruling against Markie and Warner Bros. was the first decision
to recognize digital sampling as copyright infringement. In response, record labels
were forced to scrutinize their artists’ albums for unlicensed sampling, or else face
the risks of costly copyright infringement litigation and the possible loss of all profits
associated with the infringing use. The risk of litigation and the costs of clearing
sample licenses led to a rapid shift away from heavy sample usage in the production
style of hip hop music.
Since Grand Upright, split decisions have added uncertainty to the contours of
copyright law with respect to sampling. In 2001, Bridgeport Music filed action against
infringement of George Clinton’s “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” in N.W.A’s “100 Miles
and Runnin”’ regarding a two-second guitar riff that was sampled from the Clinton
recording and re-used in the background of the song by N.W.A that was released
in 1990. The subsequent 2005 decision of the 6th circuit in Bridgeport Music, Inc.
v. Dimension Films determined that any duplication of a past sound recording, no
matter the length, constituted copyright infringement, thus eliminating a defense
of de minimis use with digital samples. However, in 2016, the 9th circuit rejected
this “bright line” rule by the 6th circuit in VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Madonna Louise
Ciccone, et al., determining that any copying by Madonna of the plaintiff’s song
“Love Break” was de minimis and did not constitute copyright infringement.
The sampling and re-use of a past sound recording currently risks infringing two
discrete copyrights of a previously published song, the copyright of the original sound
recording as well as the copyright of the underlying musical composition. Music
publishers, which typically control the composition rights of their songwriters, have
12Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records Inc.
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historically been much more litigious over unlicensed sampling than record labels,
which typically control the sound recording copyrights of their artists. This difference
in copyright enforcement may be due to the scope of publishers vs. labels. Publishers
oftentimes specialize in a specific discipline or genre of music (e.g., jazz), compared
to major record labels and their more general portfolio of artists, some of which may
also be producing sample-based works.
The “clearance” of a license to sample a sound recording thus entails purchas-
ing a license from two upstream monopolists - the owner of the musical composition
copyright, as well as the owner of the sound recording right. This presents the fa-
miliar “complementary monopolies” problem, as each upstream monopolist may not
consider the other’s pricing decisions when pricing a license for the downstream use.
In practice, sample-using artists oftentimes license only the composition right of a
desired musical section, re-performing the licensed composition to create their own
sound recording in order to to avoid the high costs associated with licensing both
copyrights.
Even if a license is sought to clear a sample, a potential licensee may incur sig-
nificant search costs in locating the appropriate rights holders. Copyright owners are
under no obligation to register or record ownership changes in centralized databases
like the U.S. Copyright Office’s Public Records Database. This feature of the copy-
right system leads to the “orphan works” phenomenon for works whose ownership
cannot be determined or whose owners cannot be contacted – an inefficiency that is
greatly enhanced by the long term of copyrights, extending decades past a creator’s
death. The lack of a maintained database of registrations and transfers could also al-
low rights assertion entities to “ambush” infringing users who desired a license, could
not identify rightsholders, and naively re-used a work.
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Sample Trolls: Bridgeport Music and Tuff City
Bridgeport Music, Inc. was founded in 1969 by Armen Boladian, who also created the
related Detroit based independent record labels Eastbound Records and Westbound
Records. Westbound achieved moderate success in the 1970s with the signing of
George Clinton’s Funkadelic band as well as a brief record deal with The Ohio Players
in between their stints at Capitol Records and Mercury Records. Samples of George
Clinton, the Ohio Players, and similar funk musicians were instrumental in developing
the sound of west coast hip hop music. In particular, samples of Clinton’s Parliament
and Funkadelic groups (affectionately known together as “p-funk”) gained widespread
sampling use in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the rise of the “g-funk” (gangsta-
funk) sound.
On May 4, 2001, Bridgeport Music, Inc. filed approximately 500 claims of copy-
right infringement against all of the major music labels for rap and hip-hop songs
that were alleged to contain unlicensed samples of copyrights controlled by Bridge-
port Music. Many of the alleged infringing works, such as N.W.A.’s “100 Miles and
Runnin,” had been originally released during the early stages of hip-hop’s history,
over a decade prior to Bridgeport’s litigation. This wide litigation campaign resulted
in Bridgeport’s popular categorization as a “sample troll.”
Bridgeport and Boladian control the rights to the majority of George Clinton’s
work and his various related acts, including songs by Parliament, Funkadelic, Parlet,
and the Brides of Funkenstein. The Bridgeport controlled works by Clinton were
heavily sampled well before Boladian’s litigation campaign, and many of Clinton’s
songs have been individually re-used and sampled hundreds of times, including Clin-
ton’s “Atomic Dog,” a song that has seen re-use through almost 300 new songs. Since
first observing the interest in re-purposing his works, George Clinton appeared in pub-
lic to be generally open and encouraging of sampling, such as through his release of
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“Sample Some Of Disc – Sample Some Of D.A.T,” a CD that features sample-ready
instrumental portions from a selection of previously-unreleased funk songs.
The control of the the rights to Clinton’s early work has been subject to great
dispute. Clinton denies the veracity of a March 1982 contract and a subsequent
December 1983 addendum to the contract that transferred copyrights interests from
Malbiz Music, Clinton’s music publishing arm, to Boladian and Bridgeport Music.
Clinton has claimed in court that these agreements were materially altered by Bola-
dian and that his signature was forged. Since then, these agreements have also been
featured in Clinton’s bankruptcy proceedings as well as disputes over a Michigan
farm that Clinton purchased in 1980. Although Clinton has achieved some success in
reclaiming master recording rights to a few of his albums, the majority of the P-funk
publishing catalog is still controlled by Bridgeport Music.13 Bridgeport’s continued
ownership of Clinton’s catalog is almost certainly short lived, as Clinton has since
filed terminations under 17 U.S. Code § 203, actions that will revert the contested
copyrights to Clinton over the next several years.
Tuff City Records is an independent New York City record label founded by Aaron
Fuchs in 1981. Fuchs originally focused on early New York hip-hop music, releasing
albums in the early 1980s by Spoonie Gee and The Cold Crush Brothers. Since then,
Fuchs has shifted focus, and today bills the label as “rescuing thousands of blues,
jazz, funk, soul and R&B treasures from obscurity.”14 Tuff City acquired this catalog
of blues, jazz, funk, soul, and R&B over time, most notably with their acquisition
of The Honey Drippers’ 1973 “Impeach The President,” a song that has now been
sampled in over 700 new sound recordings. Fuchs has purchased licenses to build his
copyright portfolio in other frequently sampled works, including songs by the band
Trouble Funk, and attempted to litigate copyrights against popular artists like the
13i.e., Bridgeport still controls the composition copyrights.
14http://www.tuffcity.com
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Beastie Boys and Kanye West, albeit with mixed success.
While some have characterized Tuff’s acquisition and litigation of copyrights in
past vintage music as opportunistic rent-seeking, Fuchs has denounced this claim,
“I have to contend with this clown Davey D’s assertion that I bought records with
break beats so that I could sue people. Everything I did was based on the notion
that hip-hop would last.”15
4.4 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the effect of copyright litigation on the magnitude of re-use, we employ
the following model:
Samplesit = δ PostTreatit +
∑
αtyeart +
∑
βisongi + εit
Where Samplesit is a count of the number of newly released songs that sample
song i in year t, PostTreatit = 1 for songs that are under the influence of sample
trolls (discussed below), αt captures year fixed effects, βi captures individual song
fixed effects, and εit represents an idiosyncratic shock.
In an ideal experiment to study the effect of copyright enforcement, the econome-
trician would randomly segregate sampling-prone songs into a treatment group and
control group. The econometrician would then transfer the randomly-selected treat-
ment group of copyrights to NPEs, agents that actively enforce, litigate, and license
copyrights under their control. The exploitation of copyrights in the treatment group
could then be directly compared to the control group.
Contrary to the ideal experiment, we observe copyright trolls endogenously col-
lecting a portfolio of songs over time. This presents two challenges to identification.
15http://fatlacemagazine.com/2007/12/tuff-city-records-part-1-interview-with-
aaron-fuchs/
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First, the copyright trolls are likely selecting and acquiring songs due to the propen-
sity with which they are sampled, as well as the extent to which these songs were used
in past works. That is, copyright trolls are acquiring the most valuable copyrights
with regards to potential profits from litigation and licensing. Second, the acquisi-
tion of these songs coincides with the timing of court decisions that shifted sampling
practices in the industry – though copyright trolls are certainly an important piece
of the mechanism that moved the sampling industry from unlicensed use toward the
current licensing model.
Our empirical strategy also explores two treatment timing assumptions for the
variable PostTreatit. First, we set 2001 as the treatment year for songs in Tuff City
and Bridgeport Music’s portfolio. We use this treatment date as this was the year
that Bridgeport Music began its litigation campaign by filing mass lawsuits against
infringing uses in the music industry. In an alternative set of estimates, we set the
treatment date according to the following rule:
TreatDateit = max
(
ttroll j ’s first lawsuit, tsong i acquired by troll j
)
This rule accounts for the fact that the rights of Tuff City and Bridgeport were
acquired over time, as well as the fact that Tuff City began asserting its portfolio
before Bridgeport.
Matching Procedure
To deal with the trolls’ endogenous selection of high-value copyrights, we employ
a matched-sample approach, where each “treated” song owned by a copyright troll
is matched to an observably similar “control” song.16 Our matching procedure se-
lects one control group song for each treated song (i.e., a one-to-one match) by
16Akin to the approach of Azoulay et al. (2010)
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randomly selecting a song from the same genre and vintage of the treated song
and whose cumulative samples in year 1991 are as close as possible to the treated
song’s cumulative samples at the same point in time. A song’s genre was coded us-
ing the WhoSampled.com genres: Hip-Hop/Rap/R&B, Electronic/Dance, Rock/Pop,
Soul/Funk/Disco, etc. Vintage was coarsened into half decade increments (e.g., 1990,
1995, 2000).
Upon matching each treated song to an observably similar control group song we
maintain the assumption that the sampling trajectory of the treatment and control
songs would not differ absent the ownership by the copyright trolls. This allows us
to causally estimate the effect of copyright trolls on exploitation patterns.
4.5 Data
Sampling data was obtained from WhoSampled.com in February 2016. WhoSampled
provides community-sourced data on the original sources for sample-based music,
cover songs, and remixes. The raw WhoSampled data records information at the
original song – sampling song dyad, including the year of release for both songs, the
songs’ associated labels of release, and the artists and producers for each song. This
raw data also includes qualitative information on each sample, such as the portion of
the original song that was sampled (e.g., drum break, melody, vocals, etc.) and where
the sample was re-used in the new song. Our sampling data includes 61,438 original
songs by 21,688 original artists and 131,332 sampling songs by 32,250 sampling artists.
Data on the portfolios of Bridgeport Music and Tuff City Records was collected
from several different sources. Bridgeport provides an online catalog of albums at their
website, bridgeportmusicinc.com. All songs by these artists in the WhoSampled
database were located in the online US Copyright office’s registration and recorda-
tion database at copyright.gov. The earliest date on which a song’s copyright was
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transferred to Bridgeport Music or Westbound Records was used as the date of ac-
quisition. For songs that could not be found in the copyright office’s database, the
online BMI repertoire, repertoire.bmi.com, was searched to confirm that Bridge-
port is the publisher for the copyright, and the song’s original date of publication was
used as the date of acquisition. Bridgeport’s original song portfolio in our data is
concentrated among just a few artists, with 166 songs in total owned by Bridgeport,
43 of these performed by Parliament, 47 by Funkadelic, and 15 by The Ohio Players.
Data on Tuff City’s portfolio was collected by querying the copyright office’s
database for releases and recordations where Tuff City and/or TuffAmerica were
named as a party. For all transfers between Tuff-labels and an artist, the first date
at which a song appeared in a copyright transfer or publication agreement with Tuff
was used as the date of Tuff’s acquisition. Compared to Bridgeport, Tuff’s portfolio
is much less concentrated. Tuff has ownership interests in 49 songs in our data, with
the most frequently observed artist, Trouble Funk, representing just seven of these
songs.
Summary statistics for the estimation sample are shown in Table 4.1. These
statistics come from the panel before one-to-one matching, therefore containing many
“control” songs for each song in a copyright troll’s portfolio. The sample is restricted
to a window from 1987 to 2010.
4.5.1 Results
Selection Stage
Logit regressions exploring the selection of the copyright trolls’ portfolios are shown
in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, at years 1991 and 2001 respectively. It is apparent that both
Bridgeport and Tuff are acquiring and retaining songs in their portfolio that have
previously been subject to extensive use through digital sampling. Bridgeport Music’s
portfolio is heavily biased towards Soul / Funk / Disco music due to their early
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acquisition of the George Clinton rights, apparent from the negative coefficients across
genres when Soul is the omitted category.
The raw matched-panel trends in sampling of Bridgeport’s songs are shown in
Figure 4·1. Usage of Bridgeport’s copyrights grows from the late 80s into the early
90s, coinciding with the g-funk style of hip-hop music popularized by Dr. Dre and
associated acts on Death Row Records. By the late 1990s, the use of Bridgeport
samples appears roughly comparable in magnitude to control group songs, but appears
to drop further in the raw data after Bridgeport’s litigation in 2001.
Analogous trends in the matched-panel data for the sampling of Tuff City’s songs
are shown in Figure 4·2. The trajectory for sampling of Tuff’s music follows a com-
parable trend to Bridgeport’s copyrights in Figure 4·1. Sampling of Tuff grows up
until the early 1990s, before falling through the mid-1990s into the 2000s. In con-
trast to Bridgeport, Tuff’s portfolio is less outlying than Bridgeport’s, with the mean
sampling of Tuff’s portfolio actually below that of controls, at least until 1993.
Difference in differences analysis
Table 4.4 displays the results of differences-in-differences regressions on the full sta-
tistical sample in which the dependent variable, samplesit, counts the number of
times a song was released in year t sampling song i. Columns (1) and (2) define the
treatment year of copyright trolls’ songs as 2001, the year that Bridgeport filed mass
lawsuits against infringing labels. Columns (3) and (4) instead define the treatment
date according to the following rule.
TreatDateit = max
(
ttroll j ’s first lawsuit, tsong i acquired by troll j
)
All columns include year-level fixed effects. Column (1) includes the treatment
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variable of interest, PostTreatit, which = 1 for songs in Bridgeport and Tuff’s port-
folio in years after 2001, as well as Treatedi, which = 1 for all songs owned by
Bridgeport or Tuff. According to Column (1), trolls’ songs on average are used in
0.64 fewer songs as a result of the 2001 mass litigation, but these songs on average
have a higher baseline of sampling, with 0.74 more samples per song on average com-
pared to control-group songs after controlling for year effects. The treatment effect
from copyright trolls remains stable when song fixed effects are added in Column (2),
implying an average 0.63 decrease in the number of times song i is sampled, while also
controlling for year-level fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) vary the treatment date
using the aforementioned rule, with Tuff’s first copyright assertion lawsuit in 1991,
Bridgeport’s in 2001. In Column (3), the significance of the post-treatment measure
drops out, while the positive and significant effect on Treatedi remains. Column (4)’s
estimate for the effect of copyright trolling is similar in magnitude to Column (2),
but the estimate shrinks to 0.52 fewer samples per song.
A graphical depiction of these difference-in-differences results are shown in Fig-
ure 4·3. We observe an increase in the incidence of sampling for trolls’ songs compared
to control group songs leading up to the treatment date – here defined as the date
of the Grand Upright ruling in 1991 – before a subsequent decline in the re-use rate
for those songs in the trolls’ portfolio compared to controls. However, given the clear
pre-trend in the sampling trajectory for the treatment group compared to the control
group, we should be concerned that the parallel-trend assumption of our difference-
in-differences estimator is violated.
We further employ a matched panel approach due to the apparent imbalance
between treated songs, those acquired by copyright trolls, and control group songs.
Each treated song owned by Tuff City or Bridgeport Music is matched to a control
group song by matching over song genre, vintage, and the nearest neighbor in terms
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of cumulative past samples at year 1991.
Logit regressions were run on the matched-panel in order to estimate selection-
into-treatment. These results are shown in Table 4.5. In comparison to Table 4.3, we
see that there is no significant difference in cumulative past samples for songs in the
treatment group compared to the control group. When the sample is restricted to Tuff
City (Column 2) or Bridgeport (Column 3), we still do not observe any significant
imbalance on sampling between the treatment and control group songs.
Linear estimation results on a matched panel, where each treatment group song
is matched to one control song, are shown in Table 4.6. All columns include year
fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) define year 2001 as the year of treatment, while
Columns (3) and (4) vary the treatment date as previously described. In Column
(1), we observe no statistically significant difference between treatment group and
control group on the Treatmenti variable, indicative of appropriate balance between
treatment and controls. However, while the point estimate for the treatment effect
translates to 0.12 fewer samples as a result of trolling, this effect is insignificant at
typical levels. This statistically insignificant treatment effect remains when song-level
fixed effects are added in Column (2). No significant effects of copyright trolling are
observed in Columns (3) and (4), implying that if trolls do exert a negative effect
on the exploitation of works, any such effect is below the threshold of noise in our
statistical sample. We also estimate the same specifications on the matched panel
using poisson regressions, and observed no consistent statistically significant effect of
copyright trolling with the results in Table 4.7.
Pre-trends and a graphical exploration of the matched-panel treatment effects are
shown in Figure 4·4. In contrast to Figure 4·3, we observe no strong, statistically
significant pre-treatment trend in the sampling trajectory of copyright trolls’ songs
compared to the matched control group songs. However, we also observe no statisti-
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cally significant post-treatment change in the exploitation rate of the treated songs
compared to controls. In fact, after treatment, the trolls’ songs appear to have a
slight increase in sampling according to the point estimates, but these estimates are
insignificant at the 5% level, and these point estimates have attenuated to zero by
five years post-treatment.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine copyright trolls’ acquisition and litigation of popular music
copyrights in order to explore their impact on the supply-side use and re-use of digital
samples. While it appears at first glance that these trolls exert a negative impact
on the exploitation of a copyright under their control, these results do not remain
once identification is carefully considered. Under our matched-panel approach that
accounts for trolls selecting the most valuable songs, we cannot reject the null of
no effect on re-use due to copyright assertion by the trolls. That is, when songs
controlled by Bridgeport and Tuff are matched to similar control-group songs, we do
not see any differential impact for those songs in the treatment group. However, this
is not definitive evidence that assertions by Bridgeport and Tuff did not negatively
affect the exploitation of these songs in the marketplace. While it is difficult to glean
much information from this type of statistically null result, we can conclude that if
there is an effect of trolling, it is not large enough in magnitude to distinguish it from
the statistical noise in our sample.
Despite the statistical null result from the main troll treatment effect estimation,
this study does provide avenues for further research. Future work may further explore
how copyright litigation has affected demand for inputs in music sampling. At a
broader level, research could investigate the economics of copyright intermediaries –
the cost of purchasing copyrights, success rates of litigation by intermediaries, what
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types of firms and producers get targeted with litigation, and estimates of average
settlements and damages awarded from litigation.
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Figure 4·1: Sampling of Bridgeport vs Control Songs
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Figure 4·2: Sampling of Tuff City vs Control Songs
0
1
2
3
4
m
ea
n 
of
 sa
m
ple
s
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
None Tuff
117
Figure 4·3: Pre and Post Copyright Troll Effects: Unmatched Sample
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Figure 4·4: Pre and Post Copyright Troll Effects: Matched Sample
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics: Estimation Panel
Mean S.D. Min Max
Year 1999.64 6.80 1987 2010
Age 19.53 10.55 1 41
Samplesit 0.14 1.07 0 195
Total Samplesi 1.95 13.46 0 1615
Trolli 0.005 0.07 0 1
Note: This table displays summary statistics from the pre-matching
estimation panel
Table 4.2: Selection Regression: Year 1991
Logit
(All) (Tuff City) (Bridgeport)
Trolli,1991 Trolli,1991 Trolli,1991
ln(Cumulative Samplesi,1991) 0.54
∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.52∗∗
(0.06) (0.11) (0.07)
ln(Agei,1991) 0.31 0.68 0.14
(0.21) (0.39) (0.24)
Hip-Hop / R&B 2.46∗ 2.42∗ -3.80∗∗
(1.03) (1.04) (1.04)
Jazz / Blues -0.68 -3.93∗∗
(1.43) (1.00)
Other 0.02 -3.25∗∗
(1.13) (0.51)
Rock / Pop -0.58 -3.87∗∗
(1.24) (0.71)
Soul / Funk / Disco 3.41∗∗ 1.15
(1.02) (1.07)
Observations 35,822 16,011 33,526
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in
which the dependent variable is is a binary variable which equals one if
song i is controlled by a copyright troll in year 1991. Logistic regressions
are used in each column.
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Table 4.3: Selection Regression: Year 2001
Logit
(All) (Tuff City) (Bridgeport)
Trolli,2001 Trolli,2001 Trolli,2001
ln(Cumulative Samplesi,2001) 0.50
∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.50∗∗
(0.05) (0.11) (0.06)
ln(Agei,2001) 0.75
∗∗ 1.47∗∗ 0.34
(0.27) (0.48) (0.31)
Hip-Hop / R&B 2.37∗ 2.43∗ -3.79∗∗
(1.03) (1.03) (0.77)
Jazz / Blues -0.56 -3.98∗∗
(1.43) (1.00)
Other 0.43 -3.06∗∗
(1.11) (0.46)
Rock / Pop -0.37 -3.87∗∗
(1.23) (0.71)
Soul / Funk / Disco 3.61∗∗ 1.31
(1.02) (1.05)
Observations 47,083 23,795 42,848
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in
which the dependent variable is is a binary variable which equals one if
song i is controlled by a copyright troll in year 2001. Logistic regressions
are used in each column.
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Table 4.4: Baseline Regression: Unmatched sampled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
samplesit samplesit samplesit samplesit
PostTreatit -0.64
∗∗ -0.63∗∗ -0.32 -0.52∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.12)
Treatedi 0.71
∗∗ 0.59∗∗
(0.21) (0.15)
Song FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,054,340 1,054,340 1,054,340 1,054,340
Robust standard errors, clustered at the song level, in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions
in which the dependent variable is the number of times song i
was sampled in year t. Linear regressions are used in each col-
umn. The treatment date is varied between Columns 1-2 and
Columns 3-4. In Columns 1-2, the treatment year is 2001. In
Columns 3-4, the treatment date is calculated as TreatDateit =
max
(
ttroll j ’s first lawsuit, tsong i acquired by troll j
)
. For Tuff,
ttroll j ’s first lawsuit = 1991, while for Bridgeport it is 2001.
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Table 4.5: Matched Panel Balance: Year 2001
Logit
(All) (Tuff City) (Bridgeport)
Trolli,2001 Trolli,2001 Trolli,2001
ln(Cumulative Samplesi,2001) 0.05 0.05 0.06
(0.08) (0.13) (0.08)
ln(Agei,2001) -0.76 -1.80
∗ -0.34
(0.54) (0.76) (0.70)
Hip-Hop / R&B 0.16 0.03 -2.14∗∗
(1.45) (1.46) (0.81)
Jazz / Blues 0.42 0.26
(2.02) (1.42)
Other 0.34 0.33
(1.57) (0.72)
Rock / Pop 0.43 0.25
(1.75) (1.01)
Soul / Funk / Disco 0.30 -1.23
(1.43) (1.45)
Observations 421 248 372
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in
which the dependent variable is is a binary variable which equals one if
song i is controlled by a copyright troll in year 2001. Logistic regressions
are used in each column. The sample is restricted to the one-to-one
matched panel of treated songs to control songs.
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Table 4.6: Matched Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
samplesit samplesit samplesit samplesit
PostTreatit -0.12 -0.12 0.43 0.09
(0.26) (0.26) (0.48) (0.25)
Treatedi 0.06 -0.18
(0.31) (0.27)
Song FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,047 10,047 10,047 10,047
Robust standard errors, clustered at the song level, in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in
which the dependent variable is the number of times song i was sam-
pled in year t. Linear regressions are used in each column. The
sample is restricted to the one-to-one matched panel of treated songs
to control songs. The treatment date is varied between Columns 1-
2 and Columns 3-4. In Columns 1-2, the treatment year is 2001.
In Columns 3-4, the treatment date is calculated as TreatDateit =
max
(
ttroll j ’s first lawsuit, tsong i acquired by troll j
)
. For Tuff,
ttroll j ’s first lawsuit = 1991, while for Bridgeport it is 2001.
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Table 4.7: Poisson Matched Panel Regression
Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4)
samplesit samplesit samplesit samplesit
PostTreatit -0.36
∗ -0.35 1.03 -0.08
(0.19) (0.18) (1.04) (0.24)
Treatedi 0.07 -0.19
(0.36) (0.31)
Song FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,047 9,305 10,047 9,305
Robust standard errors, clustered at the song level, in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in
which the dependent variable is the number of times song i was sam-
pled in year t. Poisson regressions are used in each column. The
sample is restricted to the one-to-one matched panel of treated songs
to control songs. The treatment date is varied between Columns 1-
2 and Columns 3-4. In Columns 1-2, the treatment year is 2001.
In Columns 3-4, the treatment date is calculated as TreatDateit =
max
(
ttroll j ’s first lawsuit, tsong i acquired by troll j
)
. For Tuff,
ttroll j ’s first lawsuit = 1991, while for Bridgeport it is 2001.
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Chapter 5
Recording Copyright Term and the
Supply of Music
Coauthored with Megan MacGarvie and John McKeon
Copyright law grants exclusive rights to exploit a creative work for a set time period,
and is thought to promote the creation of new works by incentivizing authors and
artists. Ex post changes in the duration of copyrights after the work has been created,
however, have been controversial. The most prominent recent example of a copyright
term extension the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 extended
the term of US copyrights to the life of the author plus 70 years, or 95 years after
publication. Some have argued that postponing the expiry of copyright many decades
in the future has a negligible impact on the present value of the stream of revenues
derived from a copyrighted work, and creates little additional incentive for creation
(Akerlof et al., 2003). Moreover, empirical research suggests that such extensions
restrict the availability of copyrighted material (Heald, 2014a; Reimers, 2018).1
This paper examines the effects of copyright on the availability of recorded mu-
sic, using as identifying variation an extension that took place during the lifetimes
of many of the affected artists. In 2011 the UK enacted Directive 2011/77/EU (Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2011), which extended
1The copyrights extended by the Sonny Bono act are scheduled to lapse in 2019, and a recent
statement by a spokesperson for the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) suggests
there will not be lobbying efforts to further extend terms (Lee, 2018).
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the copyright of sound recordings from 50 years to 70 years.2 This became known as
“Cliff’s Law” since Cliff Richards, not the owner of his songs’ recording rights, was
a major advocate for the extension. We examine the effect of the expiry of sound
recording copyright on the availability of affected tracks both in terms of reissues of
recordings as well as availability on the streaming platform Spotify – by artists pop-
ular in the 1960s. In addition, because artists can use live performances to promote
album sales, we also ask whether artists performed more and/or different songs be-
fore and after the change in the copyright extension, and whether copyright protected
songs are more likely to be performed than songs of the same age for which recording
copyrights have expired.
Results suggest a substantial increase in the number of releases of tracks once
recording copyright expires, relative to tracks of the same age and approximate vintage
remaining under copyright protection. This finding is consistent with prior findings
for books (Heald, 2014a; Reimers, 2018). In contrast to results on sound recordings,
we find a negative effect of public domain status on live performances of songs (after
controlling for year, age and artist fixed effects). The effect is largest for UK-focused
artists. This result is consistent with the idea that artists use performances to promote
sales of recordings. Overall, we obtain mixed results on the effect of copyright term
on supply. Our findings suggest that the UK copyright term extension may lead
to substantially fewer re-releases of physical albums of popular music first recorded
approximately fifty years ago. In contrast, we find no effect of copyright status
on availability on the Spotify streaming platform. However, the term extension is
associated with more live performances of affected tracks, consistent with the idea
that artists may prefer to perform copyrighted tracks as a means of promoting sales
of tracks with higher royalty revenues.
These results point towards the importance of differences in distribution models
2Copyrights on the composition lasted for 70 years before and after the change.
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and licensing arrangements in determining how copyright status affects availability.
This may imply that the ongoing transformation of the distribution of recorded music
away from physical instantiations like CDs and towards internet content platforms like
Spotify may curtail the negative effects of copyright term extensions on the availability
of music.
5.1 Prior Literature
Prior research on copyright in books has found an association between copyright
status and the availability of creative works. Heald (2008a) frames the question of
whether copyright expiry leads works to be under-exploited or over-exploited and
finds that, in a sample of books published between 1913 and 1932, titles first pub-
lished before 1923 (and therefore in the public domain) were available from a larger
number of publishers and were more likely to be in print than books published in
the subsequent decade (which are protected by copyright). Figures in Heald (2014a)
display a discrete drop in availability on Amazon for titles first published in the 1920s,
relative to titles published earlier. Reimers (2018) examines the contemporary prices,
availability, and sales ranks on Amazon for 249 book titles originally published be-
tween 1910 and 1936, and finds that titles published before 1923 are available in 26.5
more editions than titles published after 1923. The effect is largest for paperback edi-
tions, and is only marginally significant for e-books (copyrighted titles are available
2.9 fewer e-book editions, with a standard error of 1.5).
The expansion in supply as a result of copyright expiry has been found to be asso-
ciated with price declines. Reimers (2018) finds that titles in the public domain have
prices that are up to 35% lower on average. Examining an extension of copyright
terms that unintentionally extended terms differentially for titles by dead authors
but not for those by living authors, Li et al. (2018) show that prices of books decline
128
as copyright expiry approaches, and increase substantially for titles affected by an
increase in the term of copyright in 1814 relative to unaffected titles with similar
characteristics. Pollock et al. (2010) find that the UK prices of recordings on CD
whose recording copyrights had expired were significantly lower than the prices of
recordings of approximately the same age still protected by copyright. For example,
using data on CDs from early 2009, they find that recordings originally released in
1954-1958 (and therefore with expired recording copyright) were approximately 30p
less expensive on average than recordings originally released in 1960-1964 (with valid
recording copyrights), though the median prices are the same. In a broader compari-
son of pre-1959 recordings with post-1959 recordings, both average and median price
differences are larger, possibly due to declines in price as copyright expiry approaches
(as seen in Li et al. (2018) and St Clair (2004)).
Other work has focused on the effects of copyright on reuse of copyrighted material.
Heald (2008b) finds no effect of copyright vs. public domain status on the probability
a popular song from the years 1913-32 is used in a movie released between 1968 and
2007, after controlling for time period effects. Heald (2014a) examines a sample of
songs that appear in high-grossing movies listed on imdb.com and boxofficemojo.com
and finds a statistically significant increase in the rate of inclusion in movies when
songs are in the public domain. Heald (2014b) examines the availability on YouTube
of 385 popular U.S. songs recorded between 1919 and 1926, and finds similar rates
of availability for public domain and copyrighted songs (70% for songs in the public
domain and 77% for songs protected by copyright). Nagaraj (2017) finds that digitized
material from Baseball Digest protected by copyright is significantly less likely to
be reused in Wikipedia pages than material from earlier issues not protected by
copyright. This effect is more pronounced for the less popular players. Biasi and
Moser (2018) study the US book republication program during World War II, which
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abrogated the copyrights of German authors, and find an increase in citations to
scientific works made available through the program. Chapter 2 estimates the impact
of broadened copyright policy on re-use in music, showing that strengthening the
scope of copyright reduces the extent of downstream re-use along the intensive margin,
without affecting the propensity of new works to re-use prior work, but also finds that
this negatively impacted the creativity of re-use through less diversity in re-purposed
works.
While several of the aforementioned works show that extending copyright terms
increases prices and reduces availability of affected works, relatively little research
has focused on the impact of extensions on incentives to create new work. MacGarvie
and Moser (2015) study payments to authors by publishers around the time of the
copyright term extension of 1814 and find that payments increased substantially after
the extension, particularly for superstar novelists like Sir Walter Scott. Giorcelli and
Moser (2016) show that Italian states that adopted copyright laws as a result of
annexation by Napoleon in 1801 saw a five-fold increase in the creation of historically
significant operas and a ten-fold increase in the creation of operas still available in
recordings today.
The literature on patent expiry and generic entry in pharmaceuticals has suggested
that, when intellectual property rights are threatened by competition from generics
Ellison and Ellison (2011) or parallel trade Kyle (2011), producers of patented drugs
may engage in strategies to deter entry. Ellison and Ellison (2011) examine drug
companies’ advertising, product offerings, and pricing in the years prior to patent
expiry for a panel of drugs whose patents expired between 1986 and 1992. They find
that levels of some forms of advertising are lower than expected in intermediate-sized
markets, consistent with theoretical predictions of investing less in advertising in such
markets to deter entry. To the extent that live performances are used to promote sales
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of recordings, this paper contributes to our understanding of strategic responses by
holders of intellectual property (IP) to the threat of entry as the expiry of IP rights
approaches.
5.2 Music Copyright and “Cliff’s Law”
In UK copyright law, a piece of recorded music protected by three separate copyrights.
The first is the musical composition which is the musical score, or the pattern of
notes, for the song. The rights to the musical composition are typically owned by the
composer. The second aspect of copyright is the right to the lyrics to the song, which
are treated as a literary work and typically owned by the lyricist. The third aspect
is the sound recording which is the right to a specific fixation or recording of a song.
Performers typically enter into contracts which assign the recording copyright to the
record producer in exchange for a royalty.3 The sound recording can be thought of
as the specific way that the song is performed and recorded. There can be multiple
different sound recordings copyrighted separately for the same song performed in
different ways or by different artists.4
These aspects of copyright law affect various artists and songs in different ways.
Artists who chiefly write and compose their own songs will receive revenues from both
the musical composition and sound recording rights to their music while others may
only receive copyright royalties from the sound recording.
In the UK, the copyright on the musical composition lasts for the author’s lifetime
plus 70 years. However, artists who have others compose and write their music for
them depend on sound recording rights for copyright income. Regardless of the nature
3 Directive 2011/77/EU, section (9). Non-featured performers (i.e. session musicians who play in
the background), who typically received lump-sum payments rather than a royalty, became entitled
to receive royalties 50 years after the recording when the directive came into being.
4“Cover versions” are a common example of sound recordings that are distinct from the original
version’s recording copyright.
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of the benefits to the artist, a third party must pay for recording as well as composition
rights when reissuing music. Labels wishing to reissue and distribute (e.g. on CD)
a recording still on copyright must obtain a license to reproduce the recording from
the label holding the copyright on the “master” recording. Streaming platforms like
Spotify must also obtain licenses from the labels holding recording copyrights.
Copyright in sound recordings – or “records, perforated rolls, and other con-
trivances by means of which sound may be mechanically reproduced” – was estab-
lished in the UK by the Copyright Act of 1911, which limited the term to fifty years
from the making of the recording (Copyright Act, 16/12/1911, Article 19, section
1). In 2011 the UK enacted Directive 2011/77/EU, which extends the copyright of
sound recordings from 50 years to 70 years. This extension is a step towards what
advocates were pushing for but it is still a very short term compared to the United
States, which protects the copyright of sound recordings for the artist’s life plus 70
years. Cliff’s Law extends protection on songs first published in November 1963 or
later.5 Songs published before that date entered the public domain after 50 years.6
The text of the directive states that the motivation for the copyright term exten-
sion is to benefit artists facing an “income gap” at the end of their lifetimes. However,
according to Theofilos (2013), “[m]ost artists who were young and just starting their
careers were systematically forced by powerful record companies into signing deals
5EU member states were required to comply with the Directive by November 1, 2013 (Article 2,
section 1, Directive 2011/77/EU).
6The directive notes that the “rights in the fixation of the performance should revert to the
performer if a phonogram producer refrains from offering for sale in sufficient quantity ... copies
of a phonogram which, but for the term extension, would be in the public domain, or refrains
from making such a phonogram available to the public” (section (8), Directive 2011/77/EU). As
a result of this provision, some labels issued recordings for the first time around the time of the
copyright term extension. For example, in 2012 Sony released in Europe a four-CD set of Bob
Dylan’s recordings titled “The 50th Anniversary Collection: The Copyright Extension Collection,
Volume 1.” A representative of Sony told Rolling Stone that the album was released to ensure
copyright protection on songs recorded before 1963 that had not previously been released: “[t]he
whole point of copyrighting this stuff is that we intend to do something with it at some point in the
future” (Greene, 2013).
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that paid only low royalty rates and effectively forced those artists to relinquish all
other rights to their music.” Theofilos notes that Kretschmer (2011) finds that ap-
proximately 72% of the monetary benefits of term extension will go to record labels,
with only 28% going to artists (and only 4% to artists facing an income gap).
In addition to providing artists with revenue from ticket sales, concert perfor-
mances are also a form of advertising for record releases.7 If artists derive a signif-
icant amount of royalty revenue from sales of recordings, and concert performances
are used to promote sales of these recordings, artists may prefer to perform copyright-
protected songs and rather than public domain songs, as the former generate more
recording sales for the artist. However, if they do not derive significant royalties, we
may not see differences in the rate of performance of the two types of songs. Note
that tracks recorded before and after 1963 have the same status with respect to the
composition copyright, since the term on compositions was already 70 years before
Directive 2011/77/EU. Thus our effects are not caused by differences in the right to
perform the musical composition in public.
Another possibility is that artists whose works fall into the public domain increase
their propensity to tour as a substitute for the lost income from recordings. We thus
look at whether artists perform in concert at all. However, it seems most likely that
concert revenue dominates royalties from recordings.
Consistent with the theory of Ellison and Ellison (2011), the threat of entry may
also reduce incentives to promote tracks as copyright expiry approaches. If this effect
is substantial, we can expect to see a relative decline in performances of tracks ap-
proaching age 50 under the old copyright regime, with this effect disappearing after
“Cliff’s Law” goes into effect.
7Though distribution of recorded music can also increase demand for live performances: Mortimer
et al. (2012) find that digital file-sharing over the internet increases concert revenues for less well-
known artists.
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5.3 Data
In order to identify a set of songs affected by the copyright term extension, we col-
lected all Top 10/20 UK Album charts from 1960 through the end of 1965 from
Officialcharts.com. OfficialCharts provides a top 10 list of UK albums for the first
11 weeks of 1960, whereas for the remainder of 1960-1965 it provides weekly top 20
lists. These charts were then carefully hand-matched to the MusicBrainz database
(musicbrainz.org) to link the artists in the OfficialCharts data to the unique artist
identifiers in the MusicBrainz database. There are 140 artists from OfficialCharts that
match to the MusicBrainz data, and 44 artists that did not appear in the database
or had no relevant releases. Soundtrack albums appearing on OfficialCharts were ex-
cluded, including albums credited to “Original Soundtrack.” “Original Cast Record-
ings,” “Original Broadway Cast,” etc.
Using the sample of artists gathered from OfficialCharts, we then collect all tracks
released by these artists in the MusicBrainz database. We collect: artist name, release
name (e.g., the name of the album/EP), the country of release, the date of release,
the track name (normalized to lowercase and stripping accent marks), the release type
(album/single/ep), whether the track is part of a re-release, and the year of original
release. A track is considered a re-release if there is an exact match for the artist
and song title with a prior date in the database. We retain bootleg releases in some
specifications and drop them in others.
The resulting dataset contains information on 13,363 tracks by 140 artists from
1960 up to and including the beginning of 2017. Year of original recording of these
tracks runs from 1928 to 1975.8 We create a final dataset in which the unit of
observation is at the track-year level, and the key dependent variable is the number
of re-releases of that track i in year t.
8The releases from the 1920s and 1930s are by Louis Armstrong, Bing Crosby, Judy Garland,
Glenn Miller and Frank Sinatra.
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Note we are imputing the original release year from the first observed year of the
recording in our dataset. In order to ensure an accurate observed original year of
release, original release dates were taken from the earliest observed release date in
MusicBrainz data as well as earliest release obtained from the Discogs music database
(discogs.com). Artists in our MusicBrainz data were carefully hand-matched to artists
appearing in the Discogs data, and song names were standardized using the aforemen-
tioned method to merge the two databases. According to the directive, the copyright
term starts with “the fixation of the phonogram or its lawful publication” (section
(3), Directive 2011/77/EU).
Information on the record label is available for 85% of the recordings in our dataset.
There are 753 unique record label names in the data, which makes it somewhat
difficult to identify and track the ownership of recordings, particularly in cases in
which the label is an imprint of or is owned by another major label (e.g., Island
Records, a division of Universal). As a rough estimate, however, we define a “major
label” recording in the following way. If the “label type” field on MusicBrainz classifies
the release as production, original production, imprint, or holding, we classify the
label as a major label. “Reissue Production” labels are the second most common
label type in our database, with 25.2% of releases overall and 61.7% of public domain
releases. The final two types are bootleg productions (0.5% of observations overall,
and 0% of public domain 3.6) and “other” productions (1.2% overall, 3.6% of public
domain tracks), the latter of which includes releases by distributors, publishers, and
rights societies.
There are clear patterns of specialization by label and copyright status of tracks.
The major labels comprise 60.8% of the recordings of songs under copyright protec-
tion, but only 22.9% of the songs in the public domain. The four of these with the
largest shares in the on-copyright sample (Columbia, EMI, Parlophone and Virgin)
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issue 23.1% of the on-copyright recordings, but the same four firms issue only 3.2% of
the public-domain recordings in our sample. In the public domain sample, the four
largest labels (Real Gone Jazz/Real Gone Music, Not Now Music, GO Entertain and
100 Hits) represent 33.4% of tracks in our dataset. The latter four firms release only
1.1% of copyright-protected tracks.
Most of the tracks in the dataset are in CD format. In our final analysis dataset,
74.33% are CDs, 18.52% are released on vinyl, 0.69% are released on digital media,
and 6.46% are released in other formats such as DVD, cassette, etc.
Data are missing on the original release year of the track for 7,796 of 427,786
total observed track releases, and 5,528 of 369,224 observations when the sample
is restricted to official releases. These observations are dropped from the sample.
Country of release is missing for 94,489 of these observations, or 63,066 of 369,224
for official releases. Observations with missing data on country of release and year of
release are dropped from the dataset.
Artist popularity data come from the British Magazine NME’s list of the top 500
albums of all time, as well as Recording Industry Association of American (RIAA)
certifications data for any artists with more than 1 million certified units. 9
Table 5.1 lists summary statistics on the release regression dataset. Figure 5·1
displays the mean reissue count by age and type of release, before and after the
copyright term extension. This shows an unambiguous increase in the number of
re-releases of a track after age 50, except for years after 2013, when the extended
copyright term was in effect. The increase appears to come almost entirely from
non-major labels.
9The NME data were obtained from http://www.nme.com/photos/the-500-greatest-
albums-of-all-time-100-1-1426116 (accessed May 2017), and RIAA data come from https:
//www.riaa.com/gold-platinum/?tab_active=awards_by_artist (accessed May 2017)
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5.3.1 Set List Data
We obtain data on songs performed in concert from www.setlist.fm, a wiki service
on which users post lists of songs performed in concert. We queried this site’s API
for tracks of artists by MusicBrainz ID for all the artists in our reissue database. We
then matched track names listed in MusicBrainz to the performed tracks listed on
setlist.fm. We created a crosswalk of standardized names by parsing out extraneous
characters and standardizing case to match songs between the two datasets. We were
able to collect and match set lists for 92 artists and 256,290 performances of 5,651
tracks.
Table 5.2 reports summary statistics on the set list data. We restrict this data
to songs with original release years between 1930 and 1975 for our analysis. We
create one observation per year that the song could have been performed since 1960
through 2016. We create a count variable containing the number of times the artist
performed the song in that year. The typical song is performed in 15.8% of potential
song-years. We also restrict the data to performances in years before the artist’s last
active year, according to MusicBrainz. After these limitations we have 170,136 song
performances across 81 artists and 2,630 tracks. We flag years where the artist was
on tour according to our set list data so that we are able to run analysis conditioned
on touring as well.
5.4 Estimation and Results
5.4.1 Empirical Model
In order to estimate the effect of copyright protection on the reissues of a song, we
use the following model:
137
YitjA = α0 + α1PDitjA +
89∑
t=1961
βtyeart +
89∑
A=2
γAageA +
140∑
j=2
δjartistj + εitjA
In which the dependent variable is the count of releases of track i by artist j in
year t with track age A. Because the dependent variable is a count, we use Poisson
regression. PDitjA is a binary variable equal to one if the song’s recording copyright
has expired in year t and equal to zero if it is still under copyright protection in year
t.10 yeart is a dummy for release year t and ageA captures the fixed effect of track
age. artistj is the artist fixed effect, representing the separate effect for each of the
140 artists in the data. In contrast to prior studies of copyright term extensions that
performed before-after analyses, the 2013 term extension allows us to control for a
full set of age and year effects.
5.4.2 Results on re-releases: quantity
Table 5.3 displays the baseline results from regressions in which the dependent variable
is the number of UK re-releases of track i in year t. Standard errors are clustered by
artist. Column (1) includes no controls, and the incidence rate ratio (IRR) on the
PD dummy variable is 2.939 with a standard error of (0.465), which implies a highly
statistically significant increase of 194% in the number of re-releases after recording
copyright expires. Controlling for the age of the track (number of years since original
release) in column (2) increases the estimated IRR to 9.965 (standard error of 2.494),
and adding controls for year of reissue in column (3) reduces the estimate to 2.405
(standard error 0.593, percentage change of 141%). As an alternative to controlling
for age and year, the regression in column (4) controls for original release year and
year of re-release, and results are very similar. Column (6) controls for year of re-
10Following Pollock et al. (2010), we refer to these recordings as being in the “public domain,”
although the composition is still protected by copyright.
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release, age, and an artist fixed effect, and implies a statistically significant increase
of 247%.11 Columns (7) and (8) show that the effect appears to be comparable for
labels designated as major vs. non-major labels, corresponding to a 216% increase
for non-majors, compared to majors with a 233% increase.12
Equivalent regressions were estimated using OLS and Logit, with very similar
results, always implying a large and significant increase in the number of re-releases
after the expiry of recording copyright. OLS results are found in column (9) of
Table 5.3, and imply a 249% increase when songs enter the public domain (relative
to the mean annual number of UK releases of 0.055 displayed in Table 5.1).
Table 5.4 contains several robustness checks on the main result. Columns (1)
and (2) drop bootleg recordings, causing only a slight decrease in the coefficient and
associated IRR for PD. To address potential concerns that the results are driven by
a handful of extremely successful artists, in columns (3) and (4) we exclude the top
5 artists in the sample in terms of number of releases (The Kinks, the Beatles, Eddie
Cochran, Gerry and the Pacemakers, and Four Pennies). Results are once again very
similar to the equivalent columns in Table 5.3. Breaking down releases by format, we
see in columns (5) and (6) that releases on digital format (e.g. MP3) do not experience
the same significant increase at the end of recording copyright as CD releases, with
the IRR for the former implying a positive and large but statistically insignificant
change in releases.
There is a clear and consistent increase in the number of UK re-releases after the
expiry of recording rights. Our controls for age ensure this is not something specific
about tracks older than 50 years (for example, an increase in re-releases due to the
50th anniversary of an album).13 Columns (7) and (8) of Table 5.4 the dependent
11It is not possible to control for age, year, original release year and artist fixed effects because
the artist fixed effect is collinear with the original year effects.
12This includes tracks for which no information on label type is available.
13The Beatles’ Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Heart’s Club Band: Anniversary Edition is a re-release to
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variable is the number of re-releases of track i in year t in the US market. Because
recording copyrights did not expire at age 50 in the United States, we would not
expect to see any significant effect of the PD variable on US re-releases, consistent
with the estimates.
Table 5.5 examines how the effect varies with type of artist. Columns (1)-(3)
includes a dummy for artists with more than 50% of their releases in the UK market,
as well as an interaction with the PD dummy. Although the effect of being in the
public domain appears smaller for UK artists (at the 5% level of significance) in
Column (2) when age and year controls are excluded, once these controls are added
in Column (3) the difference in the effect of copyright expiry for artists with a UK
focus when compared to more global artists is significant only at the 10% level.
We also explore the effect of artist prominence, using two measures: (a) An artist’s
appearance on the NME Top 500 Albums list and (b) having at least 1 million certified
units according to RIAA.14 Column (4) includes the variable NME, equal to one if
the artist appears in the NME Top 500 albums list, with Column (5) interacting this
measure with the public domain variable. Columns (6) adds controls for year and
age. No significant difference in the effect of copyright is apparent for artists on the
NME list. Column (7) includes the RIAA variable, equal to one if the artist has
≥ 1 million certified units. Column (8) interacts this effect with the public domain
measure, while Column (9) adds year and age controls. Once again, the differential
effect of artist popularity on the increase in reissues post-copyright is positive but not
statistically significant.
commemorate the recent 50th anniversary of this album (the opening line of which lends this paper
its title).
14The NME list comes from http://www.nme.com/photos/the-500-greatest-albums-of-all-
time-100-1-1426116 (accessed June 2017).
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5.4.3 Availability on Spotify
An important caveat to the above results is that the data do not include information
on availability of tracks on digital platforms such as Spotify or iTunes, currently the
dominant providers of recorded music. While prior work has quantified the effect of
public domain status in availability in formats with physical distribution formats, less
is known about how copyright affects access to products distributed primarily through
internet platforms. One exception to this is Reimers (2018), who finds that the
negative effects of copyright on availability for e-books are comparable in percentage
terms to the effects for hardcover and paperback, though only statistically significant
at the 10% level (perhaps due to the relatively small number of e-books in Reimer’s
sample). Another is Heald (2014b), who finds that the availability of copyrighted
songs from the 1920s on YouTube is actually somewhat higher than for slightly older
songs in the public domain. This conflicting evidence suggests the need for further
investigation of the effects of copyright status on availability on online platforms.
Why might we expect to see any difference in availability for public domain record-
ings compared to copyrighted recordings? One possibility is that there may be un-
certainty about whether an artist’s original contract with the record label gives the
label the right to distribute it on the internet. While major labels presumably have
little difficulty finding and interpreting their contracts with major artists, agreements
made 50 years in the past between small independent labels and more obscure artists
may be harder to locate and interpret. Knowing that a recording is in the public do-
main in the UK because its date of original recording is prior to 1963 eliminates this
uncertainty for Spotify, and may make it more likely to be available on the platform,
since rights need not be cleared with a label. If it is true that public domain status
increases the likelihood of a track being available on Spotify due to reductions in
uncertainty about the ownership of rights, we would expect this effect to be primarily
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observed among the relatively obscure artists.
We investigate whether tracks in our MusicBrainz samples are available on Spotify,
and if they are, whether there are differences in availability between US and UK
geographic markets. Because there may be differences in demand for tracks pre- and
post-1963, and because we may not have 100% coverage in our match between Spotify
and MusicBrainz, we also compare availability in the UK market on Spotify for songs
first recorded pre- and post-1963 with availability of the same song in the US market
on Spotify. Of the 5,419 tracks in our sample recorded between 1928 and 1962, 72.6%
are available in the US market on Spotify, and 79.5% are available in the UK. For
the 10,934 tracks recorded between 1963 and 1975, 67.8% are available in the US and
71.4% are available in the UK. For the median artist in our sample, 83.33% of the
artist’s tracks are available either in the US or in the UK.15
Figure 5·2 displays the pattern over original release years of the percentage of
tracks available in both the US and UK (on the right y-axis), as well the percentage
of tracks available in the UK but not the US and vice versa. While the percentage
of tracks available in the US but not the UK is relatively constant at around 3%
during this period, the percentage of tracks available in the UK but not the US falls
from 11% prior to 1963 to 6% in 1963 and after. However, in contrast to our results
on re-releases, there does not appear to be a discrete change in 1963, but rather a
gradual decline from 1962 to 1970.
In order to quantify this effect with controls for year and artist effects, we estimate
the following regression model:
15The artists with availability rates below the 5th percentile of 21% are The Big Ben Banjo Band,
Harry Secombe, Paddy Roberts, The Dave Clark Five, The George Shearing Quintet, and Wayne
Fontana and the Mindbenders.
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YijTk = α0 + α1Pre63T + α2Dk + α3Pre63T ∗Dk +
140∑
j=2
δjartistj + εijTk
In which the dependent variable is equal to 1 if track i by artist j recorded in
year T is available on Spotify in market k (either the UK or the US) in 2017. The
dummy variable Pre63T equals 1 if the track was recorded before 1963 (and in some
specifications is substituted for by recording year dummies). To control for overall
differences in availability across markets, we include Dk, a dummy equal to 1 if the
market is the UK. To capture the effects of being in the public domain, we include the
interaction of these two variables, Pre63T ∗Dk which is equal to 1 for tracks in the
UK market released prior to 1963. Because we only observe these tracks in a single
year, we no longer control separately for age and year effects, and instead include in
some specifications dummies for year of original release. We control for artist fixed
effects and cluster standard errors by artist.
We find that sound recordings that have entered the public domain are no more
likely to be available on Spotify than recordings still protected by copyright. Table 5.6
compares the availability in the UK geographic market for songs originally released
before 1963 with the availability of the same songs in the US geographic market.
Our results suggest that sound recordings released before 1963, (and hence in the
UK public domain), are approximately 3% more likely to be available for streaming
in the UK than in the US (where the sound recording has not fallen into the public
domain) but that this difference is statistically insignificant at the 5% level.16 This
small and statistically insignificant difference is of limited economic significance when
compared to our results covering copyright’s impact on physical releases. The contrast
between this and previously discussed findings may reflect variation in the way licenses
16Recordings made before 1972 are not covered by federal copyright law, but rather by state law,
which according to Brooks (2005) implies that these recordings will enter the public domain in 2067.
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to copyrighted recordings are obtained in different distribution formats. When, for
example, reissue labels seek to license a copyrighted recording for a CD release, the
reissue label has relatively little bargaining power in contrast to Spotify, currently
one of a small number of dominant providers of digital music. Spotify’s business
model is based on offering access to vast catalogues of tracks, and to enable this has
entered into deals which gave record labels large advances on royalty payments and
an 18% equity stake in the company in exchange for clearing the labels’ recording
copyrights (Cohen et al., 2015). These advances can be recouped by Spotify against
usage/streams, with royalty payments subtracted from the total advance.17
A possible caveat to this finding is that we have restricted our analysis to artists
that appeared on “top twenty” lists in the early sixties. It may be that tracks by
artists that are more obscure than the ones in our sample benefit substantially by
entering the public domain due to a reduction in uncertainty over licensing rights.
This could imply a significant increase in availability for these artists. However,
examining obscurity within our sample in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 5.6, we do
not find any impact of recording copyright expiry on the digital availability of the
songs of more obscure artists.
It may also be possible that while availability is relatively unaffected by public
domain status, actual consumption of tracks is affected. Since Spotify does not have
to pay royalties for the recording copyright for public domain tracks, they may have
an incentive to promote consumption of them over copyrighted tracks. If Spotify
privileges tracks with expired recording copyrights on suggested playlists, we may see
higher consumption of these tracks than would otherwise be observed.
17A 2011 contact between Spotify and Sony specified a $25 million advance for the
first two years of the agreement, with a $17.5 million advance should Sony agree to a
third year. (https://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/leaked-sony-spotify-contract-
reveals-inner-workings-of-streaming-music-20150521 accessed 2/7/2018)
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5.4.4 Set list results
Results on public performances of songs are found in Table 5.7. Data are restricted
to years in which the artist was active, to tracks with an original release year in
1975 or earlier, and to performances in 1960 or later. In some columns we estimate
effects separately for UK and non-UK artists. Our hypothesis is that performances
by UK artists will be more affected by changes in copyright, because demand for their
recordings is affected more than demand for recordings by artists with a more global
focus.
We see a negative but insignificant effect of a track being in the public domain
when age and year controls are excluded in Column (1), but once we control for
year and age in Column (2), we see an IRR of 0.140 on the Public Domain dummy,
significant at the 1% level, which implies a reduction of 86.0% in the number of
performances.18 Adding artist fixed effects in column (3) slightly changes the IRR
to 0.477, still significant at the 1% level. When we include the UK artist dummy
and the UK artist × Public Domain interaction and exclude artist fixed effects in
Column (4) we find no significant difference in the effect of Public Domain status on
performances for UK artists. However, after including artist fixed effects in Column
(5), we estimate a significantly bigger negative effect of copyright on performances
for UK artists. The regression in Column (5) implies that songs by UK artists with
recording copyrights in the public domain are performed 77.3% less often than songs
under copyright, whereas songs by non-UK artists in the public domain are played
47.1% less often.
To ensure the results are not driven by the performance decisions of the most
popular artists, Columns (6) - (7) exclude the top 5 artists measured in terms of the
number of performances (The Beach Boys, Bob Dylan, Frank Sinatra, The Who, and
18Results are similar when only controlling for age or for year effects individually.
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The Rolling Stones). Results are comparable to the equivalent regressions in columns
(4) and (5).
If the expiry of copyright has an effect on the artist’s decision to tour, the results
in Columns (1)-(5) combine this effect with any potential effect on the decision of
which songs to perform. Columns (8) and (9) are conditioned on the artist touring
in year t, and therefore isolate the choice of songs. Results are similar to those in
Columns (1)-(5). In column (8) we include performance year, age and artist controls
and estimate an IRR of 0.538, significant at the 5% level, which corresponds to
a 46.2% reduction in the number of performances of tracks in the public domain.
When we estimate the effect separately for UK and non-UK artists by incorporating
the interaction in Column (9), the effect for UK artists is larger, implying an 82%
reduction in performances when the song is in the public domain compared to a 39.4%
reduction for non-UK artists (though the difference in the effect of copyright expiry
for UK artists implied by the interaction term is only significant at the 10% level).
Figure 5·3 displays the average annual number of performances by age and year.
There is a drop-off after age 50 before 2014, and much higher rates of performance
after age 50 once copyright terms are extended.
5.4.5 Qualitative results on re-releases
In addition to its effects on the quantity of re-releases, public domain status may also
have effects on which tracks are combined together into compilations, as well as on the
number of tracks and artists on compilations. Since issuers of a re-release no longer
need to transact with the label holding the recording copyright once a track is in the
public domain, we may expect to see more novel combinations of tracks, that is, the
pairing of artists or tracks on a release that have not previously been paired together.
Alternatively, since the publishing copyright continues to remain in force, we may
not see a significant change in novelty. Lower licensing costs for public-domain tracks
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may also make it possible for labels to include a larger number of tracks on a given
release.
In order to capture this, we compute two alternative measures of novelty based
upon the Jaccard similarity index. The Jaccard index is calculated by dividing the
size of the intersection of two sample sets by the union of the sample sets. First, for a
given release i, we calculate the Jaccard similarity between the set of artists appearing
on release i with the set of artists on each individual release that precedes release i.
We then take the maximum of these values to create our first similarity measure,
Jaccard (artist). A more novel release will have a lower Jaccard index than a less
novel release, and the variable ranges between 0 and 1 with an average value in our
estimation sample of 0.6331, or 0.2944 when solo releases are excluded. Solo releases
always have a Jaccard index of 1, and we set this variable to 1 for an artist’s first
release. Our second measure of novelty computes the Jaccard index across tracks
instead of artists, measuring whether or not the tracks combined on a particular
album have been observed together in the past. We also look at the number of tracks
included on a release as an alternative measure of quality or diversity.
Regression results are found in Table 5.8. The unit of observation is the release
(AKA album), and the dependent variable in columns (1)-(6) is the Jaccard index
for that release, at the artist-combination level for columns (1)-(3), and the song-
combination level for columns (4)-(6). The key independent variable is the fraction of
tracks on the release that are in the public domain at the time of the release. Fixed
effects for the average age of tracks on the release (rounded to the nearest integer)
and year of release are included. We also include controls for the type of label (reissue
or non-reissue) and whether or not a release is a solo release or a compilation.
For the artist-combination Jaccard measure, we find that increases in the fraction
of tracks in the public domain are significantly associated with less novel releases,
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after controlling for year and age effects. These regressions continue to indicate less
novel combinations of artists for releases with a higher fraction of tracks in the public
domain, even after adding controls for solo releases and reissue labels.
However, when we compute the Jaccard index across tracks rather than across
artists, we observe a different pattern. There is no relationship between public do-
main status and originality on average (column 4). However, in the full specification
including the solo dummy and the interaction with the dummy for reissue labels (col-
umn 6), we observe a negative and significant relationship between the fraction of
tracks in the public domain and the Jaccard measure for reissue labels. This im-
plies that the compilations released by reissue labels are more original when a higher
fraction of tracks on the release have recording rights in the public domain.
Columns (7) and (8) also reveal differences in the effect of public domain status
for major labels and reissue labels, when the number of tracks on a release is the
dependent variable. Column (8) shows that reissue labels include more tracks on a
release when a higher fraction of the tracks are in the public domain, but the same
is not true for major labels.
5.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we use the extension of recording copyrights in the UK in 2013 to
examine the effect of copyright status on reissues of recordings, availability on Spotify,
and the number of live performances by artists popular in the 1960s. We obtain
mixed results on the effect of recording copyright term on the supply of music: when
a song enters the public domain, there are more reissues of that song, and there is
some evidence that shorter recording copyright terms may be associated with more
releases of novel compilations. At the same time, recordings in the public domain
are performed less often in concert. This suggests that, when artists are living at the
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time of a copyright term extension, the negative supply effects of the extension on
re-releases may be counteracted by a positive supply response in live performances.
However, given that the artists popular in the 1960s are now in their seventies or
older, this increase in the supply of performances is a temporary phenomenon.
The results about the supply of re-releases are consistent with prior findings about
copyright and the availability of books (Heald, 2008a; Reimers, 2018). The welfare
implications of the effect of copyright on the supply of recordings may be even more
noteworthy because the technology used to consume recorded music when the albums
of the early 1960s were first released is essentially obsolete today. If music is not
reissued in new formats, it may not be heard by typical listeners.19 However, the
shift away from CDs and towards online platforms like Spotify may work in favor
of availability, since we observe no difference in availability between public-domain
recordings and those remaining under copyright. Digital platforms may thus help
moderate the effects of copyright term extensions on the availability of music from
this period.
19In a random sample of 1,500 American recordings released between 1890 and 1962, Brooks
(2005a) finds that 65% of historic recordings are not available to listeners because they are not
reissued by rights holders and because “the physical barriers created by recording technologies
change often and have rendered most such recordings accessible only through obsolescent technologies
usually found only in special institutions.” (p. 14)
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Figure 5·1: Average number of reissues of tracks
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Figure 5·2: Availability on Spotify by year of original release
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Figure 5·3: Average annual number of live performances by track age
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics on Releases
(1) (2) (3) 4
Mean S.D. Min Max
Original Release Year 1963.92 6.358 1928 1975
UK artist 0.12 0.325 0.00 1.00
Year of release 1991.39 15.328 1960 2017
Age of track 27.46 15.725 0.00 89.00
Global releases 0.23 0.933 0.00 87.00
UK releases 0.06 0.317 0.00 24.00
USA releases 0.07 0.389 0.00 42.00
European releases 0.02 0.164 0.00 12.00
UK Major Label releases 0.03 0.204 0.00 13.00
UK Non-major Label releases 0.03 0.210 0.00 24.00
UK CD Releases 0.05 0.285 0.00 24.00
UK Digital Releases 0.00 0.021 0.00 2.00
Public Domain 0.06 0.241 0.00 1.00
N. observations: 1, 001, 480
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics on Set Lists
(1)
mean sd min max
Original year 1964.49 5.715 1930 1975
Performance year 1990.64 15.140 1960 2016
Yearly performance count 1.26 7.171 0.00 178.00
Tour dummy 0.50 0.500 0.00 1.00
Public dummy 0.05 0.207 0.00 1.00
Age 26.15 15.445 0.00 86.00
N. observations: 135,514
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Table 5.3: Baseline Results on Releases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
UK Releases Major labels Non-major Labels UK Releases
OLS
Public Domain 2.939∗∗∗ 9.965∗∗∗ 2.405∗∗∗ 2.935∗∗∗ 2.983∗∗∗ 3.468∗∗∗ 3.328∗∗∗ 3.157∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.465) (2.494) (0.593) (0.292) (0.754) (0.858) (1.152) (0.688) (0.034)
Age Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Year Controls No No No Yes Yes No No No No
Artist Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. obs 1,001,480. Artist clustered robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays incidence rate ratios (IRR) from regressions in which
the dependent variable is the number of UK releases of track i in year t.
Columns (1)-(8) are Poisson regressions, Column (9) is Ordinary Least
Squares, and displays the un-transformed regression coefficients instead
of IRR. Robust standard errors clustered by artist. Column (1) includes
no controls. Column (2) includes a dummy for the age of the track
(number of years since original release). Column (3) controls for year
of release and age. Column (4) controls for original year of release and
year of release. Column (5) controls for year of release, age, and original
release year. Column (6) and (7) controls for year of release, age, and
an artist fixed effect. Column (7) uses a dependent variable Original
Labels, with a count of UK reissues released by original production
labels, with Column (8) uses a dependent variable Non- original Labels
counting only those releases not labeled as original.
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Table 5.4: Robustness of Results on Releases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Drop Bootlegs Drop Top 5 Artists CD Releases Digital Placebo: US Releases
Public Domain 2.366∗∗∗ 3.409∗∗∗ 2.519∗∗∗ 3.205∗∗∗ 3.455∗∗∗ 2.330 0.719 0.902
(0.585) (0.850) (0.600) (0.757) (0.855) (1.728) (0.188) (0.179)
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Artist Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
N 991,993 991,993 966,522 966,522 1,001,480 1,001,480 1,001,480 1,001,480
Exponentiated coefficients; Artist clustered robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays incidence rate ratios from a Poisson regression. In
columns (1)-(6) the dependent variable is the number of UK releases of
track i in year t. In columns (7) and (8), the dependent variable is the
number of US releases of track i in year j. All columns include year
and age fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) exclude bootleg recordings.
Columns (3) and (4) exclude the top 5 artists in the sample in terms of
total releases (The Kinks, the Beatles, Eddie Cochran, Gerry and the
Pacemakers, and Four Pennies). Column (5) counts only UK releases
packaged as physical CDs, while Column (6) counts digital releases in
the UK.
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Table 5.5: Artist Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Public Domain 2.432∗∗∗ 3.105∗∗∗ 2.574∗∗∗ 3.083∗∗∗ 2.919∗∗∗ 2.520∗∗∗ 2.915∗∗∗ 2.451∗∗∗ 2.192∗∗∗
(0.601) (0.512) (0.664) (0.391) (0.323) (0.489) (0.454) (0.381) (0.457)
UK Artist 1.179 1.231 1.224
(0.250) (0.258) (0.260)
Public Domain × UK Artist 0.462∗∗ 0.558∗
(0.146) (0.190)
NME Top 500 2.496∗∗∗ 2.424∗∗∗ 2.459∗∗∗
(0.482) (0.538) (0.557)
NME Top 500 ×Public Domain 1.212 1.102
(0.418) (0.437)
RIAA 1.178 1.110 1.122
(0.219) (0.222) (0.224)
RIAA × Public Domain 1.426 1.303
(0.420) (0.418)
Age Controls Yes No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Year Controls Yes No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
N 1001480 1001480 1001480 1001480 1001480 1001480 1001480 1001480 1001480
Exponentiated coefficients; Artist-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays incidence rate ratios from a Poisson regres-
sion in which the dependent variable is the number of UK re-
leases of track i in year t. Artist prominence is explored us-
ing two measures: (a) An artist’s appearance on the NME Top
500 Albums list (http://www.nme.com/photos/the-500-greatest-
albums-of-all-time-100-1-1426116) and (b) having at least 1 mil-
lion certified units according to RIAA (https://www.riaa.com/gold-
platinum/?tab_active=awards_by_artist). Column (1) includes
the variable UK artist, = 1 if the artist had over 50% of their releases
in the UK. Column (2) interacts this measure with the publicdomain
variable, while Column (3) includes the interaction and controls for
year and age. Column (4) in introduces the variable NME, equal to
one if the artist appears in the NME Top 500 albums list, with Column
(5) interacting this measure with publicdomain, and Column (6) fully
controlling for year and age. Column (7) includes the RIAA variable,
equal to one if the artist has ≥ 1 million certified units. Column (8)
interacts this effect with the publicdomain measure, while Column (9)
controls for year and age.
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Table 5.6: Availability on Spotify
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Available in Market
UK 0.0474∗∗∗ 0.0474∗∗∗ 0.0367∗∗∗ 0.0367∗∗∗ 0.0474∗∗∗ 0.0367∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
pre-1963 0.0911∗∗∗ 0.0749∗∗ 0.0631∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.029)
pre-1963×UK 0.0323 0.0323 -0.0538
(0.021) (0.021) (0.076)
Obscure -0.0713∗∗∗
(0.014)
Obscure×pre-1963×UK 0.0215
(0.020)
Artist FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Release Year FE No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 32,704
Artist-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays coefficients from a linear probability model regres-
sion. In all specifications, the dependent variable is a binary variable
that equals 1 if song i is available in geographic market m on the digital
music streaming platform Spotify as of September 2017. The estima-
tion sample is restricted to songs with an original release year before
1975. The independent variable UK equals 1 for observations in the UK
geographic market. Pre-1963 equals 1 for songs with an original release
year prior to 1963. The independent variable Obscure ranges from
0 to 10, with 10 measuring the most obscure (least popular) artists.
Columns (1)-(4) and (6) include artist fixed effects. Columns (4) and
(6) include original year of release fixed effects.
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Table 5.7: Set List Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All Years Exclude Top 5 Artists Touring Years
Public Domain 0.792 0.140∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.606∗
(0.270) (0.042) (0.119) (0.038) (0.142) (0.117) (0.175) (0.129) (0.156)
UK Artist × Public Domain 1.044 0.265∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.286∗
(0.491) (0.125) (0.099) (0.195)
UK Artist 0.418∗
(0.193)
Age Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Artist Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 103792 103792 103792 103792 103792 74802 74802 66461 66461
Exponentiated coefficients; Artist clustered robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays incidence rate ratios from a Poisson regression where
the dependent variable is the number of times a track t was performed
in year i. Column (1) has no controls. Column (2) adds in fixed effects
for age, and year, and Column (3) controls for age, year and artist
fixed effects. In column (4) we control for an interaction of a UK
artist flag with the public domain dummy, as well as the UK artist
dummy. Column (5) adds artist fixed effects and includes the UK
artist interaction. Columns (6) - (7) exclude the Top 5 artists by public
performances: The Beach Boys, Bob Dylan, Frank Sinatra, The Who,
and The Rolling Stones. In Columns (8) - (9), our sample is restricted
to years that the artist was on tour (i.e. the artist has at least one set
list in our data during that year)
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Table 5.8: Novelty of Releases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Jaccard Jaccard Jaccard Jaccard Jaccard Jaccard # #
(Artist) (Artist) (Artist) (Song) (Song) (Song) Tracks Tracks
mean(PublicDomain) 0.144∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.00693 0.0139 -0.0153 3.340 -1.852
(0.048) (0.049) (0.022) (0.036) (0.037) (0.028) (5.027) (4.845)
Reissue 0.0531∗∗∗ 0.00714 0.0210 -0.00233 7.974∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.006) (0.013) (0.010) (1.450)
mean(PublicDomain)×Reissue 0.0484 0.0167 -0.0376 -0.0537∗∗ 20.10∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.019) (0.031) (0.025) (4.920)
Solo 0.701∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ -11.62∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.881)
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,769
Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays coefficients from linear regressions. In Columns (1)-
(3), the dependent variable, Jaccard (artist), is a continuous variable
between 0 and 1 that measures the maximum similarity between the
observed combination of artists on release i, with the combination of
artists on each past release, j. The Jaccard variable decreases towards 0
with novelty, and equals 1 if the exact combination of artists on release
i has been previously observed. Columns (4)-(6) use the Jaccard (song)
dependent variable, which decreases towards 0 with novelty, and equals
1 if the exact combination of songs on release i has been previously
observed. Columns (7) and (8) use the number of tracks appearing on
release i as the dependent variable, while Columns (12) and (13) use
as a dependent variable the number of unique artists appearing on the
observed release. All columns include age and year fixed effects
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summary of the thesis
In this dissertation, I provide four essays on the role of copyright in the reuse of
information and cumulative creativity. In the first essay, Chapter 2, I demonstrate
how a shift in copyright policy caused a decrease in reuse, altering the content of
new products and the trajectory of innovation in the music industry. The next essay,
Chapter 3 provides the natural complement to the previous results. In Chapter 3,
I estimate the economic impact of a reusing product upon the original, and find no
evidence that reusing, derivative works act as substitutes for the original upon which
they are based. Instead, in some cases, reuse appears to confer a positive demand
spillover to the original. Chapter 4, with Timothy Simcoe, shifts focus to examine
the litigation of copyrights. We find that litigation by copyright aggregators does not
appear to decrease the exploitation and reuse of their songs, at least compared to
other popularly reused songs. In the final essay, Chapter 5 with Megan MacGarvie
and John McKeon, we examine the effects of copyright on the availability and supply
of music. We find that copyright expiry causes a significant increase in the supply of
recorded music through the number or re-releases of a song, but a song appears less
likely to be performed in concert when its copyright expires. However, copyright’s
restriction on the availability of recorded music appears mediated by digitization,
with songs protected by copyright no less likely to be available on digital streaming
platforms like Spotify.
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With regards to implications of this research, I have demonstrated that copy-
right policy induces some stifling effects on cumulative creativity and the supply of
information goods. Copyright policy has altered the content of new products by re-
stricting reuse (Chapter 2), but this reuse appears to have limited economic harm on
prior copyright owners (Chapter 3). However, some of the restrictions imposed by
copyright on reuse, in terms of the availability of music, appear negated by digital
technologies and new models of distribution for information goods.
This dissertation focuses upon the reuse of existing information goods, and the re-
sults here do not diminish the potential for copyright to incentivize innovation. While
the empirical estimates of Chapter 3 imply that a copyright regime more permissive of
reuse may not decrease the incentives to innovate, these results do not consider moral
rights of the original author. Policymakers face a challenge in adapting copyright to
the digital era while also balancing copyright’s economic incentives, restrictions, the
deadweight loss of the monopoly it grants, along with considerations for the moral
rights of the author.
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